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Abstract 
Motivated Reasoning and Response Bias: A Signal Detection Approach 
Dries Trippas 
The aim of this dissertation was to address a theoretical debate on belief bias. Belief bias is 
the tendency for people to be influenced by their prior beliefs when engaged in deductive 
reasoning. Deduction is the act of drawing necessary conclusions from premises which are 
meant to be assumed as true. Given that the logical validity of an argument is independent 
of its content, being influenced by your prior beliefs in such content is considered a bias. 
Traditional theories posit there are two belief bias components. Motivated reasoning is the 
tendency to reason better for arguments with unbelievable conclusions relative to 
arguments with believable conclusions. Response bias is the tendency to accept believable 
arguments and to reject unbelievable arguments. Dube et al. (2010) pointed out critical 
methodological problems that undermine evidence for traditional theories. Using signal 
detection theory (SDT), they found evidence for response bias only. We adopted the SDT 
method to compare the viability of the traditional and the response bias accounts. In 
Chapter 1 the relevant literature is reviewed. In Chapter 2 four experiments which 
employed a novel SDT-based forced choice reasoning method are presented, showing 
evidence compatible with motivated reasoning. In Chapter 3 four experiments which used 
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) method are presented. Crucially, cognitive 
ability turned out to be linked to motivated reasoning. In Chapter 4 three experiments are 
presented in which we investigated the impact of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive 
style on belief bias, concluding that cognitive style mediated the effects of cognitive ability 
on motivated reasoning. In Chapter 5 we discuss our findings in light of a novel individual 
differences account of belief bias. We conclude that using the appropriate measurement 
method and taking individual differences into account are two key elements to furthering 
our understanding of belief bias, human reasoning, and cognitive psychology in general.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
Humans reason to make sense of their environment. Doing so involves the application of 
logical rules of variable complexity. Reasoning is required for learning (Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009), related to memory (Heit & Hayes, 2011), necessary for 
argumentation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011) and a major determinant of intelligence 
(Lohman & Lakin, 2009). It necessarily follows that no account of human cognition can be 
complete without an understanding of reasoning. 
There are multiple types of reasoning, the two major ones of which are known as 
induction and deduction (e.g., Heit & Rotello, 2005; 2010). Induction involves the 
computation of beliefs through the generalisation from individual cases. For instance, if 
John has consistently woken up after going to sleep for the past 25 years, he will hold a 
strong belief that he will wake up the next time he goes to sleep. Deduction is concerned 
with the computation of truth based on what we know (or assume) is true. For example, if 
you assume that all humans are mortal and that John is human, then it is true that John is 
mortal. This is a logically valid inference. Deductive inferences are valid if the conclusion 
necessarily follows from the premises according to the classical rules of logic. Valid 
conclusions are true if the premises they are drawn from are true. 
Rationality has been defined as the ability to conform to these logical rules (Stanovich, 
1999). Piaget (1953), for instance, argued that cognitive development from irrational child 
to rational adult involved the acquisition of logical rules (Stenning & van Lambalgen, 
2008). The study of deductive reasoning revealed that, in fact, people erred consistently 
against many of these logical rules (Wason, 1968). Because these structural deviations 
from the logical norm were considered irrational, they were termed biases. This fit in with 
the heuristics and biases approach in judgement and decision making popularised by 
16 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974). One example of such a bias in the domain of deduction 
was studied by Henle and Michael (1956). Their research showed that people who were 
instructed to judge the logical validity of certain types of deductive reasoning problems 
ignored logical rules. Instead, they based their judgements of validity on their prior beliefs 
(i.e., their knowledge of what is true in the world). This influence of prior beliefs on 
deductive reasoning is known as belief bias (Wilkins, 1928). 
Belief bias was considered a particularly interesting example of irrationality in reasoning 
because it suggested that people resort to induction in tasks that require deduction. As 
such, belief bias was extensively studied as a paradigmatic example of irrationality in 
reasoning, although other systematic biases in deduction also occur. Evans, Barston, & 
Pollard (1983) investigated belief bias in three experiments which controlled for the 
impact of these various other reasoning biases. A large effect of validity was found, 
indicating that people could reason deductively – to a certain extent. Two reliable belief 
bias effects were also found. First, people accepted arguments with believable conclusions 
more than arguments with unbelievable conclusions, showing a first component to belief 
bias known as response bias. Second, logical validity and conclusion believability 
interacted, showing that the aforementioned validity effect appeared to be larger for 
unbelievable arguments. This logic by belief interaction was interpreted in terms of people 
engaging in more effortful reasoning for unbelievable arguments leading to increased 
accuracy. This type of belief bias is known as motivated reasoning (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 
1979). 
Many studies have since replicated these two types of belief bias, i.e. response bias and 
motivated reasoning (e.g., Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994; Evans, Handley, & 
Harper, 2001; Morley, Evans, & Handley, 2004; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992; 
Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000; Quayle & Ball, 
2000; Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999). These studies resulted in the development of 
17 
 
numerous belief bias theories. While many of these theories differ in their interpretation 
and explanation of the two belief effects, they all provide plausible explanations for the 
two key phenomena: the effect of prior beliefs on responding and the effect of prior beliefs 
on reasoning.  
In a recent paper, Dube, Rotello, & Heit (2010) have challenged the motivated reasoning 
aspect of belief bias. Dube and colleagues analysed belief bias data using signal detection 
theory (SDT). They argued that a methodological oversight based on an incorrect 
assumption in all the previous work on belief bias led to an incorrect interpretation of the 
logic x belief interaction. On the basis of three experiments they argued that belief bias is 
just a response bias. In other words, beliefs only affect the response stage, not the 
reasoning stage. If their assertion holds true, all belief bias theories that provide a 
psychological explanation to account for the logic by belief interaction are incorrect, and 
much what has been assumed to be true about human reasoning is false. 
In the remainder of this chapter we first introduce deductive reasoning in more detail by 
explaining logical validity, syllogisms, the link between rationality and bias, and a number 
of psychological theories which can account for the empirical findings. Next, we zoom in 
on belief bias by introducing the most viable belief bias theories and the methods which 
have been used to investigate it. Finally, a very recent theory of belief bias known as the 
response bias account is introduced. Given that the justification for the account is firmly 
rooted in SDT, we provide a detailed explanation of SDT after which we explain how it has 
resulted in a theoretical and empirical debate on the status of motivated reasoning in 
belief bias. 
1.2 Deductive reasoning 
Deductive reasoning is an important field of study. It has been argued that without 
deduction, science, technology, laws, social conventions, and culture would not exist 
18 
 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Deduction differs from other kinds of reasoning (e.g., 
induction) in that it is primarily concerned with truth preservation: if the premises of an 
argument are true and the conclusion necessarily follows from these premises, then the 
conclusion is true. However, truth is not identical to logical validity: all true arguments are 
valid, but not all valid arguments are true. Arguments which are valid and which have true 
premises are known as sound arguments (e.g., Thompson, 1996). Much of the research on 
deductive reasoning has used unsound arguments as the general focus of interest lies with 
whether people can draw logically valid inferences. 
1.2.1 Logical Validity and Syllogisms 
An argument is logically valid if its conclusion necessarily follows from its premises 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). For instance, given the premises that “all sentences 
contain words” and that “all words contain letters”, the conclusion that “all sentences 
contain letters” is logically valid because it necessarily follows. A potential alternative 
conclusion that “all letters contain sentences” is invalid given these premises, because it 
cannot follow from them. It is important to note that the semantic content of such a 
reasoning problem is independent of its logical validity. For instance, taking the previous 
valid argument and switching around the terms “sentences” and “letters” would yield the 
following equally valid argument: “all letters contain words”, “all words contain sentences”, 
“therefore, all letters contain sentences”. These types of arguments are known as 
categorical syllogisms (hereafter, syllogisms). 
Syllogisms are deductive arguments originally invented by Aristotle in an attempt to 
devise a formal system of reasoning. A syllogism is a reasoning problem which consists of 
three quantified sentences, two of which are premises and one of which is a conclusion. 
The conclusion is a statement about two end-terms (A and C) which are connected in the 
premises by a middle term (B). Every statement is preceded by one of the following 
quantifiers: All (universal affirmative, abbreviated A), No (universal negative, E), Some 
19 
 
(particular affirmative, I), and Some … not (particular negative, O). The combination of the 
three quantifiers in a syllogism makes up the mood of the syllogism. For example: 
Premise 1: Some artists are beekeepers 
Premise 2: All beekeepers are clowns 
_______________________________________________ 
Conclusion: Some artists are clowns 
The mood of this syllogism is IAI (Some – All – Some). The ordering of the end- and middle 
terms in the premises makes up the figure of the syllogism. According to Aristotle’s 
original notation the syllogism above (A – B; B – C) is in figure 1. In his book Prior 
Analytics, Aristotle originally only explicitly acknowledged three figures, but a fourth 
figure was introduced later. Confusingly, according to modern convention this form is 
known as figure 2, whereas Aristotle’s original figures 2 and 3 are now respectively known 
as figures 3 and 4 (see Table 1.1).  Finally, the conclusion direction of a syllogism can also 
be varied: it can go from A – C or from C – A. 
Table 1.1 
Syllogistic Figure: Old versus New Notation. 
 Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 
Aristotle’s 
convention 
A – B 
B – C 
A – B 
C – B 
B – A 
B – C 
/ 
 
Contemporary  
convention 
A – B 
B – C 
B – A 
C – B 
A – B 
C – B 
B – A 
B – C 
  
In the remainder of this thesis the modern convention is used (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991). Combining the 64 moods with the four figures and the two conclusion directions 
gives a total of 512 syllogisms, of which only 27 are logically valid. 
20 
 
1.2.2 Rationality and Bias 
Originally, syllogisms were of particular theoretical interest because early scholars with an 
interest in human rationality assumed that rationality entailed the capability to reason 
logically, in other words, to think according to normative logical rules. In early research, 
syllogisms were used as a convenient benchmark against which reasoning performance 
could be evaluated, because their logical validity is clearly defined (Henle, 1962). In 
certain experiments, researchers presented people who were unfamiliar with syllogisms 
with a number of syllogistic premises and instructed them to come up with a valid 
conclusion. This is known as the conclusion generation paradigm (e.g., Markovits & Nantel, 
1989). Others presented people with entire syllogisms, including the conclusion, and 
asked them to judge whether the conclusion was valid or invalid. This is known as the 
conclusion evaluation paradigm (e.g., Evans et al, 1983). It soon became apparent that 
regardless of the method used, people did not respond normatively. This caused 
researchers to conclude that people were irrational and that human reasoning was flawed 
(e.g., Stanovich, 1999; 2010). Interestingly, many people made the same mistakes in their 
reasoning. These systematic deviations from the supposed norm were called reasoning 
biases. Even though the idea that people’s reasoning is irrational has been abandoned by 
most researchers (Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Oaksford & 
Chater, 2007; 2009; although see Stanovich, 2010), these so-called biases became an 
interesting topic of study on their own because they can provide insights into the cognitive 
processes behind reasoning (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1990). We now introduce the four 
reasoning biases which all theories of syllogistic reasoning need to be able to account for 
(Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2012). 
The atmosphere effect is the earliest explanation of how syllogistic reasoning is flawed 
(Sells, 1936; Woodworth & Sells, 1935). Participants were instructed to judge the validity 
of a number of syllogistic conclusions. The data revealed that the reasoners did not strictly 
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adhere to the rules of logic as evidenced by their suboptimal reasoning performance. More 
importantly, many participants erred in very similar ways suggesting that they were 
influenced by the mood of the premises: when confronted with negative premises, 
reasoners preferred negative conclusions. If the premises contained the some-quantifier, 
reasoners preferred conclusions also containing the some-quantifier. Finally, if neither of 
these was the case, participants were biased towards accepting conclusions with the all-
quantifier (Begg & Denny, 1969). 
The concept of illicit conversion was formally studied by Chapman and Chapman (1959; 
see also Wilkins, 1928). They re-examined the atmosphere effect by replacing the 
conclusion evaluation paradigm (Sells, 1936; Woodsworth & Sells, 1935) with a multiple 
choice paradigm. Instead of a valid/invalid judgement, participants were presented with 
four possible conclusions and a fifth option that “nothing follows”. Inspection of the error 
pattern revealed that the atmosphere effect could not completely account for the results. 
Instead, the researchers proposed that participants illicitly converted “All A are B” into “All 
B are A” and “Some A are not B” into “Some B are not A”. By treating these premises as 
fully interchangeable, the participants generated an error pattern not explained by 
atmosphere alone. Whereas such conversions are appropriate for “Some A are B” and “No 
A are B”, and even though they may often hold true in daily life, they are logically incorrect. 
A more formal model of illicit conversion has been introduced by Revlis (1975) and tested 
by Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, and Yopp (1980). 
The figure effect is another common bias in syllogistic reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1975; 
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). Participants were presented with two logically equivalent 
pairs of premises, either in figure 1 (Some A are B, All B are C) or figure 2 (All B are A, 
Some C are B). For both pairs of premises they were given the choice between two valid 
conclusions: “Some A are C” or “Some C are A”. Participants strongly preferred conclusions 
in the A-C direction for figure 1 and conclusions in the C-A direction for figure 2. Figural 
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bias was less pronounced in figure 3 and completely absent in figure 4 (see Table 1.1 for 
an overview of the figures). These findings were later confirmed in experiments using 
non-abstract problem content and a conclusion generation paradigm (Johnson-Laird & 
Steedman, 1978). 
Matching bias is a well-known phenomenon in several deduction tasks (Evans, 1972; 
Evans & Lynch, 1973). Applied to syllogistic reasoning, it makes the same predictions as 
the atmosphere effect, but for more sound theoretical reasons (Wetherick & Gilhooly, 
1995). According to Wetherick and Gilhooly, qualitatively distinct subgroups of reasoners 
exist in any syllogistic reasoning task. One group attempts to apply logic to solve the 
syllogisms and manages to do so relatively successfully. A second group also attempts to 
apply logic, but is not successful in doing so. A final group of participants does not attempt 
to apply logic, but instead uses a simple matching heuristic to reach an answer. According 
to the matching hypothesis, these participants only endorse conclusions that are in the 
same mood as the most conservative quantifier. The “No”-quantifier is the most 
conservative one and the “All”-quantifier is the least conservative one. The “Some”- and 
“Some…not”-quantifiers are equally conservative and lie in between the other two.  As 
such, both premises need be affixed by “All” in order for a conclusion using the “All” 
quantifier to be endorsed, whereas a single “No”-quantifier in either of the premises leads 
to the preference of a “No”-quantified conclusion. Importantly, this research introduced 
the powerful idea of different subgroups of reasoners doing qualitatively different things, 
a concept that will be explored further on in this dissertation. 
1.2.3 Syllogistic Reasoning Theories 
Syllogisms are often used as a means of investigating how people draw inferences. Given 
the heavy focus on this argument type, a viable theory explaining how people reason about 
syllogisms is required. Such a theory should be able to account for all the reasoning biases 
introduced in the previous section in a psychologically plausible way. We now introduce 
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the four major classes of syllogistic reasoning theory: mental logic, mental models, verbal 
reasoning, and probability heuristics. 
Mental logic is the idea that deduction through the use of logic is a fundamental human 
ability hard-wired into the brain (Rips, 1994; Braine & O’Brien, 1991; 1998; Braine & 
Rumain, 1983). According to mental logic reasoners engage in mental proofs using the 
rules of logic in order to determine the logical validity of deductive arguments such as 
syllogisms. This idea is rooted in the developmental theory of Piaget (1953) which 
assumed that as children grow up, they become more rational because they acquire an 
understanding of the relevant logical rules. One strong point of the mental logic tradition 
is the development of a computational model (PSYCOP) which is able to reason with 
syllogisms using predicate logic (Rips, 1994). Unfortunately, the model cannot 
convincingly account for the structural reasoning biases introduced above, limiting its 
usefulness. In order to solve this caveat, more recent iterations of the mental logic theory 
have become less rigorous in their assumptions, allowing for instance the inclusion of 
reasoning schemas which are influenced by prior knowledge (Braine & O’Brien, 1998). 
Currently, the idea that people possess a built-in mental system for deduction which 
conforms to the normative rules of logic has mostly been discredited (Evans, 2002; 
Elqayam & Evans, 2011). 
Mental models theory (MMT) breaks with the mental logic tradition by arguing that people 
do not rely on built-in logical rules to reason. According to MMT, people construct mental 
models of the premises which they then use to deduce valid conclusions (Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984). These so-called mental models consist of mental 
tokens which represent the categories in the reasoning problem. Note that MMT is 
agnostic on the nature of these mental tokens (e.g., whether they are visual or symbolic). 
MMT posits a three-step process to explain how people reason about syllogisms. First, 
reasoners construct a model of the premises representing the current state of affairs. For 
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instance, consider the premises “some artists are ballerinas” and “all ballerinas are cooks” 
the following mental model might be constructed:  
artist = ballerina = cook 
artist = ballerina = cook 
  ballerina = cook 
Second, reasoners attempt to come up with a true and informative conclusion that holds in 
the model of the premises which has been constructed so far. For instance, given the 
model of the premises above, the tentative conclusion that “all artists are cooks” might be 
drawn, because in this mental model all of the artists are also cooks. Third, when such a 
conclusion is found, reasoners will attempt to falsify it by constructing alternative models 
of the premises. The reasoner might construct for instance the following model of the 
premises as an alternative to the first one: 
artist = ballerina = cook 
artist = ballerina = cook 
artist     
From this model, it can be seen that the initially drawn conclusion that “all artists are 
cooks” no longer holds, given the counterexample of the artist which is not a cook. Instead, 
the only valid conclusion given these two possible models of the premises is that “some 
artists are cooks”. In a conclusion evaluation paradigm where the participant has to judge 
the validity of a conclusion, a conclusion is considered invalid if a model which falsifies the 
conclusion can be found. If no such conclusion can be found, the reasoner considers it valid.  
In contrast to mental logic, MMT can account for the syllogistic reasoning biases (Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984). For instance, in the first stage of reasoning, figural bias drives the 
construction of the initial model, potentially affecting reasoning performance: if the 
reasoner does not search for counterexamples and if the initial model contains an invalid 
conclusion, it will be incorrectly accepted. One important aspect of MMT is that syllogisms 
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vary in the amount of models that must be constructed to determine their validity. A 
syllogism such as “all artists are ballerinas”, “all ballerinas are cooks”, “therefore, all artists 
are cooks” is known as a one-model problem, because there is only one available (relevant) 
model of the premises: 
artist = ballerina = cook 
artist = ballerina = cook 
artist = ballerina = cook 
 
 In the third stage, considering the generated counterexamples will be more difficult for 
syllogisms for which multiple models of the premises are available compared to ones that 
only allow for a single model of the premises, potentially due to the fact working memory 
constraints limit the amount of models which can be simultaneously considered (Johnson-
Laird & Bara, 1984). This could then lead to structural errors that might be predicted by 
atmosphere, illicit conversion and matching (if for a different reason). One of MMT’s 
strengths lies with its ability to account for various types of deduction problems such as 
conditional inference, relational reasoning, and meta-deduction (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991), making it a useful and plausible framework in the quest to account for human 
reasoning. MMT appears to be very good at explaining the syllogistic reasoning data 
patterns (Khemlani & Johnsson-Laird, 2012), but its account of conditionals is a lot less 
plausible in light of alternative ones such as for instance the suppositional theory of 
conditionals (Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005; although see also Barrouillet, Gauffroy, & 
Lecas, 2008). 
The verbal reasoning theory (VRT) is a syllogistic reasoning theory also based on the 
mental models framework (Polk & Newell, 1995). According to the VRT, instead of 
searching for counterexamples, people reason by semantically encoding and re-encoding 
the premises. In line with the mental logic account’s PSYCOP, Polk and Newell wrote a 
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number of computer programs of increasing complexity (VR1 – VR3) which generate 
putative conclusions based on an implementation of the linguistic encoding process which 
they propose underlies syllogistic deduction. The major difference between MMT and VRT 
is the absence of a falsification strategy rooted in the generation of counterexamples for 
the latter. Research, however, indicates that participants can search for counterexamples 
and occasionally do so (e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1990).  
The probability heuristics model (PHM) of syllogistic reasoning breaks with all the theories 
above by replacing the framework of traditional logic concerned with the computation of 
validity, with a probabilistic framework rooted in normative Bayesianism concerned with 
the computation of probabilistic- or p-validity (Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Oaksford & 
Chater, 2007; 2009). An argument is p-valid if its conclusion is less uncertain than its 
premises. Within this alternative normative framework, PHM proposes five heuristics 
which can account for typical syllogistic reasoning data patterns.  
The first three heuristics focus on the generation of conclusions. First, the min-heuristic 
states that reasoners will use the least informative quantifier of the premises as the 
conclusion quantifier when generating conclusions. Ranked from most to least informative 
we have All > Some > No > Some…not. Second, according to the p-entailment heuristic, the 
second most preferred conclusion quantifier is one which is probabilistically entailed in 
the original conclusion. For instance “no dogs are animals” probabilistically entails that 
“some dogs are not animals”. Third, the attachment-heuristic states that reasoners 
determine the direction of the conclusion by looking at the subject of the premise with the 
least informative quantifier. If the subject of this so-called min-premise is an end-term (so 
either A or C), reasoners will use this term as the subject of the conclusion. If the subject of 
the min-premise is the middle term, reasoners will use the end-term of the max-premise 
as the subject of the conclusion. The final two heuristics are used by the reasoner to assess 
their confidence in the generated conclusions. According to the max-heuristic people are 
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more confident in the generated conclusion if the quantifier of the max-premise (i.e., the 
premise with the most informative quantifier) is more informative. For instance, if the 
max-premise uses the all-quantifier as opposed to the no-quantifier, people will be more 
confident in the conclusion. Finally, the some…not-heuristic states that people will avoid 
producing or accepting some…not conclusions because they are so uninformative.  
The p-validity framework in which the PHM is rooted shares some strengths with MMT. 
For one, the concept of p-validity can also provide plausible explanations for other types of 
tasks typically studied in the deduction paradigm, such as conditional reasoning. The 
major difference is that according to the PHM, participants engage in probabilistic 
reasoning rather than deduction (although there is some mention about probabilistic 
deduction in the new paradigm of reasoning, e.g., Evans &  Over, 2012). The fact that the 
PHM also applies to statistical syllogisms using non-traditional quantifiers such as “Most” 
and “Few” is also a useful addition. Furthermore, PHM salvages the idea of human 
rationality by substituting the normative framework, suggesting that participants operate 
probabilistically. A negative point of PHM is the fact that according to the some…not-
heuristic, participants should completely avoid accepting some…not conclusions due to 
their low informativeness. Yet, many of the most important experiments on syllogistic 
reasoning (e.g., Evans et al., 1983, Newstead et al., 1992) show that people do manage to 
reason about these conclusions relatively successfully. The concept of studying thinking 
and reasoning in function of p-validity substituted for traditional validity is gaining track 
within the new paradigm of reasoning (Evans, 2012). For the large majority of the 
traditional syllogisms, however, p-validity and validity are almost interchangeable, 
suggesting that the conclusions drawn from this dissertation can be interpreted in light of 
both the old and the new paradigms of reasoning.  
 
28 
 
1.3 Belief Bias 
Belief bias is the tendency for people’s deductive reasoning to be influenced by their prior 
beliefs in the truth of the conclusion. Consider the following syllogisms (Table 1.2) as a 
classic example from Evans et al. (1983): 
Table 1.2 
Four validity by believability syllogism types 
 Believable Unbelievable 
Valid Some addictive things are inexpensive 
No cigarettes are inexpensive 
_____________________________________________ 
Some addictive things are not 
cigarettes 
89% 
Some millionaires are hard workers 
No rich people are hard workers 
_____________________________________________ 
Some millionaires are not rich people 
56% 
Invalid  
No addictive things are inexpensive 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive 
_____________________________________________ 
Some addictive things are not 
cigarettes 
71% 
 
No millionaires are hard workers 
Some rich people are hard workers 
_____________________________________________ 
Some millionaires are not rich people 
10% 
Note. Proportions indicate endorsement rates of conclusions as found by Evans et al. 
(1983) 
Evans et al. (1983) instructed participants to judge whether the conclusions of syllogisms 
like these necessarily followed or not (i.e., whether they were logically valid). Even though 
for each validity level the arguments were identical in structure (valid: EI3_O1, invalid: 
IE3_O1), the believable conclusions were accepted much more than the unbelievable 
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conclusions (47% more).  The participants’ prior beliefs in the truth of the conclusion 
caused their acceptance rates of these structurally identical arguments to vary wildly. One 
particular finding of interest in this case is the fact that for unbelievable arguments, the 
valid – invalid endorsement rate difference was much larger (46%) than for the believable 
arguments (18%).  
Much like argument figure, for instance, conclusion believability affected the endorsement 
rates in syllogistic reasoning (Johnsson-Laird & Steedman, 1978). Contrary to the 
structural reasoning biases introduced in the previous section, however, belief bias can be 
seen as induction influencing deductive decisions, rendering it an interesting special bias 
worthy of additional study. The influence of prior beliefs on logical reasoning was well 
documented prior to Evans et al. (1983) (e.g. Wilkins, 1928; Henle, 1962; Henle & Michael, 
1956). However, the experiments presented by Evans and colleagues were the first ones in 
which all the structural biases introduced earlier (i.e., atmosphere, figure, illicit conversion 
and matching) were adequately controlled for. Furthermore, logical validity and 
conclusion believability were crossed, rendering a two by two design with four cells: valid-
believable, valid-unbelievable, invalid-believable and invalid-unbelievable (Table 1.2). 
This design allowed for a controlled analysis of the effects of logic and belief on the 
endorsement rates of conclusions. The majority of the studies on syllogistic belief bias 
published in the past 30 years which have used this methodology reliably found three 
statistical effects: a main effect of logic, a main effect of belief, and a logic x belief 
interaction effect. Given the reliability of these effects, all viable theories of belief bias 
must account both for the main effect of belief (i.e., why are people unable to suppress the 
influence of prior beliefs in the response stage?), as well as the interaction (i.e., why are 
people better at discriminating valid from invalid arguments when they have unbelievable 
conclusions?) as demonstrated by Evans et al. (1983).  
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With regards to the latter, some theories introduce the concept of motivated reasoning. 
Motivated reasoning entails that, rather than simply rejecting conclusions which go 
against their prior beliefs, people will engage in more effortful reasoning in order to try 
and disconfirm the conclusion. A conceptually similar example of motivated reasoning was 
discovered by Lord et al. (1979). They asked people to judge the methodological quality of 
various pieces of research. The results showed that people uncritically accepted the 
evidence of research studies whose conclusions were in line with their beliefs. Conversely, 
people were much more critical of the methodology of studies whose conclusions clashed 
with their prior beliefs, even though the arguments were structurally identical. For a 
syllogistic belief bias theory to be viable, it must explain both components, i.e. response 
bias and motivated reasoning. In the following paragraph the six traditional belief bias 
theories are introduced. 
1.3.1 Belief Bias Theories 
Selective Scrutiny (SS) is the first account of belief bias presented by Evans et al. (1983). 
According to SS, reasoners will uncritically accept believable conclusions, but will engage 
in more logical reasoning for unbelievable conclusions. This can explain both the main 
effect of beliefs and the logic x belief interaction. Counterevidence for selective processing 
comes from behavioural studies, many of which have shown that logic still has a 
significant effect on arguments with believable conclusions (e.g., Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 
2000). Logic should not affect believable arguments if participants accept all believable 
items without further scrutiny. Finally, response time studies (Thompson, Striemer, 
Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003) have found that participants actually spend more time 
deliberating about believable than unbelievable conclusions, which is potentially 
incompatible with the idea that participants engage in more reasoning for unbelievable 
arguments. 
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Misinterpreted Necessity (MN) is an alternative theory of belief bias forwarded by Evans et 
al. (1983; see also Dickstein, 1980, 1981; Markovits & Nantel, 1989; Newstead et al., 1992). 
According to this account, participants have trouble understanding the concept of 
necessity required to adequately assess logical validity (i.e., that the conclusion has to 
follow in all cases for it to be logically valid). For certain types of invalid arguments 
(specifically known as indeterministically invalid) the conclusion can follow in some cases, 
but it does not follow in all cases. When people are confronted with this type of invalid 
argument during reasoning, they are thought to respond as a function of their beliefs: the 
fact that the conclusion can be both consistent and inconsistent with the premises is 
confusing and may be taken as evidence suggestive of validity. For valid arguments, the 
conclusion is always consistent with the premises, so beliefs will not be used as a response 
in this case. MN can account for both the main effect of belief and the logic x belief 
interaction. Note that the MN interpretation of the logic x belief interaction is not one of 
motivated reasoning, but rather one in terms of a response bias for invalid conclusions 
compared to an absence of response bias for valid arguments. The predictions from MN 
have not held up to scrutiny because it struggles to explain the belief effect on valid items. 
Furthermore, at least one study has found the logic x belief interaction for simple 
problems in which the conclusion is always consistent or inconsistent with the premises 
(Glinsky & Judd, 1994). 
Metacognitive Uncertainty (MU) is an updated version of misinterpreted necessity which 
adds an overall response bias, thus allowing for a belief effect on valid arguments in 
addition to invalid arguments (Quayle & Ball, 2000). According MU, indeterminately 
invalid arguments require more effort to evaluate because all the alternative cases need to 
be kept in working memory simultaneously (i.e., the cases where the conclusion is 
consistent with the premises as well as the cases where the conclusion is not consistent 
with the premises). Participants for who the working memory resources required for this 
operation are exceeded will respond on the basis of believability for the invalid arguments, 
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leading to a larger response bias on invalid than on valid items and as such the logic x 
belief interaction. Quayle & Ball (2000) demonstrated that participants with adequate 
working memory capacity did not show the logic x belief interaction, suggesting that they 
were able to complete this operation without an increased belief bias for invalid compared 
to valid problems. As with Misinterpreted Necessity, the interaction is not theoretically 
interpreted as originating from motivated reasoning. Contrary to MU’s predictions, eye-
tracking data suggests that participants do not spend more time generating alternative 
cases for invalid arguments (Ball et al., 2006). 
Modified Verbal Reasoning Theory (MVRT) is a belief bias extension of the VRT introduced 
earlier (Thompson et al., 2003). MVRT is an attempt to reconcile the finding of a logic x 
belief interaction with the fact that participants actually spend more time on believable 
than on unbelievable conclusions (contrary to what a motivated reasoning accounts such 
as, for example, Selective Scrutiny would predict). According to this theory participants 
reason by semantically encoding and re-encoding the premises and will continue to do so 
until an adequate response is found or until a self-imposed deadline elapses. If they come 
up with a compatible response before the deadline, it will be accepted. If the deadline 
elapses, participants will either reject the conclusion or base their response on conclusion 
believability. Finally, MVRT argues that participants set an extended response deadline for 
believable conclusions because they are more palatable, resulting in a drawn-out 
rationalisation process. This theory is compatible with a traditional logic x belief 
interaction and longer response times for believable than unbelievable arguments. As MN 
and MU before, however, it does not interpret the logic x belief interaction in terms of 
motivated reasoning. 
Mental Models Theory (MMT) has been adjusted and extended to account for belief bias in 
an evaluation paradigm by Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham (1989). According to this 
version of MMT, participants will first construct a mental model of the premises from 
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which they draw an initial conclusion. If the presented conclusion is inconsistent with the 
mental model, it is rejected. If the conclusion is consistent with the initial model, 
participants will assess the conclusion’s believability. Believable conclusions are readily 
accepted. Unbelievable conclusions, on the other hand, will trigger a motivated reasoning 
process which entails the construction of alternative models. Only if the conclusion is 
consistent with all additionally constructed models, the conclusion is accepted. If a 
counterexample is found, the conclusion is rejected. For one-model problems, this leads to 
fairly good reasoning given that the initially constructed model will provide insight to the 
validity of the conclusion. Nevertheless, a small main effect of beliefs is still predicted due 
to an overarching response bias, here referred to as a “conclusion filtering mechanism” 
which takes place after the reasoning process.  For multiple model syllogisms, MMT 
predicts the interaction between logic and belief because the additional search for 
counterexamples cued for unbelievable problems will lead to an increased probability of 
finding a disconfirmatory model which will lead to the increased rejecting of invalid 
problems. Newstead et al. (1992) found evidence in favour of MMT, with the absence of 
the logic x belief interaction for one-model problems. Counterevidence for MMT has been 
presented by Glinsky & Judd (1994), who found the logic x belief interaction for one-model 
problems. Ball, Phillips, Wade, and Quale (2006) used an eye-tracking procedure to 
investigate two predictions drawn from MMT. First, participants should look at 
unbelievable conclusions more than believable conclusions, because the latter are readily 
accepted. Second, participants should look at the premises longer if they first looked at an 
unbelievable conclusion. Their findings were incompatible with these predictions. A 
similar finding that participants take less time to respond to unbelievable than to 
believable conclusions provides additional evidence against MMT (Thompson et al., 2003; 
Thompson, Newstead, & Morley, 2011). The biggest potential issue for MMT, however, is 
the fact that participants typically only ever construct a single model of the premises 
(Evans, Handley, Harper & Johnson-Laird, 1999). 
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Selective Processing Theory (SPT) provides an alternative take on the mental models 
account and was independently proposed by Klauer et al. (2000) and Evans et al. (2001). 
According to SPT, participants only ever construct a single model of the premises (Evans 
et al., 1999) and reason from the conclusion to the premises (Morley et al., 2004). First, 
people assess the believability of the conclusion. If the conclusion is believable they will 
attempt to construct a model that is consistent with the premises. Given that for both valid 
and invalid multiple model problems such a model can be found, believable conclusions 
are generally accepted. If the conclusion is unbelievable people will attempt to construct a 
model that is inconsistent with the premises. For valid arguments, such a model cannot be 
found, leading to acceptance. For invalid arguments, an inconsistent model can be found, 
leading to an increased rejection rate. The net effect is increased logical performance for 
unbelievable compared to believable arguments. As such, the logic x belief interaction can 
be interpreted in terms of motivated reasoning (Evans, 2007). Note that SPT also predicts 
a general belief bias in terms of a response bias to operate for one-model and multiple-
model problems. As with MMT, the finding that participants take longer to respond to 
believable arguments might be difficult to reconcile with the idea of increased reasoning 
for unbelievable arguments (Ball et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2003; 2011).  
1.3.2 Methods of Studying Belief Bias 
All of the major belief bias theories have been developed in order to explain behavioural 
reasoning data. As we briefly explained above, there are multiple ways to collect belief 
bias data. In the conclusions generation paradigm, participants are presented with the 
premises of a syllogism and instructed to generate a conclusion (e.g., Markovits & Nantel, 
1989). An advantage of this approach is that it resembles day-to-day reasoning: 
participants are given some information on the basis of which they have to draw a valid 
conclusion. A disadvantage of this approach is that participants do not always realise that 
the conclusion needs to contain both end-terms and that only the four syllogistic 
35 
 
quantifiers can be used to reach a valid argument. This caveat can be overcome by 
carefully instructing participants about the expected form of the conclusion, but doing so 
inevitably reduces the ecological validity of the experiment because participants might no 
longer draw the conclusions they would do naturally.  
An alternative option, known as the multiple-choice paradigm (e.g., Chapman and 
Chapman, 1959), can deal with the aforementioned problem. In this method participants 
are presented with the premises of a syllogism and provided with multiple conclusions, 
plus the option that “nothing follows”. An advantage of this alternative method is that it 
increases reasoning performance and consequently facilitates investigation of the 
reasoning process. A disadvantage is that it might also introduce the use of unwanted (i.e., 
non-believability related) heuristics in conclusion selection. For instance, the probability 
heuristics model dictates that participants would never select the “some…not”-quantified 
conclusion option due to its low informativeness (Chater & Oaksford, 1999). Disregarding 
these types of syllogisms is not an option, however, because they are crucial for belief bias 
research. First, these syllogisms are the most complex because multiple models of their 
premises exist. This increased complexity could provoke a higher reliance on prior beliefs, 
in contrast to syllogisms for which the underlying logic is transparently easy (e.g., “all 
artists are ballerinas”, “all ballerinas are cooks”, “therefore, all artists are cooks”). The 
higher complexity of the multiple model syllogisms renders them a suitable platform for 
the study of belief bias. Second, the invalid counterparts of these syllogisms are 
indeterminately invalid, meaning that they are invalid because the conclusion does not 
necessarily follow, although it follows for certain models of the premises. Many belief bias 
theories (e.g., Metacognitive Uncertainty, Modified Verbal Reasoning Theory, Mental 
Models Theory, and Selective Processing Theory) make specific predictions for these types 
of problems, such as motivated reasoning induced accuracy increases or increased 
response bias. Consequently, these syllogisms are well-suited for the comparison of belief 
bias theories. Finally, syllogisms with “some…not”-quantified conclusions allow 
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atmosphere, illicit conversion, and figural effects to be experimentally controlled for, 
rendering them useful from a methodological design point of view (Begg & Denny, 1969; 
Dickstein, 1978; Revlin, Leirer, Yopp, & Yopp, 1980).  
The issues outlined above have led most belief bias research conducted in the past 30 
years to adopt the conclusion evaluation paradigm in which participants are presented 
with a syllogism consisting of two premises and a conclusion. They are then instructed to 
respond “valid” if the conclusion is logically valid or “invalid” if it is not. The proportion of 
“valid” responses, also known as the endorsement rate, is then analysed by calculating 
three indexes. The logic index is a contrast of the number of “valid” responses to valid 
arguments (hits) minus the “valid” responses to invalid arguments (false alarms). This is 
an index of logical reasoning competence, with higher numbers indicating higher logical 
reasoning performance. The belief index is a contrast of the number of “valid” responses to 
believable arguments minus the number of “valid” responses to unbelievable arguments. 
This is an index of belief bias as response bias. Finally, the interaction index is a contrast of 
the logic index in the unbelievable condition and the logic index in the believable condition: 
Interaction Index = (H unbelievable – F unbelievable) – (H believable – F believable) 
This is a measure of the degree to which participants reason better for unbelievable 
compared to believable arguments, i.e., motivated reasoning. Note that in more recent 
research, the logic, belief, and interaction index are not always explicitly mentioned 
because they are formally equivalent to the main effect of logic, the main effect of belief, 
and the logic x belief interaction in ANOVA of endorsement rates (i.e., proportion of 
“valid”-responses), respectively. Using this method, mixed evidence has been found for 
each of the six traditional belief bias theories. The recent application of a novel analytic 
technique, however, has raised some questions with the plausibility of all the work that 
has been conducted on belief bias so far. 
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1.4 The Response Bias Account 
The logic x belief interaction is a key empirical observation which has inspired much 
theorising about which account of belief bias is to be preferred (e.g., the absence of the 
logic x belief interaction for one-model problems has been taken as evidence in favour of 
MMT and SPT and against SS). A recent paper by Dube et al. (2010) put this method of 
theorising into question. Dube et al. conducted three syllogistic reasoning experiments and 
analysed them using a method from the signal detection theory (SDT) framework. They 
showed that the interpretation of the logic x interaction in terms of motivated reasoning 
tacitly requires the assumption that hits (saying valid to a valid argument) and false 
alarms (saying valid to an invalid argument) are linearly related as response bias 
increases. This is unknown to or unacknowledged by many belief bias researchers. Their 
results led them to conclude that the logic x belief interaction takes on a different 
interpretation when analysed using SDT. Their analysis indicated that, rather than being 
an indication of the degree of motivated reasoning, the interaction is merely a statistical 
artefact. Consequently, according to their findings, only response bias remains. If their 
claims hold, then all accounts of belief bias which have some psychological mechanism in 
place to account for the interaction (i.e., the six theories introduced in the previous section) 
are necessarily incorrect. Dube et al. propose an alternative account which argues that 
belief bias is just a response bias – the response bias account of belief bias. Before 
describing Dube et al.’s findings in more detail, we now turn to an explanation of SDT. 
1.4.1 Signal Detection Theory 
SDT originated in the field of radar research to deal with the fact that radars were limited 
in performance due to intrinsic noise and that any “blip” could originate not only from a 
mixture of signal and noise, but also from noise alone (Peterson, Birdsall, & Fox, 1954). 
Green and Swets (1966) realised that the same concepts applied in psychophysics, the 
study of how human perception is related to the physical world (Fechner, 1860). They 
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adapted SDT for use with humans as the detecting agent. The main tenet of SDT is the idea 
that for any yes–no decision about the presence of a stimulus both targets (signals) and 
non-targets (noise) exist, and that they can both lead to positive (i.e., yes, the target was 
presented) and negative (no, the target was not presented) responses. Ever since its 
original introduction SDT has been applied to many fields in cognitive psychology, such as 
memory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), social cognition (Gable, Reis, & Downey, 2003), 
and reasoning (Heit & Rotello, 2005; 2010; Rotello & Heit, 2009).  
The main assumption of SDT is that targets and non-targets are normally distributed on a 
strength dimension, with the targets usually having a higher mean than the non-targets 
(see Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 Example target (signal) and non-target (noise) distributions assumed to underlie 
human decision making performance by the standard SDT model. The vertical line is the 
response criterion. 
In a typical SDT experiment on human perception, participants are presented with a 
number of stimuli varying in strength, for instance tones of variable loudness. They are 
then instructed to respond “yes” if they heard a tone and “no” if they did not. As an added 
difficulty, on certain trials no tone is presented. With loud tones the signal is easy to detect, 
but the less loud the tone, the more difficult it becomes to detect the target (i.e., to 
distinguish signal from noise). With this type of study design there are four possible 
response categories.  Two of these are correct responses: the participant can respond “yes” 
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to a tone that has been presented. This is known as a hit (H). The participant can also 
respond “no” if no tone has been presented, which is known as a correct rejection (CR). 
There are also two incorrect response classes: the participant can respond “yes” even if no 
tone has been presented. This is known as a false alarm (F). Finally, the participant can 
respond “no” even though a tone was presented, which is known as a miss (M), see Table 
1.3. 
Table 1.3 
Four response classes according to SDT. 
Target presented Non-target presented 
“Yes” response Hit (H) False Alarm (F) 
“No” response Miss (M) Correct Rejection (CR) 
A large disadvantage of analysing the proportion of correct responses in a yes-no task 
without taking these four possible response categories into account is that an increase in 
the proportion of reported detections does not necessarily equate to an increase in 
detection performance. For instance, imagine a doctor who has to investigate X-rays in 
order to assess whether patients have a tumour or not. Perhaps he correctly classifies a lot 
of tumours because he is very good at detecting the blobs on the X-Rays. If this is the case, 
then most of the doctor’s responses are hits and few are false alarms, resulting in high 
detection performance (sensitivity in SDT terms). It is also possible, however, that he is not 
very good at interpreting the X-rays, but that he simply responds “yes” quite often. If this is 
the case, even though he has a large proportion of hits, he also has a large amount of false 
alarms, resulting in poor sensitivity. In SDT terms, the tendency to be inclined to give more 
yes than no responses (or vice versa), regardless of the underlying stimuli is known as 
response bias. A marked preference of yes to no responses is known as liberal responding, 
whereas the opposite is termed conservative responding. Contrary to many traditional 
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analysis techniques, SDT acknowledges that sensitivity and response bias can vary 
independently. Furthermore, the theory provides a framework which allows sensitivity to 
be disentangled from response bias. 
Sensitivity is related to the relative positioning of the target and non-target distributions. 
A larger distance between both distributions results in greater sensitivity. The rightward 
shift of the target distribution in the bottom panel of Figure 1.2 compared to the target 
distribution in the top panel demonstrates this concept. Sensitivity (d’) can be calculated 
using the values in Table 1.3 using the following formula (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005): 
d’ = z(H) – z(F) 
(z(x) is a function which gives the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution) 
Figure 1.2 The target distribution of the bottom panel is shifted rightwards compared to the 
target distribution in the top panel, indicating increased sensitivity for the former. 
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Response bias is a measure of how likely the participant is to respond “yes” or “no”.  SDT 
acknowledges the fact that, all things being equal, certain people are more likely to 
respond yes (they are more liberal in their judgements) and that others are more likely to 
respond no (they are more conservative; Aminoff et al., 2012; Kantner & Lindsay, 2012). 
Likewise, certain conditions will render participants more liberal on average, whereas 
others might lead to more conservative judgements overall. Formally, the degree of 
response bias is equated to the position of the response criterion (c). If the strength of a 
stimulus (regardless of its target-status) exceeds the criterion, the participant will respond 
positively. The bottom panel of Figure 1.3 demonstrates how a downward criterion shift 
indicates more liberal responding. Bias can be calculated using the values in Table 1.3 with 
the following formula: 
c = - 0.5 * [z(H) + z(F)] 
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Figure 1.3 The response criterion (vertical line) in the bottom panel is shifted leftwards 
compared to the criterion in the top panel, indicating a more liberal response bias. 
A Gaussian distribution is defined by two parameters: its mean (µ) and its standard 
deviation (σ). One problem of the single-point sensitivity (d’) and bias (c) measures is that 
they require the assumption of equal variance (σ2) in the target and non-target 
distributions. Studies show that, more often than not, this assumption does not hold 
(Green, 1986), for instance because the target distribution is more spread out than the 
non-target distribution. Fortunately, SDT can deal with the unequal-variance problem in 
multiple ways. One often used way is known as the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curve method. 
The ROC Method 
A ROC curve is a cumulative plot of hits versus false alarms across increasingly liberal 
levels of responding. Otherwise put, every point on the ROC implies an identical sensitivity 
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level, but points towards the right indicate a greater tendency to say yes (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). An example of a ROC implied by a standard equal variance SDT model, 
the distributions of which are presented in Figure 1.1, can be found in Figure 1.4A. ROCs 
are useful tools for data interpretation because three crucial things can be derived from 
them. First, the distance of the ROC to the upper left corner indicates sensitivity 
(independent from bias). The closer the ROC is positioned to the upper left corner, the 
higher sensitivity. The ROC in Figure 1.4B shows higher sensitivity compared to the ROC in 
Figure 1.4A. Second, the relative shift of an ROC to the right indicates a more liberal 
response bias (for identical levels of sensitivity). The ROC in Figure 1.4C shows an example 
of more liberal response bias compared to the ROC in Figure 1.4A. Finally, the shape of the 
ROC provides some information about the shape of the underlying distributions. 
Curvilinear ROCs are consistent with (but do not necessitate) normally distributed targets 
and non-targets, as expected by SDT. The observation of a linear ROC would suggest the 
SDT model is inappropriate because the underlying distributions are not normal, see 
Figure 4D. 
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Figure 1.4 A. ROC implied by standard equal variance SDT model. B. ROC implied by model 
with higher sensitivity  .C. ROC implied by model with equal sensitivity as in A. but with a 
more liberal response criterion. D. ROC implied by non-SDT model.  The diagonal line where 
false alarm rate = hit rate shows chance performance. 
Empirical ROCs can be constructed by instructing participants to adjust their response 
criterion while keeping sensitivity constant. The most common way to achieve this is by 
collecting confidence ratings (e.g., Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). After each yes-no response 
participants are asked to rate how confident they are in their response, for instance on a 
scale from 1 (not very confident) to 3 (very confident). The binary judgements are then 
combined with the confidence ratings to create a 6-point scale: 6 (high confidence yes 
response), 5 (medium confidence yes response), 4 (low confidence yes response), 3 (low 
confidence no response), 2 (medium confidence no response), 1 (high confidence no 
response). The leftmost point on the ROC is a plot of P(6 | target) v. P(6 | non-target). The 
next point along the curve is P(6 + 5 | target) v. P(6 + 5 | non-target), and so forth. Given 
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the cumulative nature of these response categories, the final point of the ROC must 
necessarily fall at (1, 1). The major advantage of ROC curves over single-point measures 
(i.e., d’ and c) is that the latter require the assumption of equal variance in the target and 
non-target distributions. ROCs do not require this assumption, and as such they can be 
used to calculate more appropriate sensitivity (e.g., da and Az) and bias (e.g., ca) 
parameters. 
1.4.2 The Response Bias Account 
Dube et al. (2010) applied the ROC procedure to a typical belief bias experiment. They 
instructed participants to reason about syllogisms for which validity was crossed by 
believability, resulting in the traditional item types (i.e., valid-believable, valid-
unbelievable, invalid-believable, invalid-unbelievable, see Table 1.2). In addition to the 
standard conclusion evaluation paradigm, participants were asked to rate their confidence 
in each validity judgement. The data were analysed in two ways: the endorsement rates 
were analysed in the traditional manner using ANOVA and the ROCs were analysed by 
fitting and comparing SDT models. The endorsement rate analysis resulted in the standard 
three effects: a main effect of logic, a main effect of belief, and a logic x belief interaction, 
suggesting the typical belief bias effects were present (i.e., response bias and motivated 
reasoning). The ROC curves (Figure 1.5) painted a different picture. The first notable point 
was that the ROCs were curvilinear instead of linear. This was incompatible with the linear 
ROCs predicted by the logic x belief interaction (or interaction index). Some simple algebra 
demonstrates why the interaction index necessarily predicts linear ROCs. The interaction 
index [II = (H U – F U) – (H B – F B)] is a contrast of the logic index for unbelievable [LI U = H U 
– F U] and believable [LI U = H U – F U] problems. Solving both logic indexes for hits shows
that in both cases, the hit rate is linearly related to the false alarm rate [H U = F U + LI U; H B 
= F B + LI B]. Consequently, the interaction index is only a valid measure of the difference in 
reasoning performance between the believable and unbelievable conditions if the ROCs 
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are linear. In Figure 1.5 it can be seen that the hypothetical linear unbelievable (red) ROC 
is shifted towards the upper left compared to the linear believable (black) ROC, supporting 
the significant logic x belief interaction in the endorsement rate analysis. However, the 
empirical ROCs were curvilinear, demonstrating the inappropriateness of the interaction 
index (Dube et al., 2010). 
Figure 1.5. ROC curves presented by Dube et al. (2010, Experiment 2). Red and black lines are 
ROCs implied by the interaction index. 
Having demonstrated that the experimental data is incompatible with the linearity 
assumption required for the correct interpretation of the logic x belief interaction, Dube et 
al. instead applied the more appropriate SDT procedure. Visual inspection of the ROCs 
suggested that the believable ROC was shifted to the right compared to the unbelievable 
ROC which is compatible with a response bias. Furthermore, the unbelievable ROC did not 
seem to be closer to the upper left than the believable ROC, suggesting that accuracy did 
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not differ between the conditions. These findings were confirmed using formal model fits. 
Dube et al. used a maximum likelihood procedure to fit a standard unequal variance SDT 
(UVSD) model to the data. They then performed likelihood ratio tests to compare the 
unconstrained model with a model in which there was no accuracy difference between the 
believable and unbelievable condition. The test showed that constraining these 
parameters did not impede model fit. Constraining the response bias parameters to be 
equal across conditions, however, did significantly reduce the fit of the model. Taken 
together, these findings suggested that belief bias is just a response bias. The far reaching 
consequence of this is that all major theories of belief bias which explain the logic x belief 
interaction in terms of a psychological mechanism (motivated reasoning or otherwise) are 
incorrect (Dube et al., 2010). 
1.4.3 The Belief Bias Debate 
In response to Dube et al.’s conclusions that belief bias is just a response bias, Klauer and 
Kellen (2011) applied a different measurement method to assess the viability of this 
strong conclusion. They applied a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model to Dube et 
al.’s data and found a) that the MPT model fit the data better and b) that beliefs did have 
an impact on reasoning accuracy according to this alternative model, in line with the 
traditional theories of belief bias. Dube, Rotello, & Heit (2011) in turn replied to Klauer 
and Kellen by comparing the flexibility of the SDT and MPT models using model recovery 
simulations and demonstrated that the latter was more flexible, leading to its superior fit. 
They concluded that the SDT model was more appropriate and stuck with their original 
conclusion that belief bias is just response bias. 
This theoretical debate and its heavy methodological focus have left the field of belief bias 
in a state of uncertainty with regards to the status of motivated reasoning. Depending on 
the measurement method used (SDT v. interaction index / MPT), belief bias is just a 
response bias or also contains a motivated reasoning component. Given the far-reaching 
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conclusions of this research and the fact that it is based on the relatively small amounts of 
empirical data currently available, we set out to further the belief bias debate. More 
specifically, in this dissertation we aimed to investigate the status of motivated reasoning 
and response bias using SDT, arguably the most appropriate method (Dube et al., 2011). 
We now provide an outline of the structure of this dissertation. 
1.5 Dissertation Structure 
In this first chapter we have outlined why belief bias is an important but as of yet poorly 
understood topic of study within cognitive psychology. A debate in the literature about 
which aspects of belief bias exist and which methods are the most appropriate to 
investigate this problem is currently in progress (Dube et al., 2011; Klauer & Kellen, 2011). 
The aim of the research presented in this dissertation is to advance the debate between 
the traditional interpretation of belief bias and the alternative interpretation that belief 
bias is just a response bias.  In the following chapters we present research designed 
specifically to further this debate using two methods within the SDT framework. In 
Chapter 2, a novel SDT-based method known as forced choice reasoning is introduced in 
an attempt to find converging evidence for the response bias account. In Chapter 3, we use 
the SDT-based ROC method to investigate the effect of various experimental 
manipulations on belief bias. In Chapter 4, both methods are used to investigate the 
impact of individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style, in an 
attempt to reconcile the empirical differences observed. In Chapter 5 we discuss the 
theoretical viability of the major belief bias accounts in light of the evidence presented in 
the literature and this dissertation. We now turn to Chapter 2 in which we introduce the 
forced choice reasoning method. 
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Chapter 2: Forced Choice Reasoning 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 we provided an overview of the methods typically used to study belief bias. 
Evidence suggested that the frequently used conclusion evaluation paradigm is 
suboptimal for the study of belief bias and that interpreting results from this method 
might lead to incorrect conclusions. Dube, Rotello, & Heit (2010) argued that the signal 
detection theory (SDT) framework is a more appropriate measurement method for the 
study of belief bias, given the observed ROC curvilinearity of reasoning data (Dube et al., 
2010; Heit & Rotello, 2005; 2010; Rotello & Heit, 2009). Plotting ROCs and fitting SDT 
models to them is a better way of measuring belief bias, but alternative SDT-based 
approaches also exist. In this chapter, we introduce one such approach known as the 
forced choice method. The main aim of the current chapter is to test the viability of the 
response bias account of belief bias using this novel method. Converging evidence 
consistent with the response bias account would strengthen its theoretical position as the 
most viable explanation of belief bias. Evidence incompatible with the response bias 
account in the form of motivated reasoning, however, would cue the start of a more 
thorough search into the specific mechanisms underlying (both components of) belief bias. 
2.1.1 Forced Choice Reasoning 
As explained in Chapter 1, the ROC procedure provides a method which allows for the 
estimation of reasoning accuracy independently from response bias. Research on 
psychophysics has shown that this is not always the most efficient option to study a 
phenomenon (Fechner, 1860). In contrast detection research, for example, higher 
discrimination accuracy was attained by presenting two stimuli next to each other and by 
instructing the participant to choose the brighter one. This research paradigm is known as 
the forced choice method (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005).  The forced choice procedure is 
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an alternative method within the SDT framework which can achieve bias-free estimates of 
accuracy by controlling for response bias. The main difference between the ROC and the 
forced choice methods is that in the former only one stimulus is evaluated per trial, 
whereas in the latter, multiple stimuli have to be judged per trial. The forced choice 
method is often used in research on recollection memory, where the task is to study a list 
of words and to indicate in a test phase whether a word was studied (old) or not (new). 
Instead of presenting targets intermixed with lures and instructing the participants to 
judge whether each word is old or new, two words are presented next to each other. It is 
the participant’s task to choose which of the two is old (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
One notable example of how the forced choice method is capable of increasing our 
understanding of a phenomenon in a way that the more traditional single presentation 
methods cannot is found in research on the frequency effect in recognition memory. The 
frequency effect entails that people are more likely to respond “old” to words which have a 
higher frequency in real life due to their increased familiarity. As such, in the single 
presentation paradigm, when participants responds “old” we have no way of knowing 
whether they did so because they remembered the word or because it has a high 
frequency. In the forced choice presentation method, however, the presented target and 
lure stimuli can be chosen to be of equal frequency. Consequently, frequency-based 
response bias is controlled for because the participants cannot choose one word over the 
other on the basis of its frequency. Instead, judgements mainly reflect the memory 
strength of the stimulus (Glanzer & Bowles, 1976). An additional motivated for using the 
forced choice method alongside the ROC method is that it does not require various 
modeling assumptions to be met. Occasionally, some scepticism or doubt as to whether the 
required assumptions for single-point or ROC measures are met exists. In these cases, 
converging evidence using an alternative method within the same framework can 
strengthen the viability of the results. 
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We applied the forced choice method to reasoning in order to study belief bias. The 
previously introduced methods for studying belief bias (i.e., the conclusion generation 
paradigm, the conclusion evaluation paradigm, the multiple choice method, and the ROC 
method) all have in common that only one argument is presented at a time. Participants 
have to evaluate on each trial whether the presented argument is valid or invalid. One 
major advantage of the forced choice method is that it can control for the unwanted effects 
of individual differences in response bias. Individual differences in criterion placement 
exist (Animoff et al., 2012; Kantner & Lindsay, 2012) and might introduce additional noise 
in the assessment of sensitivity (Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009). 
We adapted the forced choice procedure and tailored it to be suitable for the study of 
belief bias in order to test Dube et al.’s (2010) claim that belief bias is just a response bias. 
To our knowledge, this is the first time the forced choice method has been applied to 
reasoning. In Experiment 1, we use the forced choice reasoning method to conduct a direct 
test of motivated reasoning independently of response bias. Positive evidence of 
motivated reasoning would suggest that the response bias only account is insufficient to 
explain belief bias. 
2.2 Experiment 1 
We extended the forced choice method for the study of belief bias as follows: on each trial 
two arguments are presented, one of which is valid and one of which is invalid. The 
participant has to evaluate both arguments and discriminate the valid argument from the 
invalid by reasoning about both. The major advantage of the forced choice approach 
applied to reasoning is that the possibility for belief bias as response bias can be 
eliminated. Participants know that one argument is valid and that one is invalid, but they 
also notice that both conclusions have the same believability status (e.g., in Table 2.1 both 
arguments have a believable conclusion). Consequently, a simple belief-based decision 
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heuristic (i.e., accept believable, reject unbelievable) cannot be applied. Believability can 
be manipulated between trials such that on some trials both conclusions are believable 
and on other trials both conclusions are unbelievable. This novel forced choice paradigm 
allows for a direct test of motivated reasoning by comparing accuracy for the believable 
and the unbelievable problem types. Unlike most of the traditional accounts of belief bias 
(see Chapter 1), the response bias account predicts that beliefs do not influence reasoning 
accuracy (Dube et al., 2010). Therefore, an effect of beliefs on accuracy would be 
incompatible the response bias account. We also included a neutral condition to 
investigate whether unbelievable arguments increase reasoning performance, as 
suggested by motivated reasoning accounts (e.g., Evans et al., 2001), or whether believable 
arguments lead to worse reasoning. 
Table 2.1 
Example of Syllogisms Presented in a Typical Forced Choice Reasoning Trial. 
VALID BELIEVABLE: 
No cigarettes addictive things are inexpensive 
Some addictive things are inexpensive 
_______________________________________________ 
Some addictive things are not cigarettes 
INVALID BELIEVABLE: 
No addictive things are inexpensive 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive 
_______________________________________________ 
Some addictive things are not cigarettes 
Note. Both syllogisms have identical conclusions. The left syllogisms is valid, the right one 
invalid. 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 22 participants took part in exchange for course credit. Seven participants were 
male and 15 were female (age 18 – 31, M = 21, SD = 3). 
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Materials 
A list containing 48 problems was created to be used as stimuli. Every problem consisted 
of two syllogisms presented side by side. The two syllogisms always had identical 
conclusions. One syllogism was always valid and the other one was always invalid. Half the 
time the syllogism on the left was valid and half the time the one on the right was valid. 
Sixteen problem frames were repeated three times (see Table 2.2). Half of these were valid 
and half were invalid. All syllogisms were of the multiple-model type, half of them two-
model and half three-model. For the two-model syllogisms, logical validity was 
manipulated by changing the quantifier of one of the premises from “All” to “No”. For the 
three-model syllogisms, logical validity was manipulated by reversing the conclusion 
direction. A syllogism is defined as logically valid if its conclusion necessarily follows from 
the premises. If the conclusion is possible, but not necessitated by the premises, the 
argument is logically invalid. 
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Table 2.2 
Syllogisms Used in Experiments 1-11. 
Valid Invalid 
EI3_O2: No A are B 
Some C are B 
Some C are not A 
EI3_O1: No A are B 
Some  C are B 
Some A are not C 
EI4_O2: No B are A 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
EI4_O1: No B are A 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
EI1_O2: No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
EI1_O1: No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
IE1_O1: Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
IE1_O2: Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
OA3_O1: Some A are not B 
All C are B 
Some A are not C 
OE3_O1: Some A are not B 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
AO3_O2: All A are B 
Some C are not B 
Some C are not A 
EO3_O2: No A are B 
Some C are not B 
Some C are not A 
OA4_O2: Some B are not A 
All B are C 
Some C are not A 
OE4_O2: Some B are not A 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
AO4_O1: All B are A 
Some B are not C 
Some A are not C 
EO4_O1: No B are A 
Some B are not C 
Some A are not C 
Note. A = “All X are Y”; E = “No X are Y”; I = “Some X are Y”; O = “Some X are not Y”. The first 
digit indicates the figure (1 = AB-BC; 2 = BA-CB; 3 = AB-CB; 4 = BA-BC). The second digit 
indicates the conclusion direction (1 = A-C; 2 = C-A). 
Potential unwanted effects of problem content were controlled for by randomly assigning 
the problem contents to the syllogisms for each participant anew (e.g., Klauer & Singmann, 
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in press). This resulted in a unique problem list for every participant. Conclusion 
believability was manipulated by combining sixteen superordinate categories (e.g., birds) 
with two subordinate members of each those categories (e.g., parrots and sparrows; see 
Table 2.3 for a full list), resulting in relationships that were either definitionally true or 
false. 
Table 2.3 
Item Contents Used in Experiments 1-11. 
Category Members 
amphibians 
birds 
boats 
cars 
criminals 
furniture 
dogs 
drinks 
fish 
fruits 
insects 
reptiles 
tools 
trees 
vegetables 
weapons 
frogs 
parrots 
kayaks 
BMWs 
robbers 
desks 
Spaniels 
beers 
trout 
prunes 
bees 
lizards 
hammers 
oaks 
carrots 
cannons 
salamanders 
sparrows 
canoes 
Volvos 
murderers 
sofas 
Labradors 
sodas 
salmons 
peaches 
beetles 
iguanas 
saws 
willows 
cabbages 
swords 
toads 
ducks 
yachts 
Vauxhalls 
embezzlers 
cupboards 
Terriers 
wines 
cods 
apples 
ants 
snakes 
spanners 
pines 
parsnips 
guns 
newts 
robins 
speedboats 
Fiats 
terrorists 
bookcases 
Dalmatians 
whiskeys 
haddocks 
bananas 
spiders 
crocodiles 
shovels 
maples 
radishes 
spears 
Note. In Experiment 1 only the first two columns of members were used for the believable 
and unbelievable problem types, whereas the third column was used as the linking term 
for the neutral problems. 
An example of a believable conclusion is: “some birds are not parrots” (because prior 
knowledge dictates that there are other types of birds besides parrots). An example of an 
unbelievable conclusion is: “some sparrows are not birds” (because prior knowledge 
dictates that all sparrows are birds). Premise believability is known to exert a response 
bias in addition to the conclusion believability effect (Thompson, 1996). Given the main 
focus on conclusion believability, premise believability was controlled for.  Sixty-four 
pseudowords (Table 2.4) were generated using Wuggy (Keuleers & Brysbaert, 2010) and 
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48 were randomly assigned to the middle terms of the syllogisms. Nonsense middle terms 
are commonly used to control for premise believability (e.g., Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & 
Allen, 1992; Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001). 
Table 2.4 
Pseudowords Used in Experiments 1-11. 
redes fosks pives pields decottions sothods renes bunges 
wasses geets swants cronxes firters nickhomes revoules pinds 
foins chindles soats sonds pumes papes trops envenches 
lebs brops stoges crots punties stamuses vennars cortemns 
weens quinces loaxes stoals curges gruts cosuors wightes 
punds jubs parfs fises hoons tutches brimbers punes 
cofts spashes fimps brams heets piffures burtes queels 
flamps dathses darms vosts trinnels goples boodings veemers 
Note. Pseudowords were used to control for premise believability. 
Believable, unbelievable and neutral problems trials were created to be used as stimuli. 
Believable problem trials featured a valid-believable syllogism beside an invalid-
believable one (see Table 2.1 for an example). Believable conclusions were created by 
presenting the superordinate category before a subordinate member of that category (e.g., 
some birds are not parrots). Unbelievable problem trials featured a valid-unbelievable 
syllogism next to an invalid-unbelievable one. Unbelievable conclusions were created by 
reversing the assignment order used in the believable case (e.g., some parrots are not 
birds). Neutral problem trials featured a valid-neutral syllogism next to an invalid-neutral 
one. Neutral conclusions were created by presenting two pseudowords (e.g., some fromps 
are not blarks). The middle-term of the premises of neutral problems was always assigned 
a randomly chosen subordinate member that was unused in the believable and 
unubelievable problems. Combining these syllogistic structures and item contents yielded 
a uniquely randomised list of 48 problems for every participant. Each list contained 16 
believable problems, 16 unbelievable problems and 16 neutral problems. 
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Procedure 
The participants were tested on individual computers in small groups. Upon entering the 
lab they were sat in front of a computer. They were presented with an information sheet 
outlining the general aims and procedure of the experiment, a form allowing them to give 
informed consent, and a detailed instruction sheet which explained the meaning of logical 
validity using a definition and an example (see Appendix A). The experimenter instructed 
the participants to subsequently read the information sheet, to sign the consent form if 
they agreed, and to read the instructions. Participants then had to enter their age and 
gender on the screen using the keyboard and mouse. Further instructions were presented 
on the screen using E-Prime 2.0. The instructions read: 
“In the following experiment you will repeatedly be presented with two reasoning problems. 
One of these problems is logically valid. One of these problems is logically invalid. It is your 
task to choose which problem is valid. Use the mouse to click the box that contains the valid 
argument according to you. The box around the reasoning problem you chose will turn green, 
indicating that you think it is valid. The box around the reasoning you didn't choose will turn 
red, indicating that you think it is invalid. After every choice, use your mouse to indicate how 
confident you are that you made the correct decision. Before the actual experiment you will 
be presented with 6 practice trials to ensure that you understand the instructions. After the 
practice trials the actual experiment begins. If you have any questions ask the experimenter 
before or during the practice trials.” 
The participants then completed six practice trials (two believable, two unbelievable and 
two neutral). No accuracy feedback was provided. If the participants had no further 
questions after completing the practice trials they were told to complete the 48 
experimental trials at their own pace. For every problem participants would be presented 
with two syllogisms side by side. Both syllogisms always had identical conclusions and 
item contents. Upon choosing one of the response options by clicking on it, the border of 
58 
the box containing the chosen syllogism would turn green and the word “VALID” appeared 
underneath. Simultaneously the border of the box containing the remaining syllogism 
would turn red and the word “INVALID” appeared under it (see Figure 2.1 for an example). 
Participants were allowed to change their selection an unlimited amount of times by 
clicking the other box, but only chose to swap from one option to the other in 2% of the 
cases. The participants had to confirm their final choice by rating their confidence on a scale 
from 1 (not very confident) over 2 (moderately confident) to 3 (very confident) by clicking 
in the corresponding box, after which the next problem trial was presented. Upon 
completing all the experimental trials participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Figure 2.1 Example of the problem setup and response options in Experiment 1. 
Measures 
On every experimental trial the participant’s chosen response (i.e., left argument or right 
argument) was recorded, as well as whether this response was correct or incorrect. The 
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participant’s confidence that he or she chose the valid argument on a scale from 1 (not 
very confident) – 3 (very confident) was also measured. Response latency (the time 
between problem presentation and the confidence rating) was also recorded. 
Design 
The experiment had a one-way design with problem type manipulated within subjects 
(believable v. unbelievable v. neutral). Every participant received a unique problem set 
containing identical syllogistic structures which were each assigned problem contents 
randomly. Within every list all the problems were presented in a randomised order. 
2.2.2 Results 
Participants were allowed to change their response but only did so in fewer than 2% of the 
cases. In order to check whether the participants showed a bias for the left or the right 
argument, the amount of left responses per participant was compared with 24 using a one 
sample t-test. Participants were not biased in either direction t(21) = 1.09, p = .29. Two 
participants were removed from the subsequent analyses because they responded below 
chance indicating that they did not follow the instructions or engage with the task 
(including these participants did not change the overall conclusions). Given that accuracy 
was measured on a proportion scale, homogeneity and normality assumptions were 
possibly violated. In order to account for this, all proportions were arcsine transformed 
prior to the analysis (Milligan, 1987). This transformation is used in all further 
experiments. Reported means and standard errors are the original untransformed values. 
Accuracy 
To verify that the participants responded significantly above chance, the average 
proportion of correct responses across participants was compared with arcsine(.50). 
Overall, participants scored significantly above chance (M = .69), t(19) = 6.48, p < .001. 
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Motivated reasoning 
In order to investigate whether participants engaged in motivated reasoning, a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: believable v. unbelievable) on proportion 
correct responses was performed. The analysis revealed that there was no difference in 
accuracy for believable (M = .69) and unbelievable (M = .71) problems, F(1, 19) = 0.58, p 
= .46, ηp2 = .03. A neutral item type was also included to investigate whether motivated 
reasoning in the forced choice reasoning was positive or negative. In order to test for this, 
a repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: believable v. unbelievable v. neutral) on 
proportion correct was performed. There was no effect of problem type, F(2, 38) = 0.71, p 
= .50, ηp2 = .04. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 
Experiment 1: Means (Standard Errors) for the Accuracy, Confidence Rating and Latency 
Analysis 
Believable Unbelievable Neutral 
Accuracy .69 (0.04) .71 (0.04) .68 (0.03) 
Confidence 2.13 (0.08) 2.17 (0.09) 1.89 (0.07) 
Latency 21,977 (1,508) 19,768 (932) 22,198 (1,572) 
Note. Accuracy is proportion correct responses, confidence is on a scale from 1 – 3, and 
latency is measured in ms. 
Confidence 
Confidence was compared as a function of problem type using one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA (problem type: believable v. unbelievable v. neutral). The analysis revealed a main 
effect of problem type, F(2, 38) = 11.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .37. Post-hoc tests revealed that 
compared to neutral problems, confidence was higher for believable, t(19) = 3.91, p = .001, 
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and unbelievable, t(19) = 4.20, p < .001 ones. There was no difference in confidence 
between believable and unbelievable problems, t(19) = 0.69, p = .50. Means and standard 
errors can be found in Table 2.5. 
Latency 
Response latency (RT) in milliseconds was compared for each problem type using one-
way repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: believable v. unbelievable v. neutral). Prior 
to analysis all RT values were transformed using the natural logarithm. The analysis 
revealed that RT marginally differed between conditions, F(2, 38) = 2.90, p = .068, ηp2 = .13. 
Follow-up tests revealed that participants responded significantly more quickly to 
unbelievable than to believable problems, t(19) = 2.40, p = .027, and marginally more 
quickly to unbelievable than to neutral problems, t(19) = 2.06, p = .053. There was no 
significant believable–neutral difference, t < 1, p = .90. Means and standard errors can be 
found in Table 2.5. 
2.2.3 Discussion 
A forced choice reasoning method was used to test for motivated reasoning. There was no 
effect of beliefs on reasoning accuracy. These results are incompatible with motivated 
reasoning, but compatible with the response bias account of belief bias proposed by Dube 
et al. (2010). Confidence was higher for believable and unbelievable problems compared 
to neutral ones, which has been demonstrated in previous work (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 
2006). Participants responded significantly quicker to unbelievable problems, which is 
inconsistent with the claim made by many traditional accounts of belief bias that 
additional reasoning takes place for syllogisms with unbelievable conclusions (Evans et al., 
2001; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003). 
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2.3 Experiment 2 
The aim of the Experiment 1 was to test for motivated reasoning whilst controlling for 
response bias. The absence of motivated reasoning is consistent with the response bias 
account and provides support for Dube et al. (2010). In Experiment 2 our aim was to 
reintroduce the possibility for response bias in order to find converging evidence for the 
response bias account (note that traditional accounts also predict response bias alongside 
motivated reasoning). Given the novelty of the forced choice reasoning method, the 
question was raised whether this method could result in response bias when it was 
specifically reintroduced. 
Two new problem types were created to allow for a test of response bias. In the new 
problem types, believability and validity were intentionally confounded, opening up the 
possibility for participants to base their responses on the believability of the conclusion. 
The non-conflict problem type consisted of a valid and an invalid syllogism. Conclusion 
believability was manipulated such that the valid syllogism always had a believable 
conclusion and that the invalid syllogism always had an unbelievable one. In other words, 
validity and believability were perfectly positively correlated. For the conflict problems, 
the valid argument always had an unbelievable conclusion and the invalid argument had a 
believable conclusion (validity and believability were perfectly negatively correlated; see 
Table 2.6). The reintroduction of different believability statuses within each trial allowed 
participants to base their validity decision on their belief in the conclusion. For the non-
conflict problems, doing so would result in a high overall proportion of “correct” 
responses (if for the wrong reason), given that the believable conclusion always followed a 
valid argument. For the conflict problems, basing the validity judgement on prior beliefs 
would result in a low overall proportion of correct responses. In other words, if 
participants judge validity on the basis of believability as all belief bias accounts 
predict, then proportion “correct” for non-conflict problems should be higher than for 
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conflict problems. As such, the contrast between proportion correct responses for the non-
conflict and the conflict problems is a measure of belief bias as response bias. Traditional 
accounts of belief bias as well as the response bias account predict that participants will 
show response bias. This prediction is tested in the current experiment. 
Table 2.6 
Example of the Non-Conflict and Conflict Problem Types 
A. Non-
conflict 
VALID BELIEVABLE: 
No cigarettes are inexpensive 
Some addictive things are inexpensive 
___________________________________________ 
Some addictive things are not cigarettes 
INVALID UNBELIEVABLE: 
No cigarettes are inexpensive 
Some addictive things are inexpensive 
____________________________________________ 
Some cigarettes are not addictive 
B. 
Conflict 
VALID UNBELIEVABLE: 
No addictive things are inexpensive 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive 
___________________________________________ 
Some cigarettes are not addictive 
INVALID BELIEVABLE: 
No addictive things are inexpensive 
Some cigarettes are inexpensive 
______________________________________________ 
Some addictive things are not cigarettes 
Note. Both syllogisms have conclusions that vary in believability. The left syllogisms is 
valid, the right one invalid. For the non-conflict problem type (A.) valid syllogisms always 
have a believable conclusion, invalid syllogisms always have an unbelievable one. For the 
conflict problem type (B.) valid syllogisms have unbelievable conclusions, invalid 
syllogisms have believable ones. The presented syllogisms are taken from Evans et al. 
(1983) and were not used in the present experiment. 
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2.3.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 33 participants took part in exchange for course credit. Six participants were 
male and 27 were female (age range = 18 – 26, M = 20, SD = 2). 
Materials 
The materials were created in exactly the same way as in Experiment 1. The neutral 
problem type was dropped in favour of the non-conflict and the conflict problem types. 
The believable and unbelievable problem types used in Experiment 1 were 
also included in the current study. This resulted in four problem types for a total of 64 
trials (16 of each problem type). For believable problems both conclusions were 
believable, with one argument always being valid and one argument always invalid. For 
the unbelievable problems both conclusions were unbelievable, one always being valid 
and one always being invalid. For the non-conflict problems one conclusion was believable 
and one conclusion was unbelievable, with the added constraint that the believable 
conclusion was always valid and that the unbelievable conclusion was always invalid. 
Finally, for the conflict problems one conclusion was always believable and one conclusion 
was always unbelievable, with the believable conclusion always constrained to be invalid 
contrary to the unbelievable conclusion, which was always valid. Within each problem 
type, half of the times the argument on the left was valid and half the times the argument 
on the right was valid. Item contents were randomized as in Experiment 1. An additional 
subordinate category member item was added for each of the 16 categories to compensate 
for the two added problem types. Sixteen extra pseudowords were randomly generated to 
be used as nonsense middle terms, allowing premise believability to be controlled for. 
Procedure, Measures, and Design 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. Accuracy, confidence ratings, and 
response latency were measured. The experiment employed a one-way within subjects 
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design (problem type: believable v. unbelievable v. non-conflict v. conflict). As in the 
previous experiment, every participant received an identical list of problems with 
uniquely randomized item contents. Within every list all the problems were presented in a 
randomised order. 
2.3.2 Results 
On each trial, participants were able to change their response from the left syllogism to the 
one on the right or vice versa, but only did so in 3% of the cases. A one-sample t test 
comparing proportion of left responses with 32 indicated that the participants were not 
biased towards the left or the right argument, t(32) = 1.22, p = .23. Three participants 
scored below chance for the believable and unbelievable problem types and were 
removed from all subsequent analyses. Note that we only took performance into account 
for the believable and unbelievable problems types as they are a true measure of 
reasoning performance. The conflict and non-conflict problems do not provide a pure 
measure of reasoning accuracy due to the (intentional) confound between validity and 
beliefs. 
Accuracy 
On the whole, the sample reasoned significantly above chance, with the average 
participant getting 68% correct for the believable and unbelievable problem types, t(29) = 
6.07, p < .001. The current study allows for a test of response bias as well as for a test of 
motivated reasoning. The relevant contrast for the former test is between the non-conflict 
and the conflict problem types. For the latter, the contrast of interest is the difference 
between the believable and the unbelievable problem types. 
Response bias 
Accuracy was analysed using one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: non-
conflict v. conflict). The analysis revealed that there was no significant difference in 
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accuracy for the non-conflict (M = .67) and the conflict (M = .67) problem types, F(1, 29) = 
0.02, p = .90, ηp2 < .01. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 2.7. 
Motivated reasoning 
Accuracy was analysed using one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: 
believable v. unbelievable). The analysis revealed that there was no significant difference 
in accuracy for the believable (M = .67) and the unbelievable (M = .69) problem types, F(1, 
29) = 0.042, p = .84, ηp2 < .01. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 
Experiment 2: Means (Standard Errors) for the Accuracy, Confidence Rating and Latency 
Analysis  
 Believable Unbelievable Non-conflict Conflict 
Accuracy .67 (.03) .69 (.03) .67 (.04) .67 (.04) 
Confidence 2.00 (0.05) 2.04 (0.06) 1.99 (0.06) 2.03 (0.07) 
Latency 16,307 (1,082) 17,074 (931) 16,514 (1,042) 16,183 (913) 
Note. Accuracy is proportion correct responses, confidence is on a scale from 1 – 3, and 
latency is measured in ms. 
Confidence 
Confidence ratings were analysed using one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem 
type: believable v. unbelievable v. non-conflict v. conflict). There was no effect of problem 
type on confidence, F(3, 87) = 0.47, p = .70, ηp2 = .02. Means and standard errors can be 
found in Table 2.7. 
Latency 
RTs were transformed using the natural logarithm and analysed using one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA (problem type: believable v. unbelievable v. non-conflict v. conflict). 
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There was no effect of problem type on latency, F(3, 87) = 1.37, p = .26, , ηp2 = .05. Means 
and standard errors can be found in Table 2.7. 
2.3.3 Discussion 
The forced choice reasoning paradigm introduced in Experiment 1 was extended with two 
additional problem types to allow for a test of response bias and of motivated reasoning. 
The main finding of Experiment 1 was replicated: beliefs did not affect accuracy, 
suggesting that participants did not engage in motivated reasoning. This finding is 
compatible with the response bias account of belief bias (Dube et al., 2010). Incompatible 
with the response bias account, however, was the finding that belief did not affect 
performance on the non-conflict and conflict trials. This suggests that participants did not 
show a response bias even when given the opportunity to do so. This finding requires 
explanation, because these results imply that belief bias is absent in syllogistic reasoning 
when studied in a forced choice paradigm.  
There are two potential explanations for these results. The first option is that the 
presentation of the motivated reasoning problem types (believable and unbelievable) 
alongside the response bias problem types (non-conflict and conflict) caused participants 
to infer that believability was not a relevant and/or useful problem cue to base a validity 
judgement on in the current experiment. Given that for half the problems beliefs did not 
allow participants to make a validity decision (i.e., the believable and unbelievable 
problem types), they may have chosen to completely ignore beliefs altogether, instead 
defaulting to content-independent reasoning strategies. This explanation is referred to as 
the belief suppression hypothesis. The second possibility is that presenting syllogisms in a 
forced choice context triggers a shift in focus from the conclusion to the premises of the 
argument. In the traditional single-problem presentation paradigm, research suggests that 
participants typically reason from the conclusion to the premises (Morley, Evans, & 
Handley, 2004). Participants first evaluate the believability of the conclusion, the 
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assessment of which drives the reasoning process, leading to belief bias. It is possible that 
the forced choice reasoning paradigm interferes with this process, resulting in an absence 
of (both components of) belief bias in favour of more structure based reasoning. We call 
this explanation the shifted focus hypothesis. In the remainder of this chapter we test the 
belief suppression hypothesis (Experiment 3) and the shifted focus hypothesis 
(Experiment 4). 
2.4 Experiment 3 
The initial aim of the forced choice reasoning paradigm was to allow for an investigation of 
response bias and motivated reasoning using a novel SDT-based method. In Experiments 1 
and 2, evidence consistent with Dube et al.’s (2010) response bias account was found. 
Contrary to the clear predictions from all belief bias accounts (including the response bias 
account) however, response bias did not occur when the opportunity to find it was 
reintroduced in Experiment 2. This finding suggests that the forced choice method had an 
impact on the reasoning process. One suggestion was that the method led to the active 
suppression of prior beliefs when reasoning.  
In the current study the belief suppression hypothesis is tested. According to this 
hypothesis, response bias was absent because of the inclusion of the motivated reasoning 
test within subjects. Otherwise put, the believable and unbelievable item types revealed to 
participants that believability is an irrelevant cue for the task at hand. Consequently, 
participants suppressed the influence of beliefs even for those problems in which it could 
be used (i.e., the non-conflict and conflict problems). If the belief suppression hypothesis 
holds, then presentation of only those problems for which beliefs could potentially be 
considered a useful discriminatory cue (i.e., the non-conflict and conflict problems) should 
reintroduce response bias. In the current study participants were presented only with 
non-conflict, conflict and neutral problems. All accounts of belief bias (including the 
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response bias account) predict that accuracy should be higher for the non-conflict 
compared to the conflict trials due to the application of a belief selection heuristic. As in 
Experiment 1, the neutral problem type was included to investigate the direction of the 
belief bias (Evans et al., 2001). 
2.4.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 23 participants took part in exchange for course credit. Four participants were 
male and 19 were female (age 18 – 25, M = 20, SD = 2). 
Materials 
The stimulus list contained 48 problems in total. Sixteen problems were of the non-conflict 
type, 16 problems were of the conflict type and 16 problems were of the neutral type. All 
problems were constructed in the same way as in the previous experiments. 
Procedure, Measures, and Design 
The procedure was completely identical to the procedures of Experiments 1 and 2. The 
same dependent variables as in Experiments 1 and 2 were measured: accuracy, confidence 
and latency. A one-way within subjects design was used (problem type: no conflict v. 
conflict v. neutral). Every participant received an identical list of problems with uniquely 
randomized item contents. For each participant the problems were presented in an 
individually randomised order. 
2.4.2 Results 
On every trial participants were given the opportunity to change their response from one 
option to the other and back again. In total, participants only switched in 3% of the cases 
after making their initial selection. Participants were not biased towards the left or the 
right argument, t(22) = 0.52, p = 0.60. Two participants responded below chance on the 
neutral problems and were removed. 
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Accuracy 
Response bias 
The remaining participants performed above chance for the neutral problems (M = .73), 
t(20) = 5.80, p < .001. To test for belief bias as response bias, accuracy was analysed using 
a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: non-conflict v. conflict). The analysis 
revealed that there was no significant accuracy difference between the non-conflict (M 
= .71) and conflict (M = .68) problem types, F(1, 20) = 0.18, p = .68. The accuracy level of 
the non-conflict and conflict problem types was compared with a neutral problem type 
using one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: non-conflict v. conflict v. 
neutral). There were no significant accuracy differences between the three problem types, 
F(2, 40) = 0.32, p = .73. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8 
Experiment 3: Means (Standard Errors) for the Accuracy, Confidence Rating and Latency 
Analysis 
 Non-conflict Conflict Neutral 
Accuracy .71 (0.04) .68 (0.05) .73 (0.03) 
Confidence 2.23 (0.07) 2.27 (0.07) 1.95 (0.07) 
Latency 16,449 (1,030) 16,725 (893) 20,009 (1,155) 
Note. Accuracy is proportion correct responses, confidence is on a scale from 1 – 3, latency 
is measured in ms. 
 Confidence 
Confidence ratings were analysed using a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem 
type: non-conflict v. conflict v. neutral). A significant main effect of problem type was 
found, F(2, 40) = 18.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. Pairwise contrasts revealed that confidence was 
lower for the neutral compared to the non-conflict, t(20) = 4.97, p < .001, and conflict, t(20) 
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= 4.76, p < .001, problem types. There was no confidence difference between the non-
conflict and conflict problem types, t < 1, p = .21. Means and standard errors can be found 
in Table 2.8. 
Latency 
Log-transformed RTs were analysed using one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem 
type: non-conflict v. conflict v. neutral). The analysis produced a significant main effect of 
problem type, F(1, 20) = 8.63, p = .001, ηp2 = .30. Pairwise contrasts revealed that 
participants took longer to respond to the neutral problems compared to the non-conflict, 
t(20) = 3.40, p = .003, and the conflict, t(20) = 3.09, p = .006, problems. Non-conflict and 
conflict RTs did not differ significantly, t < 1, p = .55. Means and standard errors can be 
found in Table 2.8. 
2.4.3 Discussion 
The main aim of Experiment 3 was to test the belief suppression hypothesis. According to 
this hypothesis, the participants in Experiment 2 did not show response bias because the 
presence of the motivated reasoning problem types (believable and unbelievable) 
emphasised that believability was not a relevant cue (i.e., if both conclusions are 
(un)believable given that one argument is valid and the other is invalid, then it necessarily 
follows that conclusion believability is unrelated to validity). The absence of belief bias as 
response bias in the current experiment in the absence of the motivated reasoning 
problem types suggests that the belief suppression hypothesis is incorrect. Note that in all 
experiments so far the vast majority of the participants responded significantly above 
chance, suggesting that the absence of motivated reasoning (E1-E2) and of response bias 
(E2-E3) and cannot be attributed to floor performance – the participants reason, they just 
do so in a nontraditional way. Furthermore, the presence of believable and unbelievable 
contents versus neutral content did have an impact on confidence and latency: 
participants were more confident and responded quicker to the non-conflict and conflict 
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problems compared to the neutral problems, yet performance did not differ. Taken 
together these findings suggest that perhaps the forced choice method in its current form 
encourages a different reasoning style. In the discussion of Experiment 2 we proposed that 
such an alternative reasoning style may have originated from a shift in focus from the 
conclusion to the premises. In Experiment 4 the shifted focus hypothesis was tested. 
2.5 Experiment 4 
According to the shifted focus hypothesis, the mere act of presenting two reasoning 
problems next to each other fundamentally alters the reasoning process in such a way that 
participants focus on the premises first, rather than the conclusion. In other words, forced 
choice reasoning might trigger premise-to-conclusion reasoning, whereas typically, 
conclusion-to-premise reasoning is the norm (Morley et al., 2004). In addition to this, we 
suspect that presenting a valid and an invalid argument next to each other reveals the 
underlying structure. In many cases, for instance, the only difference between the two 
problems is that the A- and C- terms appear to be swapped around in the premises, with 
all other things remaining equal. A focus on the structure of the argument rather than the 
believability of the conclusion might explain why beliefs have no impact and performance 
is reliably above chance.  
In the current experiment we attempted to reintroduce conclusion-to-premise reasoning. 
If the shifted focus hypothesis is correct, then nudging people towards a conclusion-to-
premise reasoning technique should lead to a reintroduction of beliefs in the reasoning 
process – be it in terms of a response bias or motivated reasoning. We altered the forced 
choice method by introducing non-simultaneous problem presentation. As in the previous 
experiments, participants were presented with two syllogisms side by side, however, at 
the start of each trial, only the conclusions were presented (Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2 Example of the non-simultaneous problem presentation used in Experiment 4, 
prior to selection. 
The participant then had to reason about both syllogisms individually by revealing the 
premises of each argument by clicking on the corresponding box (Figure 2.3). This 
ensured that participants processed the conclusions prior to processing the premises. 
Furthermore, the fact that both syllogisms were never simultaneously visible ensured that 
a structure based comparison of the premises was impractical. If the non-simultaneous 
problem presentation reintroduces the effects of belief, we can further investigate 
whether participants engage in response bias (Dube et al., 2010), motivated reasoning, or 
both (e.g., Evans et al., 2001). 
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Figure 2.3 Example of the non-simultaneous problem presentation used in Experiment 4, 
after selection. 
2.5.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 53 people took place in exchange for course credit (18 male). The mean age was 
20 years (SD = 3, range = 18 – 31). 
Materials 
The materials were identical to the ones used in Experiment 2. Every participant received 
a problem list containing 64 trials with 16 problems of each problem type (i.e., believable, 
unbelievable, non-conflict, conflict). As in all previous experiments, item contents were 
randomly assigned for each participant resulting in a unique problem content – problem 
structure combination, allowing us to control for any unwanted effects of item content. 
Procedure, Measures, and Design 
The procedure was identical to the procedure in the previous experiments, with the 
exception of the non-simultaneous problem presentation (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3 for an 
75 
example). On each trial, participants were presented with two boxes containing only a 
conclusion. Upon clicking either box, the premises associated with that syllogism appeared, 
allowing the participant to reason about its validity while the other premises remained 
hidden. Clicking the non-selected box revealed the premises associated with the other 
syllogism and made the premises of the first syllogisms disappear (see Figures 2.2 and 
2.3). As such, participants could only ever reason about one problem at a time. The 
participants were allowed to switch between both problems as often as they desired. As in 
all previous experiments we measured accuracy, confidence ratings on a scale from 1 – 3 
and response latency in milliseconds. The experiment employed a one-way within subjects 
design (problem type: believable, unbelievable, non-conflict, conflict). 
2.5.2 Results 
Participants were allowed to switch between the left and the right argument as often as 
they desired. The amount of selection switches was a lot higher than in the previous 
experiments, with participants swapping between 1 to 2 times per trial on average (M = 
1.56, SD = 1.52). This makes sense in light of the fact that participants had to make at least 
one switch to see both syllogisms. Contrary to the previous experiments, only one 
participant responded below chance for the believable and unbelievable problems and 
was removed. 
Accuracy 
Participants responded significantly above chance for the believable and unbelievable 
problems (M = .75), t(51) = 10.34, p < .001. We analysed the accuracy data for the 
motivated reasoning problems (i.e., the believable and unbelievable problem types) and 
the response bias problems (i.e., the no conflict and conflict problem types) separately. 
Response bias 
Accuracy was analysed using a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: non-
conflict v. conflict). The analysis revealed that there was no significant difference in 
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accuracy for the non-conflict (M = .77) and the conflict (M = .73) problem types, F(1, 51) = 
0.49, p = .49, ηp2 < .01. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 2.9. 
Motivated reasoning 
Accuracy was analysed using a one-way repeated measures ANOVA (problem type: 
believable v. unbelievable). The analysis revealed a main effect of problem type, 
suggesting that participants achieved higher logical reasoning accuracy for unbelievable 
(M = .77) than for believable (M = .72) arguments, F(1, 51) = 4.10, p = .048, ηp2 = .074. 
Means and standard errors can be found in Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9 
Experiment 4: Means (Standard Errors) for the Accuracy, Confidence Rating and Latency 
Analysis  
 Believable Unbelievable Non-conflict Conflict 
Accuracy .72 (.02) .77 (.03) .77 (.02) .73 (.03) 
Confidence 2.13 (0.06) 2.24 (0.06) 2.17 (0.06) 2.23 (0.07) 
Latency 22,001 (1,147) 21,208 (1,130) 21,080 (1,077) 20,668 (999) 
Note. Accuracy is proportion correct responses, confidence is on a scale from 1 – 3, latency 
is measured in ms. 
Confidence 
Response bias 
Confidence ratings were analysed using a one-way (problem type: non-conflict v. conflict) 
repeated measures ANOVA. There was no effect of problem type, p > .20. Means and 
standard errors can be found in Table 2.9 
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Motivated reasoning 
Confidence ratings were analysed using a one-way (problem type: believable v. 
unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVA. Participants were more confident for the 
unbelievable than for the believable problems, F(1, 51) = 6.42, p = .014, ηp2 = .11. Means 
and standard errors can be found in Table 2.9. 
Latency 
Response bias 
Log-transformed RTs were analysed using a one way (problem type: non-conflict v. 
conflict) repeated measures ANOVA. There was no effect of problem type on latency, 
p > .81. Means and standard errors are presented in Table 2.9. 
Motivated reasoning 
Log-transformed RTs were analysed using a one way (problem type: believable v. 
unbelievable) repeated measures ANOVA. There was also no effect of problem type on 
latency, p > .33. Means and standard errors are presented in Table 2.9. 
2.5.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 4 non-simultaneous problem presentation was used to test the shifted 
focus hypothesis. Compatible with this hypothesis, non-simultaneous problem 
presentation revealed an effect of belief using the forced choice paradigm. Participants 
engaged in motivated reasoning, but there was no evidence of response bias (although the 
means certainly indicated a trend in the expected direction). This finding is incompatible 
with Dube et al.’s response bias account of belief bias, given that this account predicts 
exactly the reverse pattern (i.e., the presence of response bias in the absence of motivated 
reasoning).  
With regards to the traditional accounts, the findings also do not fit well with 
misinterpreted necessity (MN; Evans et al., 1983), metacognitive uncertainty (MU; Quayle 
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& Ball, 2000) and modified verbal reasoning theory (MVRT; Thompson et al., 2003). All of 
these accounts do not interpret the logic x belief interaction as originating from motivated 
reasoning, but rather from a misunderstanding of the logical meaning of necessity (MN), 
from overloaded working memory resources (MU), or because model search is easier for 
believable than for unbelievable problems (MVRT). In all of these cases the logic x belief 
interaction is interpreted as resulting from response bias differing in magnitude for valid 
and invalid problems, something which cannot possibly drive the accuracy effect given our 
use of the force choice method explicitly prevented such a response bias from occurring. 
The findings are more compatible with the following three accounts of belief bias: 
selective scrutiny (SS; Evans et al., 1982), mental models theory (MMT; Oakhill et al., 
1989), and selective processing theory (SPT; Evans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2000). Out of 
the three viable theories, the results are the least compatible with SS given that it would 
predict both response bias and motivated reasoning, and that only the latter is found. 
Furthermore, SS does not explicitly suggest that reasoning occurs from the conclusion to 
the premises; as such there should be no difference in the effects of belief between the 
simultaneous and the non-simultaneous problem presentation. According to MMT, the key 
aspect of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning is a motivated search for counterexamples. 
However, MMT explicitly predicts premise to conclusion reasoning, so it is unclear how 
the theory can account for the fact that non-simultaneous problem presentation leads to 
different results than simultaneous problem presentation. SPT, finally, provides a 
reasonable account of the findings given that it explicitly predicts conclusion to premise 
reasoning. However, as with SS, SPT also predicts a small response bias which is not found 
here. The current findings are not fully compatible with any of the extant theories of belief 
bias. 
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2.6 General Discussion 
The aim of the current chapter was to test both the response bias (Dube et al., 2010; 2011) 
and the traditional accounts of belief bias using a novel forced choice reasoning method 
within the SDT framework. In Experiment 4, significant evidence of motivated reasoning 
was found using a non-simultaneous presentation method. Conversely, in the first three 
experiments the motivated reasoning (E1-E2) and response bias (E2-E3) components of 
belief bias were absent. The absence of response bias in Experiment 1 could be taken as 
evidence compatible with the response bias account, but the subsequent absence of 
response bias in Experiment 2 suggested that perhaps the simultaneous forced choice 
reasoning method encourages a different reasoning process compared to more traditional 
belief bias tasks.  
Two potential explanations for the absence of the belief effects were forwarded. According 
to the belief suppression hypothesis, the presentation of the motivated reasoning problem 
types alongside the response bias ones caused participants to disregard beliefs completely, 
given that they were clearly irrelevant in the determination of logical validity. According 
to the shifted focus hypothesis, presenting two arguments side by side triggered a focus on 
the structure of the premises rather than the conclusion, leading to an atypical reasoning 
process different from what is typically expected in a single presentation paradigm. 
Experiment 3 provided evidence incompatible with the belief suppression hypothesis by 
showing that simultaneous problem presentation of the response bias problems in the 
absence of the motivated reasoning problems did not lead to belief bias as response bias. 
Experiment 4 provided evidence compatible with the shifted-focus hypothesis, suggesting 
that changing the presentation method to encourage a conclusion-to-premise reasoning 
strategy resulted in an effect of beliefs on reasoning. 
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2.6.1 Eliminating Response Bias 
The fact that simultaneous problem presentation can be used to eliminate belief bias both 
in terms of response bias and motivated reasoning whilst still retaining above chance 
performance is an unexpected and novel finding given the reliability with which the 
interference of belief with reasoning has been demonstrated countless times since Wilkins 
(1929). This is particularly interesting considering that many studies have unsuccessfully 
attempted to eliminate belief bias using various manipulations.  For instance, augmented 
instructions stressing the importance of logical necessity have been shown to reduce, but 
not eliminate belief bias (Evans, 2000; Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994; Newstead, 
Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). The only exception is the case of reasoning with causal 
conditionals, where response was eliminated using strong instructions, but only for 
participants of higher cognitive ability (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010). 
Furthermore, the response bias that was observed was of a smaller magnitude than that in 
syllogistic reasoning, probably explaining why it was easier to eliminate. 
In the traditional syllogistic belief bias paradigm, limiting the amount of response time 
available has led to the elimination of motivated reasoning in favour of more response bias 
(Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). However, the validity of all these results is questionable 
given that these experiments did not employ the appropriate measurement method (i.e., 
SDT) to quantify response bias and motivated reasoning. It appears that the simultaneous 
forced choice reasoning method is an interesting new paradigm for the study of deductive 
reasoning in the absence of both components of belief bias. 
2.6.2 Reintroducing Motivated Reasoning 
Non-simultaneous problem presentation led to the reintroduction of an influence of 
beliefs, albeit only in terms of motivated reasoning. This finding is striking for a number of 
reasons. First, this is–to our knowledge–the first demonstration of motivated reasoning in 
a forced choice reasoning paradigm, suggesting that the effect is not necessarily a 
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statistical artefact originating from the application of an inappropriate analysis technique 
(i.e., endorsement rate analysis). Second, the finding of motivated reasoning in the absence 
of response bias is unexpected and novel, particularly given that the latter merely requires 
participants to apply a simple belief-heuristic. Even though this finding is potentially 
compatible with various traditional theories of belief bias, it cannot be fully explained by 
any one account (see the Discussion of Experiment 4).  
The main aim of this chapter was to assess the viability of Dube et al.’s (2010) response 
bias account using an alternative novel method rooted in the SDT framework. Our results 
provide evidence incompatible with the idea that belief bias is just a response bias and 
that motivated reasoning is just an artefact of inappropriate assumptions. These results 
indicate that a more thorough investigation of both belief bias components is required. We 
return to the forced choice method in Chapter 4 in which we assessed the impact of 
individual differences. We now first turn to Chapter 3 in which we employed the ROC 
method in combination with various traditional experimental manipulations that have 
been shown to have an impact on belief bias. The primary aim of Chapter 3 is to replicate 
the absence of motivated reasoning reported by Dube et al. using their method. This is 
important to ensure that our motivated reasoning evidence which has led us to question 
the response bias account is not merely due to unforeseen methodological issues inherent 
to the forced choice paradigm. 
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Chapter 3: The ROC Method 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 tentative evidence against the response bias account of belief bias was found 
using a novel forced choice paradigm situated within the SDT framework. This raises the 
question why our findings clash with those reported by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010), 
who found that response bias can sufficiently account for belief bias. In contrast, our 
results showed that beliefs resulted in motivated reasoning instead of response bias. This 
finding was puzzling given that both experiments adopted a methodology situated within 
the SDT framework. There was a difference, however: Dube et al. gathered confidence 
ratings to plot receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves in order to disentangle 
response bias and reasoning accuracy. We, on the other hand, achieved the same goal by 
employing a forced choice reasoning approach. Even though the two methods are 
conceptually equivalent, we cannot exclude the possibility that a difference in the methods 
has led to the difference in the belief bias effects, as suggested for instance by the presence 
of motivated reasoning in the absence of response bias in Experiment 4. On a similar note, 
previous research in the medical imaging domain has shown that the forced choice and 
ROC procedures can lead to different results (Burgess, 1995). 
In the current chapter we report four experiments employing the ROC method. This leaves 
open two options: a) application of the ROC method will replicate Dube et al.’s findings, 
suggesting that there is something unique about the forced choice method which leads to 
motivated reasoning, or b) application of the ROC method will mimic our forced choice 
findings, suggesting that an alternative difference between Dube et al. and our studies is 
driving the discrepancy. If the first option turns out to be correct, we need to investigate 
how and why conceptually equivalent methods within the same framework can lead to 
clashing results. This finding could potentially put into question the validity of the SDT 
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approach for the study of reasoning. If the second option holds true, a broader focus on the 
differences between Dube et al.’s experiment and our experiments is necessary. 
3.1.1 Belief Bias Manipulations 
Various experimental manipulations have been shown to affect belief bias. For instance, 
decreasing the logical complexity of syllogisms has been shown to eliminate motivated 
reasoning and to decrease response bias (Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). Time 
taken to respond is has been shown to simultaneously decrease motivated reasoning and 
increase response bias (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). Strong or augmented deductive 
reasoning instructions have been demonstrated to eliminate both response bias and 
motivated reasoning (Newstead et al., 1992), although later research has shown that 
rather than eliminate, instructions merely decreased belief bias (Evans, Newstead, Allen, & 
Pollard, 1994). Item contents can also have unintended effects on syllogistic reasoning and 
belief bias if the assignment of contents to argument structures is not sufficiently 
randomised or poorly controlled (Klauer & Singmann, in press). The crucial difference 
between Dube et al.’s results and the results presented in Chapter 2 could be linked to any 
of these factors, i.e., a difference in paradigm (forced choice v. ROC), argument complexity, 
response time taken, instructions, or item contents. We investigate the potential impact of 
all these factors in four experiments. 
3.1.2 The ROC Procedure 
To ensure that the use of a different paradigm does not lie at the basis of the inconsistent 
motivated reasoning findings, we employed the ROC procedure in the next studies. In the 
traditional conclusion evaluation paradigm, SDT posits that the reasoner compares the 
strength of the current argument with a criterion. If the argument strength exceeds the 
criterion, the participant responds “valid”, if not, an “invalid” response is given (see Figure 
3.1). 
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Figure 3.1. Underlying invalid and valid argument strength distributions of the classic binary 
choice reasoning paradigm according to SDT. “Valid” is responded if argument strength 
exceeds the response criterion. 
One potential issue with the yes/no approach and the single-point sensitivity (d’) and bias 
(c) measures that go with it is that these single point measures require the assumption 
that the underlying normal distributions of argument strength for valid and invalid 
arguments have equal variance. Given that this assumption is often violated, it is desirable 
to enrichen the data by gathering additional observations through manipulation of the 
response criterion. These additional data points can then be used to verify whether the 
equal variance assumption holds, and if it does not, additional measures which account for 
unequal variance can be calculated. In practice this goal is often achieved by gathering 
confidence ratings (Dube et al., 2010; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). These extra 
observations allow for a higher resolution inspection of the underlying distributions. 
Confidence ratings are used to plot ROC curves, which are plots of hits versus false alarms 
(i.e., sensitivity) for decreasing levels of the response criterion (i.e., bias). The underlying 
assumption of using confidence ratings to construct ROCs is that differences in confidence 
given identical reasoning accuracy reflect internal criterion placement. When reasoning 
with confidence ratings, the participant must divide the argument strength dimension into 
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6 bins using 5 response criteria (Figure 3.2), as opposed to two bins using one response 
criterion in the case of a valid/invalid decision (Figure 3.1). If the argument strength 
exceeds the most conservative criterion, a high confidence “valid” (i.e., 6) response is given. 
More liberal responses are linked to lower values on the recoded confidence rating scale. 
Confidence ratings for “invalid” responses are recoded such that highest confidence 
“invalid” responses equate to the most liberal response criterion in terms of the 
underlying argument strength. The reason for this is that responding “invalid” with high 
confidence implies very low argument strength (i.e., there is only very weak evidence to 
suggest that the argument is valid), consequently, a response of “1” implies a very liberal 
response criterion. The relation of the confidence ratings to the argument strength 
distributions can be seen in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2. Underlying distributions and the 5 criteria of the SDT confidence rating reasoning 
paradigm. A “6” response equates a high confidence “valid” response. A “1” response equates 
a high confidence “invalid” response. “5” = medium confidence “valid”; “4” = low confidence 
“valid” response, “3” = low confidence “invalid” response, “2” = medium confidence “invalid” 
response.  
Figure 3.3 shows how the six confidence ratings can be cumulatively plotted across 
increasing levels of bias in terms of hits versus false alarms (sensitivity). Due to the 
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cumulative nature of the ROC, and the fact that the density under each distribution equals 
one, the final point of the ROC necessarily ends up at (1, 1). From a theoretical point of 
view, optimal performance is achieved when hits are maximized and false alarms are 
minimized. As such, the closer the resulting curve lies to the upper left corner of the graph, 
the higher performance. This measure is often formalised by calculating the area under 
the ROC, A-sub-z (Az). The explicit relation of the underlying response criteria to the points 
ultimately plotted in a ROC curve is made evident in Figure 3.3. SDT models can be fit to 
these ROCs to estimate the mean and variance of the underlying distributions, as well as 
the location of the 5 criteria. 
Figure 3.3. Construction of an ROC curve using confidence ratings. Hits are plotted against 
false alarms for increasing levels of bias. 
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We now introduce the first experiment in which we attempted to replicate Dube et al.’s 
finding of response bias in the absence of motivated reasoning using the ROC procedure. 
We also manipulated syllogism complexity. 
3.2 Experiment 5 
Dube et al. (2010) argued that belief bias in syllogistic reasoning can be explained in terms 
of a response bias. Conversely, in Chapter 2 evidence was found that was incompatible 
with a pure bias account. The main aim of this first experiment was to replicate Dube et 
al.’s finding using their method. We additionally manipulated argument complexity in 
order investigate whether their findings generalise to a different class of reasoning 
problems. Argument complexity was manipulated between subjects by presenting one 
group of participants with a number of simple (i.e., one-model) syllogisms, whereas a 
different group was presented with the previously used complex (i.e., multiple-model) 
syllogisms. We also methodologically improved upon Dube et al.’s (2010) design in 
multiple ways. Item contents were randomly assigned to syllogistic forms for each 
participant individually, ensuring that any observed (lack of) differences between 
conditions are not due to unfortunate random content assignment (e.g., Klauer & 
Singmann, in press). Finally, given that Dube et al.’s response bias theory is ultimately 
based on a null-result (i.e., the absence of a difference in accuracy between believability 
conditions), we increased the available power to detect an effect by doubling the amount 
of arguments evaluated by each participant. 
3.2.1 Theoretical Predictions 
If the response bias account holds, there should only be an effect of response bias in both 
the simple and the complex argument condition. Any observation of motivated reasoning 
in either condition is clear evidence against the response bias account. The complexity 
manipulation additionally allows us to distinguish between various traditional accounts of 
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belief bias. Selective scrutiny (SS) predicts more accurate reasoning for unbelievable 
compared to believable syllogisms because people tend to automatically accept believable 
conclusions but engage in deductive reasoning for unbelievable ones. This should be true 
for both simple and complex problems (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). Misinterpreted 
necessity (MN) predicts an accuracy effect for complex syllogisms because for conclusions 
that are indeterminately invalid, people adopt the heuristic of responding solely based on 
believability. This means that they will tend to be accurate when invalid conclusions are 
unbelievable but inaccurate when they are believable. This difference in accuracy is not 
predicted for simple syllogisms because they are determinately invalid (Evans et al., 1983). 
Mental Models Theory and Selective Processing Theory both predict an accuracy effect for 
multiple-model (i.e., complex) syllogisms. According to MMT, unbelievable conclusions cue 
a motivated search for all possible models, making it likely that an invalid argument will 
be correctly rejected. Believable conclusions do not cue a search, so that believable invalid 
arguments are less likely to be rejected (Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989). 
According to SPT, unbelievable conclusions cue a falsifying strategy so that the single 
model constructed for an unbelievable invalid argument points to its correct rejection. On 
the other hand, believable conclusions cue a confirming strategy so that the single model 
constructed for a believable invalid argument points to its incorrect acceptance (Evans, 
Handley, & Harper, 2001). The effect on accurate responding described by MMT and SPT 
does not apply to valid conclusions where there is only a single possible model (i.e., simple 
syllogisms). The net result is that with complex problems, both MMT and SPT predict an 
effect of believability on accuracy as a result of differences in the ability to reject invalid 
conclusions. With simple problems, on the other hand, according to MMT people will 
always arrive at the same model regardless of differences in reasoning style or strategy. 
According to SPT, people will arrive at a confirmatory model for valid syllogisms with 
believable conclusions (leading to correct acceptance) but fail to arrive at a 
disconfirmatory model for valid syllogisms with unbelievable conclusions (also leading to 
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correct acceptance). Thus, according to both theories, believability is predicted to have no 
effect on accuracy for the simple problems. 
3.2.2 Method 
Participants 
A total of 91 undergraduate psychology students from Plymouth University participated in 
exchange for partial fulfilment of a course requirement. Fifteen participants were male 
and 76 were female (age 18 – 43, M = 20, SD = 4). 
Design 
Logical validity (valid v. invalid argument) and conclusion believability (believable v. 
unbelievable) were manipulated within subjects, and argument complexity (simple v. 
complex syllogisms) was manipulated between subjects. 
Materials and Measures 
For each participant, we created a unique list of 64 syllogisms (32 valid and 32 invalid) by 
randomly assigning 64 item contents to the available syllogistic structures. This ensured 
that item content had the potential to be different in every validity x believability cell for 
each participant, allowing us to control for content effects. Item contents were identical to 
the ones used in the experiments presented in Chapter 2. Every list contained 32 valid 
syllogisms and 32 invalid syllogisms. The simple syllogisms were of the one-model type 
using all four figures and all quantifiers bar the “Some…not” one (see Appendix A for an 
overview). These were sampled from Evans, Handley, Harper, & Johnson-Laird (1999). 
The complex syllogisms were of the multiple-model type and taken from Dube et al. 
(2010). Believability was manipulated by making the conclusions definitionally true or 
false. This was achieved by combining object categories with category members. In the 
simple argument condition, conclusions used the “No”- or “Some”-quantifiers. Believable 
“No”-conclusions consisted of a category with a member from a different category (e.g., no 
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tools are trout). Unbelievable ones consisted of a category with one of its members (e.g., 
no tools are hammers). Believable “Some”-conclusions consisted of a category with one of 
its members (e.g., some tools are hammers). Unbelievable ones consisted of a category 
with one of its non-members (e.g., some tools are trout). In the complex argument 
condition conclusions used the “Some…not”-quantifier. Believable conclusions featured 
the category followed by one of its members (e.g., some tools are not hammers). 
Unbelievable conclusions featured a category member followed by its category (e.g., some 
hammers are not tools). We used nonsensical middle terms to control for premise 
believability. Each list was generated by combining the structures, item contents and 
middle terms according to the constraints outlined above. Examples of all problem types 
can be found in Table 3.1. We measured endorsement rates (participant responded “valid” 
or “invalid”), confidence ratings (1 = not confident at all – 3 = very confident), and 
response latency in milliseconds. 
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Table 3.1 
Experiment 5: Examples of Simple and Complex Reasoning Problems 
Valid Invalid 
Simple Believable All bananas are queels 
No queels are reptiles 
No bananas are reptiles 
 Some cars are remoxtions 
All remoxtions are ducks 
No cars are ducks 
Unbelievable Some spaniels are mips 
All mips are fruits 
Some fruits are spaniels 
All Fiats are punes 
No punes are insects 
Some insects are Fiats 
Complex Believable No saws are veemers 
Some tools are veemers 
Some tools are not saws 
Some haddocks are curges 
No curges are fish 
Some fish are not haddocks 
Unbelievable No birds are pinds 
Some pinds are parrots 
Some parrots are not birds 
No spears are blans 
Some weapons are blans 
Some spears are not weapons 
Note. In the actual data set figure and mood were not confounded with problem type. P1 = 
first premise, P2 = second premise, C = conclusion. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested on individual computers in small groups. Upon entering the room 
they were randomly assigned to the simple (n = 47) or complex (n = 44) condition.  The 
instructions were taken from Dube et al. (2010; exp. 2) and presented on the screen. 
Participants were instructed to assume the premises were true, to judge whether the 
conclusion necessarily followed, and to rate their confidence.  After completing four 
practice trials, the participants solved the remaining 64 syllogisms. Syllogisms were 
presented one at a time with response options (s = Valid, k = Invalid) shown at the bottom 
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the screen. After each validity judgment, participants indicated their confidence on a scale 
from 1 (not confident) to 3 (very confident). 
3.2.3 Results 
Data treatment 
We analysed the data both in terms of endorsement rates and by fitting SDT models to 
ROCs. We derived SDT indexes of accuracy and bias to disentangle motivated reasoning 
from response bias (Dube et al., 2010). Validity judgements and confidence ratings were 
combined into six response bins, from 6 (high confidence valid response) to 1 (high 
confidence invalid response). ROC curves were constructed from the transformed 
confidence ratings for each individual and condition. Accuracy (Az) and bias (ca) 
parameters were derived from these ratings using Systat 12 (Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005). Az is a measure of the area under the ROC curve. Given that the ROCs are an 
estimation of the underlying cumulative probability density function, the range of Az is 0 – 
1, with .5 indicating chance performance. The parameter ca is a measure of the average 
response criterion adjusted for unequal variance for the valid and invalid argument 
strength distributions. More negative values indicate a more liberal response criterion (i.e., 
an increased likelihood of responding “valid”). Proportion measures (endorsement rates 
and Az) were arcsine transformed to conform with the assumptions of ANOVA. Response 
latencies were transformed using the natural logarithm and consequently analysed using 
ANOVA. 
Endorsement 
In order to verify whether the participants showed the traditional belief bias effect, 
endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion 
believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (complexity: simple v. complex) mixed 
ANOVA, with the first two factors manipulated within subjects and the last one between 
subjects. The analysis revealed a main effect of validity showing that participants 
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endorsed valid arguments more than invalid arguments, F(1, 89) = 398.66, p < .001, ηp2 
= .82. This effect interacted with complexity suggesting that the validity effect was larger 
in the simple arguments condition, F(1, 89) = 97.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .51. Participants also 
endorsed believable arguments more than unbelievable arguments, F(1, 89) = 10.09, p 
= .002, ηp2 = .10. A main effect of complexity indicated that participants in the complex 
condition accepted more arguments than participants in the simple condition, F(1, 89) = 
12.70, p = .001, ηp2 = .13. Logical validity and conclusion believability interacted in the 
traditional way, suggesting that the validity effect was larger for unbelievable than for 
believable arguments, F(1, 89) = 5.47, p = .022, , ηp2 = .06. Logic, belief and complexity also 
interacted, F(1, 89) = 9.82, p = .002, , ηp2 = .10. Follow-up tests revealed that the logic x 
belief interaction was significant in the complex condition, F(1, 46) = 10.22, p = .003, ηp2 
= .19, but not in the simple condition, F(1, 46) < 1, p = .47. Means and standard errors can 
be found in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 
Experiment 5: Endorsement Rates per Complexity Condition. 
Valid Invalid 
Complexity Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Simple .91 (.02) .87 (.03) .11 (.03) .06 (.02) 
Complex .78 (.03) .75 (.04) .60 (.04) .41 (.03) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). 
SDT 
ROCs (Figure 3.4) were constructed to derive accuracy and bias for each participant. 
Accuracy (Az) was analysed to test for motivated reasoning. Bias (ca) was analysed to test 
for response bias. Both variables were analysed separately. 
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Figure 3.4 Experiment 5: A) ROC for the believable and unbelievable conditions in the simple 
condition. B) ROC for the believable and unbelievable conditions in the complex condition. 
Motivated reasoning 
Accuracy (Az) was analysed using a 2 (believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (simple v. complex) 
mixed ANOVA, with the first factor manipulated within subjects and the second factor 
manipulated between subjects. The analysis revealed a main effect of beliefs on accuracy, 
suggesting that reasoning accuracy was higher for unbelievable than for believable 
arguments, F(1, 89) = 6.90, p = .010, ηp2 = .07. The analysis also revealed a main effect of 
complexity showing that logical accuracy was higher in the simple than in the complex 
condition, F(1, 89) = 69.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .52. Believability and complexity interacted, F(1, 
89) = 5.51, p = .021, ηp2 = .058. Follow up tests revealed that participants in the complex
condition showed motivated reasoning, t(43) = 2.65, p = .011, whereas those in the simple 
condition did not, t(46) = 0.34, p = .73. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 
3.3. 
Response bias 
Response bias (ca) was analysed using a 2 (believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (simple v. 
complex) mixed ANOVA, with the first factor manipulated within subjects. The analysis 
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revealed a main effect of believability, suggesting that participants responded “valid” more 
to believable arguments than to unbelievable arguments, F(1, 89) = 10.33, p = .002, ηp2 
= .10. There was also a main effect of complexity on bias, suggesting that participants were 
more liberal in the complex condition, F(1, 89) = 65.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. The two factors 
did not interact, F(1, 89) = 0.39, p = .54, ηp2 < .01. Means and standard errors can be found 
in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 
Experiment 5: SDT parameters per Complexity Condition 
Simple problems Complex problems 
Measure Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Accuracy (Az) .89 (.02) .90 (.02) .64 (.02) .70 (.02) 
Bias (ca) -0.01 (0.06) 0.18 (0.07) -0.53 (0.07) -0.25 (0.07) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). 
Latency 
We analysed latency by submitting log-transformed response times to a 2 (logical status: 
valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (argument 
complexity: simple v. complex) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two 
factors. Validity and complexity interacted, F(1, 89) = 25.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. Follow up 
tests tests indicated that for simple arguments participants took longer to respond to valid 
(M = 10,595 ms) than to invalid (M = 10,008 ms) arguments, t(46) = 3.10, p = .003. For 
complex arguments the reverse held as participants took longer to respond to invalid (M = 
12,417 ms) than to valid (M = 11,299 ms) arguments, t(43) = 3.86, p < .001. No other 
effects were significant, all ps > .16. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 3.4. 
97 
Table 3.4 
Experiment 5: Response Times per Complexity Condition. 
Valid Invalid 
Complexity Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Simple 10,703 (592) 10,488 (503) 10,045 (597) 9,972 (567) 
Complex 11,538 (612) 11,061 (520) 12,338 (617) 12,496 (586) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors) are expressed in milliseconds. 
3.2.4 Discussion 
Both the endorsement rate analysis and the SDT analysis converged in showing that 
participants engaged in motivated reasoning. This is incompatible with Dube et al.’s (2010) 
finding that belief bias is just a response bias and that beliefs do not impact upon accuracy 
when the appropriate measurement method (SDT) is used. With simple syllogisms, the 
believability effect was consistent with a pure response bias. With complex syllogisms, 
however, unbelievable conclusions produced more accurate judgments. 
The two observations of motivated reasoning using two different paradigms within the 
SDT framework (i.e., Experiment 4 and the current experiment) raise the question why 
Dube et al.’s findings differ from ours. At first glance, the response time data do not seem 
to support a motivated reasoning account given that conclusion believability had no 
impact on the response times. Similar findings have been taken as evidence against 
motivated reasoning (Thompson, Newstead, & Morley, 2011; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, 
Gunter, & Campbell, 2003), however, these apparently discrepant findings can be 
explained in two ways. First, response time does not necessarily equate to reasoning time. 
Thompson et al. argue that participants respond before a self-imposed deadline elapses. It 
is plausible that the overall time taken to respond is comparable across believability 
conditions, but that the amount of time allocated to reasoning and rationalising differs in 
such a way that participants are more engaged in reasoning in the unbelievable condition 
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and in rationalising for the believable condition. Second, research of response times 
broken down by reasoning competence has suggested that the effects typically observed in 
syllogistic reasoning research are an artefact of aggregating across multiple subgroups of 
reasoners each applying different reasoning strategies (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-
Smith, 2011). We will return to this point later on. 
Research has shown that limiting the amount of response time available affects belief bias 
by eliminating motivated reasoning in favour increased response bias (Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005). Given Thompson et al.’s (2003) argument that reasoners respond within 
an arbitrarily set response deadline, it possibly follows that the observed difference 
between our experiment and Dube et al.’s experiment is due to random sampling 
differences in the participants’ tendency to set a strict response deadline. If, for some 
reason, Dube et al.’s participants chose to respond more quickly than ours, this might 
explain the absence of motivated reasoning in their study. We test this hypothesis in 
Experiment 6. 
3.3 Experiment 6 
The aim of the current experiment is to investigate whether a response time deadline 
leads to the disappearance of motivated reasoning in favour of response bias within the 
SDT framework. Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) have demonstrated that participants put 
under time pressure engage in more response bias and no motivated reasoning. In the 
current experiment participants were randomly assigned to an untimed or a speeded 
response time condition. If the hypothesis holds that the discrepancies between Dube et al. 
and our study stem from a difference in response time taken, we should find motivated 
reasoning in the untimed condition but no motivated reasoning in the limited time 
condition. From the traditional accounts we would derive the predictions that limiting 
response time should lead to the elimination of motivated reasoning, an increase in 
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response bias, and an overall decrease in accuracy compared to the untimed condition. 
From the response bias only account we predict that limiting response time should lead to 
a decrease in overall accuracy and an increase in response bias, because limiting the 
possibility to engage in effortful reasoning should shift the participants towards a less 
effortful strategy such as a simple belief-acceptance heuristic. The response bias account 
predicts that motivated reasoning is absent in all conditions. 
3.3.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 86 Plymouth University undergraduate psychology students participated in 
exchange for course credit (34 male, age: range 18 – 49, M = 20, SD = 4). 
Design, Materials and Measures 
Logical validity (valid v. invalid argument) and conclusion believability (believable v. 
unbelievable conclusion) were manipulated within subjects, and time limit (10 s response 
time limit v. no response time limit) was manipulated between subjects. The materials 
were constructed in an identical manner as in the complex condition of Experiment 5. We 
measured endorsement rates, confidence ratings (1 – 3), response latency, and amount of 
missing trials in the speeded condition. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to the one used in Experiment 5, with two exceptions: a) all 
participants were presented with complex syllogisms and b) response time was 
manipulated between subjects by randomly assigning half the participants to a speeded 
condition. Under speeded instructions participants had to respond within a 10 second 
response time deadline. This deadline was chosen on the basis of previous research 
(Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). On each trial, a red bar at the top of the screen ran out as 
the available response time decreased. If no response had been made after ten seconds the 
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participant would be urged to respond more quickly next time and the trial would be 
discarded. All 64 trials were presented in a completely random order for each participant. 
The unspeeded condition was identical to the complex condition in Experiment 5. 
3.3.2 Results 
Data treatment 
Endorsement rates, SDT accuracy and bias parameters, and latencies were analysed as in 
Experiment 5. Less than 2% of the responses were made after the deadline. These trials 
were eliminated from all further analyses. 
Endorsement 
Endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion 
believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (time limit: no limit v. speeded) mixed ANOVA, 
with repeated measures on the first two factors. The analysis revealed a main effect of 
validity suggesting that participants accepted valid arguments more than invalid 
arguments, F(1, 84) = 67.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .45. Participants also responded “valid” to 
believable arguments more than to unbelievable arguments, F(1, 84) = 30.0, p < .001, ηp2 
= .26. Validity and believability interacted, F(1, 84) = 4.39, p = .039, ηp2 = .05. The 
interaction was opposed to the expected pattern such that the validity effect appeared to 
be larger in the believable condition than in the unbelievable condition. No other effects 
were significant, all ps > .12. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 
Experiment 6: Endorsement Rates per Time Limit Condition. 
Valid Invalid 
Time Limit Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Speeded .74 (.03) .54 (.04) .57 (.03) .40 (.03) 
No Limit .78 (.03) .61 (.04) .53 (.03) .46 (.03) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). 
SDT 
ROCs (Figure 3.5) were constructed to derive accuracy (Az) and bias (ca) for each 
participant. We tested for motivated reasoning and response bias separately. 
Figure 3.5. A) ROC for the believable and unbelievable conditions in the speeded condition of 
Experiment 6. B) ROC for the believable and unbelievable conditions in the untimed condition 
of Experiment 6. 
Motivated reasoning 
Accuracy was analysed using a 2 (believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (untimed v. speeded) 
mixed ANOVA, with repeated measures on the first factor. The analysis did not produce 
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any significant effects. Accuracy was not affected by beliefs, F(1, 84) = 1.99, p = .16, time 
limit, F(1, 84) = 1.31, p = .26, or the interaction between both, F(1, 84) < 1, p = .49. Means 
and standard errors can be found in Table 3.6 
Response bias 
Bias was analysed using a 2 (believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (untimed v. speeded) mixed 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on the first factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of 
beliefs on bias in such a way that participants were more likely to endorse believable than 
unbelievable arguments, F(1, 84) = 32.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. No other effects were 
significant, all ps > 14. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 3.6 
Table 3.6 
Experiment 6: SDT parameters per Time Limit Condition 
Speeded condition Untimed condition 
Measure Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Accuracy (Az) .61 (.02) .60 (.03) .66 (.02) .59 (.03) 
Bias (ca) -0.44 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) -0.42 (0.07) -0.11 (0.07) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). 
Latency 
Response times were analysed using a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion 
believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (time limit: no limit v. speeded) mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the first two factors. Participants responded more quickly to 
valid than to invalid arguments, F(1, 84) = 28.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. Participants in the 
speeded condition responded more quickly than participants in the untimed condition, F(1, 
84) = 43.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .34. The two factors also interacted, suggesting that validity
effect was larger in the untimed condition than in the speeded condition, F(1, 84) = 9.1, p 
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= .003, ηp2 = .10. No other effects were significant, all ps > .21. Means and standard errors 
can be found in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7. 
Experiment 6: Response Times per Time Limit Condition. 
Valid Invalid 
Time Limit Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Speeded 6,578 (390) 6,697 (378) 6,831 (578) 6,930 (552) 
No Limit 10,227 (381) 10,078 (369) 11,660 (565) 11,960 (540) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors) are expressed in milliseconds. 
3.3.3 Discussion 
The aim of the current experiment was to investigate whether differences in response 
time taken potentially underlie the discrepancies between the data reported by Dube et al. 
(2010) and our experiments. The results of the current experiment appear puzzlingly 
inconsistent with earlier data. The finding of a response bias in the absence of motivated 
reasoning appears to be compatible with the response bias account and incompatible with 
traditional accounts of belief bias. Limiting the amount of response time drove the 
participants towards quicker responding but had no impact on overall reasoning quality 
or response bias. This is surprising based on previous research showing that limiting 
response time has an impact on belief bias (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; although this 
could be explained by the fact that this study did not use the more appropriate SDT 
method). The fact that response time had no impact on response bias or overall reasoning 
accuracy is odd from the response bias account point of view. According to this account 
participants engage in a nondescript reasoning process in combination with a belief-
acceptance heuristic. Limiting response time should at least have a negative impact on 
accuracy and possibly increase the overall belief bias observed. 
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The current experiment leaves us with data inconsistent with all belief bias accounts, 
although it is more compatible with the response bias account than with the traditional 
accounts. So far our experiments resulted in two significant observations of motivated 
reasoning (Experiments 4 and 5) and one absence of motivated reasoning (the current 
experiment). Motivated reasoning was also absent in two additional experiments in 
Chapter 1, but this was probably due to the use of the simultaneous forced choice 
reasoning method. In the next experiment we further attempt to resolve these apparent 
inconsistencies by investigating the effect of instructions on belief bias within the ROC 
paradigm. 
3.4 Experiment 7 
Instructional manipulations have been shown to impact response bias and motivated 
reasoning. Evans, Handley, Neilens, and Over (2010) investigated the effect of pragmatic 
(i.e., weak) instructions on belief bias in causal conditionals. Unlike the traditional 
instructions given in deductive reasoning tasks, weak instructions encourage participants 
to respond on the basis of whether the conclusion follows from the premises or not, 
without explicitly instructing the participants to assume the truth of the premises. Results 
showed that pragmatic instructions led to increased response bias compared to deductive 
instructions (see also George, 1995; Stevenson & Over, 1995). 
The opposite approach was taken by Newstead et al. (1992), who compared the effect of 
augmented (or strong) instructions on syllogistic belief bias. These strong instructions 
emphasized the necessity requirement of logical validity. Their findings showed that 
motivated reasoning was eliminated under strong instructions. Later studies nuanced this 
finding by confirming that strong instructions reduced the impact of beliefs on reasoning 
(Evans, Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994). Taken together, these findings are reminiscent 
of the forced choice data presented in Chapter 2: our forced choice results indicated that 
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conditions which emphasised the logical structure of the argument (i.e., the simultaneous 
presentation method used in Experiments 1 – 3) eliminated any effects of beliefs – both in 
terms of response bias and motivated reasoning. In contrast, a condition in which a 
structural focus was explicitly avoided (i.e., the non-simultaneous presentation method 
used in E4) led to a belief effect – specifically in terms in motivated reasoning. 
In the current experiment we investigated the effect of pragmatic instructions on belief 
bias in syllogistic reasoning. One straightforward prediction is that the weak instructions 
should lead to increased response bias compared to a standard instructions condition 
(Evans et al., 2010). This also raises the question how beliefs might impact on motivated 
reasoning. One possibility is that the weak instructions will create a condition more 
conducive to motivated reasoning in parallel to the non-simultaneous problem 
presentation method. 
We randomly assigned participants to a standard or weak instructions condition. The 
standard instructions condition is identical to the one used in all previously reported 
experiments, including Dube et al.’s (2010). This condition allows us to potentially 
replicate the findings of Experiments 4 and 5 (if motivated reasoning is found) or 
Experiment 6 and Dube et al.’s study (if no motivated reasoning is found). In the weak 
instructions condition, participants were merely told to respond whether a conclusion 
followed from the premises or not. No explicit mentions of logic, validity, or necessity were 
made. 
3.4.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 66 Plymouth university undergraduate psychology students and volunteers 
drawn from the paid participant pool were recruited in exchange for course credit or a 
small fee (24 male, age: range = 18 – 64, M = 28, SD = 11). 
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Design, Materials, and Measures 
Logical validity (valid v. invalid argument) and conclusion believability (believable v. 
unbelievable conclusion) were manipulated within subjects, and instruction type (weak v. 
standard) was manipulated between subjects. The materials were constructed in an 
identical manner as in Experiments 5 and 6. We measured endorsement rates, confidence 
ratings (1 – 3), and response latency 
Procedure 
The procedure for the standard instructions condition was identical to the complex 
condition in Experiment 5 and the untimed condition in Experiment 6. In the weak 
instructions condition, participants were presented with the following instructions: 
In this experiment, we are interested in people's reasoning. For each question, you will be 
given some information above a line. If you judge that the information below the line follows 
from this, you should answer "Follows". If you judge that the information below the line 
doesn't follow, you should answer "Doesn't follow". Please respond as quickly as possible and 
simply follow your gut feeling. It is important that you follow your intuition. 
In the standard instructions condition on each reasoning trial the response options “valid” 
and “invalid” were available. In contrast, in the weak instructions condition the response 
options “follows” and “doesn’t follow” were presented to allow participants to engage in a 
less formal reasoning style. Confidence ratings (1 – 3) were collected after each response. 
3.4.2 Results 
Data treatment 
Endorsement rates, SDT (accuracy and bias) parameters, and response latencies were 
analysed as in Experiments 5 and 6. 
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Endorsement 
Endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion 
believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (instruction type: weak v. standard) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two factors, instruction type being a between-
subjects factor. Participants accepted valid arguments more than invalid arguments, F(1, 
64) = 47.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. Participants also responded “valid” more to believable
arguments than to unbelievable arguments, F(1, 64) = 24.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. No other 
effects approached significance, all ps > .18. Means and standard errors can be found in 
Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8. 
Experiment 7: Endorsement Rates per Instructions Condition. 
Valid Invalid 
Instructions Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Weak .76 (.03) .57 (.05) .56 (.05) .40 (.04) 
Standard .83 (.03) .63 (.05) .58 (.05) .35 (.04) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). 
SDT 
We constructed ROCs (Figure 3.6) to which we fit the SDT model for each participant to 
derive accuracy (Az) and bias (ca). We tested for motivated reasoning and response bias 
separately. 
108 
Figure 3.6. A) ROC for the believable and unbelievable conditions in the weak instructions 
condition of Experiment 7. B) ROC for the believable and unbelievable conditions in the 
standard instructions condition of Experiment 7. 
Motivated reasoning 
Accuracy was analysed using a 2 (believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (weak instructions v. 
standard instructions) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. There 
were no effects of belief or instructions on accuracy, all ps > .24. Means and standard 
errors can be found in Table 3.9. 
Response bias 
Response bias was analysed using a 2 (believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (weak instructions v. 
standard instructions) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of beliefs on the response criterion, suggesting 
that a more liberal response criterion was adapted for believable than for unbelievable 
arguments, F(1, 64) = 25.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .29. No other effects approached significance, all 
ps > .41. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9 
Experiment 7: SDT parameters per Instructions Condition 
Weak instructions Standard instructions 
Measure Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Accuracy (Az) .64 (.03) .61 (.03) .68 (.03) .65 (.03) 
Bias (ca) -0.45 (0.10) 0.03 (0.10) -0.61 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). 
Latency 
We analysed the log transformed response times using a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) 
x 2 (conclusion believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (instructions: weak v. 
standard) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two factors. The analysis 
only resulted in a significant main effect of validity suggesting that participants responded 
more quickly to valid than to invalid arguments, F(1, 64) =25.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. No other 
effects were significant, all ps > .13. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10 
Experiment 7: Response Times per Instructions Condition. 
Valid Invalid 
Instructions Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Weak 10,125 (1,057) 10,311 (991) 11,321 (1,281) 10,893 (1,165) 
Standard 12,250 (1,057) 11,310 (1,021) 13,918 (1,032) 13,096 (1,201) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors) are expressed in milliseconds. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
We attempted to replicate the motivated reasoning effect demonstrated in Experiments 4 
and 5 after we were unsuccessful in doing so in Experiment 6. Participants in the current 
experiment showed response bias, but no motivated reasoning. We created a weak 
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instructions condition which we hypothesised would result in increased response bias and 
potentially result in more motivated reasoning. Surprisingly, there was no effect of 
instructions whatsoever. This runs counter to previous findings which have demonstrated 
that manipulating instructions affects belief bias (Evans et al., 1994; 2010; Newstead et al., 
1992). The fact that presenting participants with pragmatic instructions stressing people 
to follow their gut feeling led to response patterns which were virtually identical is 
consistent with the probability heuristics model (PHM; Chater & Oaksford, 1999). 
According to PHM, participants are not engaged in deduction, but rather attempt to 
determine whether the conclusion is less uncertain than the premises using a set of five 
fast and frugal heuristics. This can explain why participants in the pragmatic instructions 
condition demonstrated similar levels of logical competence as those in a standard 
instructions condition, even though they were stressed to follow their intuition or gut 
feeling: perhaps this is what participants are doing all along. 
Taken together, the results of Experiments 4 – 7 are confusing. Using the non-
simultaneous forced choice method we found one case of motivated reasoning 
(Experiment 4). Using the ROC method we also found one case of motivated reasoning 
(Experiment 5), but two cases in which motivated reasoning appeared to be fully absent 
(Experiments 6 and 7). A potential (if unsatisfying) explanation for the inconsistent 
findings is that differences in participant motivation levels between experiments are the 
crucial difference. It seems plausible that a lack of motivation will lead to lower levels of 
motivated reasoning, whereas such an effect will not have an impact on response bias 
because it requires less effort due to its heuristic nature. It could be argued that a potential 
proxy of motivation is the amount of time participants invest in a task, with less motivated 
participants taking less time to reason per trial. We explored the relationship between 
motivated reasoning and average response time using a scatterplot. In all further analyses 
we collapsed across instructions, given the lack of instructional effects on any of the 
dependent variables. We calculated a motivated reasoning index (MRI) by subtracting 
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accuracy in the believable condition from accuracy in the unbelievable condition for each 
participant (higher values indicated more motivated reasoning) and plotted it against 
average response time taken per trial (Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7. Scatterplot of the average latency per trial v. motivated reasoning. 
Figure 3.7 demonstrates that longer latencies were significantly correlated to higher 
degrees of motivated reasoning, r(61) = .32, p = .011. Visual inspection of the scatterplot in 
combination with the moderate correlation between average latency and motivated 
reasoning suggests that more motivated participants (i.e., participants who responded 
more slowly on average) often showed positive levels of motivated reasoning, with less 
motivated participants (i.e., quicker responders) showing none, or even reversed 
motivated reasoning (albeit with much greater variance). To further explore this 
hypothesis we investigated the degree of motivated reasoning for the top 25% slowest 
responders only (M latency > 15,028 ms). A one sample t test comparing the MRI with 0 
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suggested that this group engaged in motivated reasoning (M MRI = 0.10), t(16) = 2.40, p 
= .029. Interestingly, for the 25% quickest responders (M latency < 6,818 ms) a trend 
towards reversed motivated reasoning occurred (M MRI = -0.15), t(16) = -1.93, p = .07. In 
line with our hypothesis that slower responders were more motivated, a two sample t test 
of accuracy between the 25% slowest and 25% quickest responders revealed that the 
slowest reasoners performed significantly better overall (Az = .74) than the quickest 
reasoners (Az = .55), t(32) = 5.03, p < .001. 
These findings suggest that motivation as approximated by average response time taken 
was moderately correlated to the degree of motivated reasoning. This is important 
because it indicates that perhaps the discrepancies in motivated reasoning between our 
own Experiments (and equally so, between Dube et al.’s study and ours) could be due to 
individual differences. It is plausible that in Experiment 5 we sampled a larger group of 
motivated versus unmotivated participants, whereas in Experiments 6 and 7 there were 
fewer highly motivated reasoners. Interestingly, the negative motivated reasoning 
exhibited by the unmotivated reasoners has to our knowledge never been reported in the 
belief bias literature. It is an important finding however, because it suggests that ignoring 
individual differences by averaging across motivated and unmotivated participants can 
create the illusion that motivated reasoning is absent (the negative and positive motivated 
reasoning effects cancel each other out). These data suggest that individual differences 
should not be ignored and that they provide an interesting avenue for further research. A 
similar suggestion has been made by Stupple et al. (2011), who analysed latency patterns 
in syllogistic belief bias in function of reasoning aptitude. Their findings showed that the 
aggregate RT pattern commonly observed is in fact an artefact caused by averaging across 
qualitatively different subgroups of reasoners. In Experiment 8 we address the individual 
differences hypothesis more formally by investigating cognitive ability. 
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3.5 Experiment 8 
The aim of the current experiment was to investigate the impact of individual differences 
in cognitive ability on belief bias. Cognitive ability is a correlate of working memory 
capacity (WMC; Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003) which is associated with reasoning ability 
(Capon, Handley, & Dennis, 2003). Research on causal conditional reasoning has shown 
that high cognitive ability participants are able to resist belief bias when instructed to do 
so compared to a group of lower ability participants (Evans et al., 2010). In syllogistic 
belief bias it has been shown that the logic x belief interaction (traditionally considered a 
proxy for motivated reasoning) was present only in a group of high ability participants 
(Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrely, 2004). This suggests that cognitive ability 
is a potential key determinant of motivated reasoning. We tested this hypothesis in the 
current study by comparing a higher and a lower cognitive ability group. If our hypothesis 
holds that cognitive ability is a determinant of motivated reasoning, we predict that 
motivated reasoning occurs in the higher ability group only. 
We also manipulated response time available as in Experiment 6. If response time 
available has an impact on belief bias as demonstrated by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005), 
then a drop in motivated reasoning should be observed in the higher ability – limited time 
group, but response bias should increase regardless of cognitive ability. In contrast, 
according to the response bias account, motivated reasoning should be absent in all 
conditions. From the traditional accounts, MMT predicts that working memory capacity 
may be a prerequisite for conducting the motivated search for counterexamples resulting 
in better reasoning accuracy for unbelievable compared to believable problems (Oakhill et 
al., 1989). In contrast, the metacognitive uncertainty account (Quayle & Ball, 2000) makes 
the opposite prediction that WMC is linked to an absence of the logic x belief interaction, 
although not through motivated reasoning but rather due to the application of a belief-
heuristic for indeterminately invalid problems used by lower-ability participants only. The 
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other traditional accounts do not predict a link between cognitive ability and motivated 
reasoning. 
3.5.1 Method 
Participants 
Eighty-five undergraduate psychology students from Plymouth University participated for 
course credit (15 male, age: range 17 – 52, M = 22, SD = 6). 
Design, Materials, and Measures 
Logical validity (valid v. invalid argument) and conclusion believability (believable v. 
unbelievable) were manipulated within subjects. Time limit condition (speeded v. 
unlimited) and cognitive ability (high v. low) were between-subjects factors. The problems 
were complex syllogisms constructed in the same way as in the previous experiments. 
Cognitive ability was measured using part 1 of the AH4 Group Test of General Intelligence 
which contains 65 verbal or numerical questions (Heim, 1970). The test was administered 
in small groups of five or less. The test consists of ten self-paced practice items followed by 
65 test problems of which the participant has to complete as many as possible in the span 
of ten minutes. Newstead et al. (2004) have shown that scores on part 1 of the AH4 are 
related to logical performance on a variety of deductive reasoning tasks. As in all previous 
experiments we measured endorsement rates, confidence ratings on a scale from 1 – 3, 
and response latency in milliseconds. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 6, with the exception that participants 
completed the cognitive ability test before completing the reasoning test. 
115 
3.5.2 Results 
Data treatment 
Endorsement rates, SDT accuracy and bias parameters, and latencies were analysed as in 
Experiments 5 – 7. Less than 2% of the responses were made outside of the deadline. 
These were removed prior to the analysis. Participants were assigned to a higher- (n = 41) 
or lower ability (n = 44) group on the basis of an above- or below median score on the 
cognitive ability test (Mdn = 38). 
Endorsement 
Endorsement rates were analysed using a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion 
believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (time limit: speeded v. unlimited) x 2 
(cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two 
factors. Time limit and cognitive ability were manipulated between subjects. The analysis 
revealed a main effect of validity suggesting that participants accepted valid arguments 
more than invalid arguments, F(1, 81) = 66.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .45. Participants also accepted 
believable arguments more than unbelievable arguments, F(1, 81) = 16.7, p < .001, ηp2 
= .17. A main effect of time limit demonstrated that participants in the untimed condition 
responded “valid” more often than participants in the speeded condition, F(1, 81) = 4.7,  p 
= .034, ηp2 = .05. Logical status and time limit interacted in such a way that the validity 
effect was larger in the untimed condition, F(1, 81) = 15.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Logical status 
and cognitive ability marginally interacted, suggesting that the validity effect was larger 
for the higher ability group, F(1, 81) = 3.5, p = .066, ηp2 = .04. Time limit and cognitive 
ability also marginally interacted suggesting that the higher ability – untimed group 
responded “valid” more often than the higher ability – speeded group, whereas there was 
no such difference between the lower ability groups, F(1, 81) = 3.1, p = .084, ηp2 = .04. 
There was a three-way interaction between logic, belief, and time limit, F(1, 81) = 14.8, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .16. The interaction revealed that in the untimed condition, the logic x belief 
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interaction operated in the traditional manner (i.e., with a larger validity effect for 
unbelievable arguments), whereas for the timed condition the direction of the interaction 
was reversed. No other effects were significant, all ps > .15. Means and standard errors can 
be found in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11 
Experiment 8: Endorsement Rates per Time Limit Condition and Cognitive Ability Group 
Valid Invalid 
Group Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Higher cognitive ability 
Speeded .73 (.04) .46 (.07) .48 (.05) .42 (.06) 
Untimed .83 (.04) .73 (.06) .57 (.05) .32 (.05) 
Lower cognitive ability 
Speeded .70 (.04) .49 (.07) .57 (.05) .51 (.06) 
Untimed .70 (.04) .67 (.06) .50 (.05) .39 (.05) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). 
SDT 
We constructed ROCs (Figure 3.8) to which we fit the SDT model for each participant to 
derive accuracy (Az) and bias (ca). We tested for motivated reasoning and response bias 
separately. 
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Figure 3.8. Experiment 8: Top row: ROCs for the no time limit condition for the higher (A) 
and lower (B) cognitive ability groups. Bottom row: ROCs for the time limit condition for the 
high (C) and low (D) cognitive ability groups. 
Motivated reasoning 
Accuracy was analysed using a 2 (believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (speeded v. unspeeded 
condition) x 2 (higher cognitive ability v. lower cognitive ability) mixed ANOVA, with 
repeated measures on the first factor. Accuracy was higher for the higher ability than the 
lower ability group, F(1, 81) = 4.8, p = .031, ηp2 = .06. A main effect of time limit suggested 
that accuracy was higher in the untimed than in the speeded condition, F(1, 81) = 8.5, p 
= .005, ηp2 = .10. The analysis revealed an interaction between time limit and believability 
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suggesting that in the untimed condition participants appeared to reason better for 
unbelievable than for believable arguments, whereas the opposite held true in the speeded 
condition, F(1, 81) = 8.4,  p = .005, ηp2 = .09. Follow-up tests revealed that the apparent 
difference was marginally significant in both the speeded, t(35) = 2.01, p = .052, and the 
untimed condition, t(48) = 1.86 p = .069. There was also a marginal three-way interaction 
between believability, time limit, and cognitive ability, F(1, 81) = 3.2, p = .076, ηp2 = .04. A 
separate believability x time limit analysis for the higher and the lower ability groups 
revealed that there was a significant belief x time limit interaction for the higher ability 
group, F(1, 39) = 12.4, p = .001, ηp2 = .24, but not for the lower ability group, F < 1, p = .46. 
Follow-up tests on the belief x time limit interaction in the higher ability group revealed 
that motivated reasoning occurred in the untimed condition, t(22) = 2.46, p = .022, and 
that reversed motivated reasoning in the timed condition, t(17) = 2.44, p = .026. Means 
and standard errors can be found in Table 3.12. 
Response bias 
Response bias was analysed using a 2 (believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (speeded v. 
unspeeded condition) x 2 (higher cognitive ability v. lower cognitive ability) mixed ANOVA, 
with repeated measures on the first factor. The analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of belief showing that participants were more liberal in the believable than in the 
unbelievable condition, F(1, 81) = 19.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. There was also a marginal 
interaction between time limit and cognitive ability suggesting criterion placement was 
more liberal in the untimed – higher ability group than in the speeded – higher ability 
group, whereas no such difference appeared to be present in the lower ability groups, F(1, 
81) = 2.9, p = .094, ηp2 = .034. Follow-up tests revealed that for the higher ability group the
unspeeded – speeded difference was significant, t(39) = 2.4, p = .022, whereas this was not 
the case for the lower ability group, t(42) = 0.1, p = .95. Means and standard errors can be 
found in Table 3.12. 
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Table 3.12 
Experiment 8: SDT parameters by Time Limit Condition and Cognitive Ability Group 
Speeded Untimed 
Group Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Higher cognitive ability 
Accuracy (Az) .68 (.03) .54 (.06) .66 (.03) .72 (.04) 
Bias (ca) -0.28 (0.12) 0.17 (0.09) -0.63 (0.13) -0.10 (0.16) 
Lower cognitive ability 
Accuracy (Az) .56 (.03) .51 (.05) .63 (.03) .63 (.04) 
Bias (ca) -0.31 (0.08) -0.01 (0.12) -0.22 (0.11) -0.07 (0.13) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). 
 Latency 
We submitted the log-transformed response times to a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 
2 (conclusion believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (time limit: speeded v. untimed) 
x 2 (cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
two factors. The analysis revealed a main effect of logical status suggesting that 
participants responded more quickly to valid than to invalid arguments, F(1, 81) = 16.3, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .17. There was also a main effect of time limit showing that participants 
responded more quickly in the speeded than in the untimed condition, F(1, 81) = 47.6, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .37. Logic interacted with time limit suggesting that the validity effect was 
larger in the untimed condition, F(1, 81) = 8.4, p = .005, ηp2 = .09. Follow up tests revealed 
that participants responded significantly more quickly to valid than to invalid arguments 
in the untimed condition, t(48) = 4.07, p < .001. The difference was marginally significant 
in the speeded condition, t(35) = 1.94, p = .06. No other effects reached significance, all 
ps > .22. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 3.13. 
120 
Table 3.13 
Experiment 8: Response Times by Time Limit Condition and Cognitive Ability Group 
Valid Invalid 
Group Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Higher cognitive ability 
Speeded 6,434 (838) 6,554 (990) 6,576 (1,173) 6,792 (1,076) 
Untimed 10,982 (742) 11,171 (876) 12,208 (1,037) 12,829 (951) 
Lower cognitive capacity 
Speeded 7,140 (838) 6,993 (990) 7,168 (1,173) 7,051 (1,076) 
Untimed 12,384 (742) 12,376 (876) 14,351 (1,037) 14,101 (951) 
Note. Means (Standard Errors). Response times are expressed in milliseconds. 
3.5.3 Discussion 
The aim of the current experiment was to investigate the effect of individual differences in 
cognitive ability on belief bias. Motivated reasoning was engaged in only by the higher 
cognitive ability participants. This finding is incompatible with the response bias account 
of belief bias as introduced by Dube et al. (2010). The lower ability group did not show 
motivated reasoning.  As shown previously by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005), limiting 
the available response time eliminated motivated reasoning in this higher ability sample. 
The finding that neither cognitive ability nor response time limit had an impact on the 
degree of belief bias as response bias is incompatible with the results reported by Evans 
and Curtis-Holmes. The finding of reversed motivated reasoning in the speeded high 
ability condition might appear counterintuitive in light of most of the research reported in 
the literature, but it echoes the reverse motivated reasoning pattern demonstrated by the 
quick responders in Experiment 7 suggesting that it might be an effect which has 
previously been overseen due to aggregation. These findings seem to suggest that ignoring 
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individual differences might be a key driver behind the inconsistencies reported in many 
of the previous studies of belief bias, including the ones reported in this dissertation so far. 
3.6 General Discussion 
In the current chapter we aimed to further our understanding of the response bias and 
motivated reasoning components of belief bias using the ROC method. More specifically, 
we tried to address any key factors that may have differed between Dube et al.’s (2010) 
experiment and ours: materials, argument complexity, time taken to respond, instructions, 
and cognitive ability. In Experiment 5, clear evidence compatible with motivated 
reasoning was found, suggesting that at least under some conditions, belief bias is not just 
response bias – regardless of the employed SDT method (i.e., ROC v. forced choice). 
Experiment 5 also furthered our understanding of belief bias by showing that motivated 
reasoning occurred only for complex, but not simple syllogisms – as predicted by 
traditional belief bias accounts such as mental models theory (Oakhill et al., 1989) and 
selective processing theory (Evans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2000), but not by selective 
scrutiny (Evans et al., 1983). 
Response bias occurred under both simple and complex argument conditions, although it 
was smaller in the former case. In Experiment 6 we did not replicate the motivated 
reasoning observed in the first experiment. A speeded-task manipulation had no effect on 
response bias or motivated reasoning. These findings were compatible with the response 
bias account and puzzling in light of our earlier motivated reasoning findings. In 
Experiment 7 we investigated the effect of pragmatic instructions on response bias and 
motivated reasoning. As in Experiment 6, we failed to establish motivated reasoning in the 
basic instructions condition. Even more puzzling was the finding that pragmatic 
instructions did not have an impact on response bias or motivated reasoning, suggesting 
that belief bias as response bias might be even more pervasive than previously assumed. 
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An exploratory analysis of motivated reasoning as a function of response time taken 
revealed that those who took longer to respond were more prone to motivated reasoning, 
with quicker responders engaging in no – or even reversed motivated reasoning. In 
Experiment 8, finally, we built on this finding by formally investigating the effect of 
cognitive ability on belief bias. Our findings suggested that motivated reasoning occurred 
only for a group of higher cognitive ability participants. Contrary to Experiment 6, the 
speeded-task manipulation eliminated motivated reasoning in this higher ability group. 
A host of additional manipulations on belief bias were also investigated. Previous research 
on complexity has led to inconsistent results, with the logic x belief interaction for single 
model problems occasionally appearing (Glinsky & Judd, 1994) and disappearing 
(Newstead et al., 1992; Klauer et al., 2000). Our findings suggested that beliefs do not 
affect reasoning accuracy for simple syllogisms. Limiting the amount of response time had 
no discernible impact in Experiment 6, in contrast to previous studies in which it led to 
increased response bias (Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 2009) and decreased motivated 
reasoning (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). In fact, the finding that there was no effect of 
limiting response time seems to suggest that perhaps the untimed group was reasoning at 
a subpar level. In Experiment 8 we controlled for poor performance by measuring 
cognitive ability. This time, the speeded manipulation led to decreased motivated 
reasoning, although it had no impact on the magnitude of response bias. Interestingly, for 
the high ability subgroup the time pressure resulted in a reversed motivated reasoning 
effect, a novel finding in the belief bias literature as far as we know. A similar finding 
appeared in the quick responding subgroup found in the exploratory analysis of 
Experiment 7. One potential explanation of this finding is that the high ability group 
attempted to engage in motivated reasoning using a difficult effortful (Deutsch, Kordts-
Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009) falsification strategy as proposed by MMT and SPT, 
but that they failed to complete this process when confronted with a time limit – be it 
experimentally manipulated (E8) or self-imposed (E7). In contrast, the less effortful 
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confirmatory reasoning strategy presumably engaged for the believable problems did not 
suffer from such a time limit, leading to preserved performance and the “reversed 
motivated reasoning” effect seen here. Note that aggregating across standard and reversed 
motivated reasoners might give the impression that there is no effect of beliefs on 
accuracy whatsoever, whereas in fact, the vast majority of participants’ reasoning 
performance is affected by accuracy. 
We also collected latency data across all experiments. Previous research has demonstrated 
three response time effects: participants typically respond more quickly to valid than to 
invalid arguments and more quickly to unbelievable than to believable arguments. The 
two factors also interact in such a way that for invalid problems participants respond 
more quickly to unbelievable than to believable problems, whereas such a difference is 
absent for valid problems (Thompson et al., 2003). We replicated the validity effect on 
response latency in Experiments 5 – 8, but there was no effect of beliefs on response time. 
One potential explanation for the reliable validity effect is that valid arguments are more 
fluently processed, leading to reduced response times (Morsanyi & Handley, 2012). The 
absence of an effect of beliefs on response time might seem puzzling in light of earlier 
findings. However, Stupple et al. (2011) investigated belief bias latency data as a function of 
reasoning aptitude by comparing the RT patterns for a group of poor, good, and great 
reasoners. Their data showed that the typically observed effects reported in aggregate 
analysis are probably an artefact resulting from inappropriate aggregation across 
qualitatively different subgroups. These findings suggest a) that perhaps latency is not the 
optimal dependent variable of interest for tackling the belief bias debate and b) that 
ignoring individual differences and aggregating across groups might lead to inconsistent 
findings when analysing other, more important dependent variables such as reasoning 
accuracy, response bias, and motivated reasoning. 
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Based on the findings reported so far, we propose an individual differences account of 
belief bias. According to this account, cognitive ability is a prerequisite for motivated 
reasoning, but not response bias. Although this may be a preliminary conclusion to draw 
at this point, this account explains the differences in motivated reasoning observed 
between Experiments 4 through 8, suggesting that random differences in the proportion 
of higher versus lower cognitive ability participants determined the results. One potential 
explanation is that in Experiments 4 and 5 we randomly sampled a larger group of high 
ability participants compared to Experiments 6 and 7. We now turn to Chapter 4 in which 
we investigated the individual differences account of belief bias in more detail using both 
the ROC and the forced choice methods. 
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Chapter 4: Individual Differences 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters mixed evidence for response bias and motivated reasoning was 
found. These results are puzzling when interpreted in light of all accounts of belief bias, 
including the response bias account. In Experiment 8, cognitive ability was demonstrated 
to moderate motivated reasoning, showing that only a higher ability subgroup of 
participants engaged in motivated reasoning. This is an important result because it can 
explain the discrepancies between Dube, Rotello, and Heit’s (2010) findings and ours via a 
difference in participant sampling. Perhaps Dube et al. sampled a smaller group of above-
average cognitive ability participants, masking any potential motivated reasoning effects 
apparent in the aggregate analysis. The result is also important from a theoretical point of 
view, because it suggests that any theory of belief bias (and perhaps reasoning in general) 
explicitly needs to take individual differences into account. Consequently, we proposed an 
individual differences account of belief bias according to which cognitive ability is a 
prerequisite to engage in motivated reasoning. Before drawing such far-reaching 
conclusions, however, a more detailed investigation into the reliability of the effects is 
required. If these findings turn out to be reliable across methods, a large majority of the 
current belief bias theories – including the response bias account – will not be able to tell 
the full story without taking individual differences into account. In the current chapter we 
present three belief bias experiments using the forced choice and ROC methods 
investigating the impact of individual differences. 
4.1.1 Individual Differences in Reasoning 
The impact of individual differences on reasoning has been extensively studied (see 
Stanovich & West, 2000; 2008). Generally speaking, it is found that the degree of bias in a 
variety of reasoning tasks is reliably correlated with individual differences in various 
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traits, the main one being cognitive ability – possibly due to its link with working memory 
capacity (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003). These findings are often explained in terms of so-
called dual-process theories (DPT) of reasoning. According to DPT, the three main 
individual differences variables most relevant to explain differential levels of biased 
responding between subjects are mindware, cognitive ability, and cognitive style (Evans, 
2007; 2011; Stanovich & West, 2008). 
Mindware refers to the availability of the relevant analytic knowledge required to solve a 
task, such as the rules of logic or the theorems of probability. Absence of the relevant 
mindware (often referred to as a mindware gap) makes it impossible for participants to 
correctly perform the task, making them default to a simpler strategy. An example of a 
mindware-gap explanation for belief bias can be found in the theory of misinterpreted 
necessity: according to this theory participants have a poor understanding of “necessity”, 
causing them to use a simpler belief strategy as an escape hatch when application of the 
necessity concept is required to reason correctly (Evans et al., 1983). 
Cognitive ability (commonly referred to as general intelligence or g) is highly correlated to 
working memory capacity (WMC; Conway et al., 2003). Individual differences in cognitive 
ability (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Shikishima, Yamagata, 
Hiraishi, Sugimoto, Murayama, & Ando, 2011) and working memory capacity (Capon, 
Handley, & Dennis, 2003; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004) are linked to 
reasoning performance, with higher ability people generally reasoning better. 
Consequently, DPTs predict that lower cognitive ability people are generally more biased, 
mainly due to working memory constraints (e.g., Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999). An 
explanation of belief bias in terms of cognitive ability is provided by the metacognitive 
uncertainty account (Quayle & Ball, 2000). According to this account, certain types of 
invalid arguments are too difficult because multiple models of the premises need to be 
simultaneously held in working memory. Only high ability participants have the necessary 
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WMC available to do this, with others failing and defaulting to beliefs in a similar manner 
as predicted by the misinterpreted necessity account. 
Analytic cognitive style or cognitive reflection (hereafter, cognitive style) refers to the 
dispositional (Frederick, 2005) willingness to engage in analytic processing (e.g., 
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012). According to DPT, participants with 
a lower cognitive style disposition have a lower willingness to engage analytic processing. 
As such, they may rely on simpler strategies leading to more biased responding even if the 
relevant mindware and cognitive ability levels are available. Cognitive style can be 
measured using self-report questionnaires such as the rational-experiental inventory 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999), the actively open-minded thinking scale (Stanovich & West, 
1997), of the need for cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Alternatively, cognitive 
style can be measured using a performance measure known as the cognitive reflection test 
(CRT: Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Frederick, 2005). This test consists of three questions 
in which an intuitively compelling initial response should be inhibited in favour of a 
(relatively simple) correct response. None of the traditional theories of belief bias make 
explicit predictions about the role of cognitive style, although certain predictions can 
readily be drawn from a general DPT perspective. For instance, one might predict that 
participants lower in cognitive style are less likely to engage analytic processing and more 
likely to rely on a less effortful and more appealing belief-heuristic, leading to increased 
response bias. 
Sá et al. (1999) investigated the impact of individual differences on belief bias and 
discovered that the response bias component negatively correlated with cognitive ability 
and self-reported cognitive style, in line with DPT predictions. The researchers did not 
focus on motivated reasoning – they exclusively compared the conflict (valid-unbelievable 
and invalid-believable) with the non-conflict (valid-believable and invalid-unbelievable) 
syllogisms. Furthermore, even if they had analysed the data in the traditional manner, the 
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findings would not have been very indicative of the role of motivated reasoning for two 
reasons. First, the presented syllogisms were relatively simple (e.g., “all plants need water”, 
“all roses need water”, does it follow that all roses are plants?). As we demonstrated in 
Experiment 5, simple syllogisms do not appear to give rise to motivated reasoning, 
possibly because of the limited amount of mental models available. Second, premise 
believability was not controlled for, even though this has been shown to influence belief 
bias on top of conclusion believability (Thompson, 1996). Finally, the researchers did not 
use a valid measure of reasoning accuracy (SDT), suggesting that the absence or presence 
of the logic x belief interaction in a more traditional analysis would not have provided 
much information about motivated reasoning. Other studies which did investigate the link 
between motivated reasoning and cognitive ability produced inconsistent results, with 
some researchers finding that the logic x belief interaction was reduced in a high ability 
sample (Quayle  & Ball, 2000), with others finding that the interaction was reduced in a 
low ability subgroup (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004). One possible 
explanation for these inconsistencies is that none of these experiments adopted the 
appropriate measurement method. 
In the current chapter three studies taking an individual differences approach are 
presented. The aim of these experiments was to further the motivated reasoning debate, 
to address the inconsistencies in the literature, and to assess the viability of our newly 
proposed individual differences account of belief bias. The aim of Experiment 9 was to 
extend the main finding of Experiment 8, i.e., that motivated reasoning exclusively 
occurred in a higher cognitive ability subgroup, from the ROC to the forced choice method. 
In Experiment 10, we investigated the effect of analytic cognitive style as measured with 
the CRT to see whether the findings generalised to an important alternative individual 
differences measure. Both of these studies employed the non-simultaneous forced choice 
procedure. Experiment 11, finally, was specifically designed to compare the relative 
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contributions of cognitive ability and cognitive style to both belief bias components using 
a large participant sample. This experiment used the ROC method. 
4.2 Experiment 9 
The aim of this experiment was to find converging evidence for the hypothesis that 
motivated reasoning is engaged in mainly by a higher cognitive ability subgroup. We 
employed the non-simultaneous forced choice method, presenting participants with the 
motivated reasoning (believable v. unbelievable) and response bias (non-conflict v. 
conflict) problem types. According to the individual differences account of belief bias, 
cognitive ability is a prerequisite for engaging in motivated reasoning. Thus, the higher 
ability group should show higher reasoning accuracy for unbelievable compared to 
believable problems on average, whereas no such difference should occur for the lower 
ability group. According to the response bias account, motivated reasoning should not 
occur, regardless of cognitive ability. Instead, all participants should show response bias, 
resulting in a higher proportion correct for the non-conflict compared to the conflict 
problem type. 
4.2.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 108 (17 male) Plymouth University undergraduate psychology students 
participated in exchange for partial course credit (age range: 18 – 40, M = 20, SD = 4). 
Materials and Measures 
A unique list with 64 forced choice reasoning problems was created for each participant. 
As in the previous forced choice studies, half the problems were designed to measure 
motivated reasoning (16 believable and 16 unbelievable), the remaining problems were 
designed to measure response bias (16 non-conflict and 16 conflict). 
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Cognitive ability was measured using the AH4 test of general intelligence (Heim, 1970). 
Accuracy, confidence, and response latency on the reasoning task were also measured. 
Procedure and Design 
The participants were tested in small groups. The cognitive ability test was administered 
prior to the reasoning task. The non-simultaneous presentation method was employed in 
order to induce conclusion-to-premise reasoning (cf. Experiment 4). 
The design was a 4 (problem type: believable v. unbelievable v. non-conflict v. conflict) x 2 
(cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed design with the first factor manipulated within 
subjects and the second manipulated between subjects. Participants who scored at or 
above the median AH4 score of 90 were assigned to the high cognitive ability group (n = 
58), the remaining participants were assigned to the low ability group (n = 50). 
4.2.2 Results 
Accuracy 
Participants were not biased towards the left or the right argument, t(107) = 1.55, p = .12. 
We analysed the accuracy data for the motivated reasoning and the response bias items 
separately. Twelve participants (< 12%) performed below chance for the believable and 
unbelievable problems and were removed prior to the analyses. As in all the previous 
experiments, proportion correct was arcsine transformed to conform to the assumptions 
of ANOVA. 
Motivated reasoning 
In order to test for motivated reasoning proportion correct was submitted to a 2 (problem 
type: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the first factor. The higher ability group (M = .78) reasoned better 
than the lower ability group (M = .68), F(1, 94) = 15.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Cognitive ability 
and problem type interacted, F(1, 94) = 9.58, p = .003, ηp2 = .092. Follow-up tests revealed 
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that the higher ability group reasoned significantly better for the unbelievable than for the 
believable problems, t(50) = 3.02, p = .004. For the lower ability group there was no such 
difference, t(44) = 1.41, p = .17. No other effects were significant, all ps > .30. Means and 
standard errors can be found in Table 4.1. 
Response bias 
To test for response bias, proportion correct was analysed using a 2 (problem type: non-
conflict v. conflict) x 2 (cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the first factor. The analysis revealed a main effect of problem type showing 
that accuracy was higher for the non-conflict (M = .74) than for the conflict (M = .67) 
problem types, F(1, 94) = 7.7, p = .007, ηp2 = .075. Accuracy was also higher for the higher 
(M = .76) than for the lower (M = .65) cognitive ability group, F(1, 94) = 17.2, p < .001, ηp2 
= .16. Problem type and cognitive ability marginally interacted, F(1, 94) = 3.7, p = .059, ηp2 
= .037. Follow-up tests revealed that for the higher ability group there was no difference in 
accuracy for the non-conflict and the conflict problems, t(50) = 0.63, p = .53. For the lower 
ability group, proportion correct was significantly higher for the non-conflict than for the 
conflict problems, t(44) = 3.18, p = .003. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 
4.1. 
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Table 4.1 
Experiment 9: Means (Standard Errors) for the Accuracy, Confidence Rating and Response 
Time Analysis 
Variable Group Believable Unbelievable Non-conflict Conflict 
Accuracy Higher ability .76 (.02) .81 (.02) .77 (.02) .75 (.02) 
 Lower ability .70 (.02) .66 (.02) .71 (.02) .59 (.03) 
Confidence Higher ability 2.13 (0.07) 2.19 (0.07) 2.19 (0.07) 2.24 (0.07) 
 Lower ability 1.99 (0.07) 1.97 (0.07) 2.02 (0.07) 2.00 (0.07) 
Latency Higher ability 20,416 (831) 19,279 (816) 19,828 (904) 18,941 (807) 
 Lower ability 20,397 (831) 19,698 (816) 18,225 (904) 18,587 (872) 
Note. Accuracy is proportion correct responses, confidence is on a scale from 1 – 3, 
response time is measured in ms. 
Confidence 
Motivated reasoning 
Confidence ratings were submitted to a 2 (problem type: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 
(cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
factor. Higher ability participants were marginally more confident (M = 2.16) than the 
lower ability participants (M = 1.98), F(1, 94) = 3.41, p = .068, ηp2 = .035. Problem type and 
cognitive ability marginally interacted, suggesting that the higher ability participants 
tended to be more confident for the unbelievable than for the believable problems, with 
the lower ability participants showing the opposite pattern, F(1, 94) = 2.86, p = .094, ηp2 
= .030. The remaining effect did not approach significance, p > .39. Means and standard 
errors can be found in Table 4.1. 
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Response bias 
Confidence ratings were submitted to a 2 (problem type: non-conflict v. conflict) x 2 
(cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
factor. The higher ability participants were more confident (M = 2.21) than the lower 
ability participants (M = 2.01), F(1, 94) = 4.77, p = .031, ηp2 = .048. No other effects 
approached significance, all ps > .18. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.1. 
Latency 
Motivated reasoning 
Log-transformed response times were submitted to a 2 (problem type: believable v. 
unbelievable) x 2 (cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the first factor. Participants responded more quickly to unbelievable than to 
believable problems, F(1, 94) = 4.82, p = .031, ηp2 = .049. No other effects were significant, 
all ps > .81. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.1. 
Response bias 
Log-transformed response times were submitted to a 2 (problem type: non-conflict v. 
conflict) x 2 (cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the first factor. No effects approached significance, all ps > .18. Means and standard errors 
can be found in Table 4.1. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The aim of the current experiment was to extend the finding that motivated reasoning is 
linked to cognitive ability to the forced choice paradigm. We found that higher cognitive 
ability participants engaged in motivated reasoning, whereas no such effect occurred in 
the lower ability group. This finding echoes the findings in Experiment 8 and suggests that 
cognitive ability is linked to motivated reasoning. This is more compatible with data 
presented by Newstead et al. (2004), who exclusively found the logic x belief interaction 
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for their higher ability participants. The findings are incompatible with Quayle and Ball’s 
(2000), who found the opposite – i.e., a larger logic x belief interaction in their lower 
ability participants. We also investigated response bias. Response bias was exhibited by all 
the participants, although there was a tendency for the effect to be driven mainly by the 
low ability subgroup. This finding is compatible Sá et al.’s (1999) findings. 
These findings are inconsistent with the response bias account of belief bias, which 
suggests that motivated reasoning is not a component of belief bias. The results also pose 
problems for many of the traditional belief bias theories, if only for the fact that they do 
not explicitly consider the impact of individual differences. Two notable exceptions to this 
are the modified selective processing theory ( Stupple et al., 2011) and MMT (Oakhill et al., 
1989). According to the former theory, different subgroups of reasoners adopt 
qualitatively distinct reasoning strategies, as evidenced by different response time 
patterns. This theory lacks a formal specification of which individual differences variables 
are linked to subgroup membership, however. Instead, it uses overall reasoning aptitude 
as the main variable to determine group membership, which is a circular definition. MMT 
predicts that working memory capacity mediates the search for counterexamples, with 
those higher in WMC being more likely to be successful at the model search. The absence 
of motivated reasoning for the lower ability group demonstrated here is compatible with 
this prediction. The findings are also compatible with the individual differences account of 
belief bias: the current findings suggest that cognitive ability predicts group membership.  
One notable caveat of our findings so far is that the effects are small, suggesting that other 
factors may also play a role in explaining the degree to which people engage in motivated 
reasoning. DPT suggests that cognitive style might also play an important role in 
understanding the link between individual differences and both belief bias components. 
The role of cognitive style was investigated in Experiment 10. 
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4.3 Experiment 10 
While cognitive ability is a measure of the capability of participants to use analytic 
processing, cognitive style is a measure of the willingness to do so (e.g., Pennycook et al., 
2012). We have demonstrated using both the ROC (Experiment 8) and the forced choice 
(Experiment 9) methods that only a higher ability subgroup of participants engaged in 
motivated reasoning. One straightforward explanation for this finding is that lower ability 
reasoners lack the necessary working memory capacity to engage in the effortful (Deutsch, 
Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009) negation process that belief bias accounts 
such as selective processing (Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 
2000) and mental model theory (Oakhill et al., 1989) argue is provoked by unbelievable 
conclusions. Instead, these participants possibly adopt a confirmatory testing strategy 
regardless of believability. For these participants, beliefs only affect the decision process 
in terms of a heuristic response bias. It might appear counterintuitive that higher capacity 
is linked to increased rather than decreased levels of bias (i.e., motivated reasoning). 
However, the high ability group compensates by better overall reasoning performance and 
reduced levels of response bias. Nevertheless, the link between cognitive ability and 
motivated reasoning does raise the question whether perhaps analytic cognitive style also 
plays a major role in explaining response bias and motivated reasoning, given its large 
correlation with cognitive ability. 
Research has shown that cognitive ability and cognitive style are moderately to highly 
correlated, depending on whether a self-report [r(AOT, CA) ≈ .20 – Stanovich & West, 2000] 
or a performance measure is used [r(CRT,CA) ≈ .50 – Frederick, 2005]. An alternative 
interpretation for the current findings is that perhaps cognitive ability is linked to 
motivated reasoning due to its correlation with cognitive style. A first step in investigating 
this possibility is to figure out whether cognitive style has any bearing on belief bias 
whatsoever.  
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In the current experiment we used the non-simultaneous forced choice reasoning method 
to investigate whether cognitive style predicts motivated reasoning. A secondary aim of 
the current experiment was to see if the previous findings of motivated reasoning and 
response bias could be replicated using a between subjects design. In all non-simultaneous 
forced choice experiments so far, problem type was manipulated within subjects, meaning 
that all participants solved both the motivated reasoning and response bias problems 
types. Stanovich and West (2008) argued that a true cognitive bias should occur both in a 
within- as well as a between-subjects design, because the prior method could lead to 
unwanted effects (e.g., experimenter effects or an increased impact due to the obvious 
contrast between the item types – see also the belief suppression hypothesis discussed in 
Chapter 2). In the present study we used a blocked design to control for this potential 
problem. 
According to the response bias account, participants should not engage in motivated 
reasoning. On the basis of our previous findings we might predict that motivated 
reasoning should be engaged in exclusively by a high cognitive style group, although no 
belief bias accounts explicitly predict this. An absence of motivated reasoning suggests 
that cognitive style is not a relevant predictor of motivated reasoning and the cognitive 
ability is the more important factor, which would be compatible with MMT’s predictions 
that WMC is linked to the motivated search for counterexamples. 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 71 undergraduate psychology students (8 male) from Plymouth University 
volunteered to take part in the experiment in exchange for course credit (age: range = 18 – 
54, M = 23, SD = 7). 
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Materials 
Materials were constructed in the same way as in Experiment 9. All participants were 
presented with motivated reasoning problems (i.e., believable and unbelievable) and 
response bias problems (i.e., non-conflict and conflict) for a total of 64 trials. 
Cognitive style was measured using the CRT (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), a behavioural 
measure of analytic cognitive style (Frederick, 2005). The CRT is a three-question test 
which is a short and efficient performance measure of analytic cognitive style (e.g., 
Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2011). The participant has to solve three 
questions which cue an intuitively compelling (but incorrect) response. The three 
questions are: 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost? ____ cents. 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets? ____ minutes. 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half 
of the lake? ____ days  
For the bat-ball problem, the correct response is 5 cents, because the bat costs $1 more 
than the ball (i.e., the bat costs $1.05 and the ball costs $0.05). Due to attribute 
substitution, however, participants who lack the motivation or willingness to engage in the 
fairly low degree of effortful reasoning required to give the correct response will 
incorrectly respond 10 cents. For the widget problem, the correct response equals five 
minutes because it takes one machine five minutes to make a widget. The intuitive 
response is 100 minutes due to matching bias. Finally, for the lily pad problem, the correct 
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response is 47, because the relation between time and lake coverage is exponential. 
Incorrectly assuming the relation is linear  will lead to the incorrect response of 24 days. 
Procedure, Measures, and Design 
The procedure was very similar to that of the previous experiment, with the exception that 
upon completing the experiment, the participants were asked to complete the CRT. We 
measured proportion correct responses, confidence ratings, response latency, and CRT 
score (0 – 3). 
The design differed somewhat from the previous experiments. Participants were 
presented with the motivated reasoning and response bias problem types in a blocked 
manner. Half the participants were randomly assigned to a motivated reasoning first 
condition, in which the first 32 problems were of the believable and unbelievable types 
and the final 32 problems of the non-conflict and conflict types. The remaining 
participants were presented with the response bias problems first, followed by the 
motivated reasoning problems. Participants were not explicitly made aware of the blocked 
nature of this design: there was no pause in between the blocks, nor were there any 
explicit instructions hinting at the different blocks. The experiment employed a mixed 4 
(problem type: believable v. unbelievable v. non-conflict v. conflict) x 2 (analytic cognitive 
style: lower v. higher) x 2 (block order: motivated reasoning first v. response bias first) 
design. Participants were assigned to the lower cognitive style group if they did not 
correctly solve any of the CRT questions (n = 58). The remaining participants were 
assigned to a higher cognitive style condition (n = 29). 
4.3.2 Results 
Accuracy  
Analysis comparing only the first block demonstrated that the results of the between-
subjects and the full analysis did not differ, thus only the latter is reported here. The 
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participants were not spatially biased, t(70) =  1.37, p = .17. We analysed the motivated 
reasoning and response bias conditions separately. Nine participants (< 13%) responded 
below chance for the believable and unbelievable problems and were removed prior to the 
analysis. All proportions were arcsine transformed prior to the analyses. 
Motivated reasoning 
In order to test for motivated reasoning, proportions correct were submitted to a 2 
(problem type: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (cognitive style: higher v. lower) x 2 (block 
order: motivated reasoning problems first v. response bias problems first) mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the first factor. Problem type and cognitive style significantly 
interacted, F(1, 58) = 12.48, p = .001, ηp2 = .18. Follow-up tests revealed that the higher 
cognitive style group reasoned better for the unbelievable (M = .80) than for the believable 
(M = .72) problems, t(26) = 3.03, p = .005. For the lower style group, this difference was 
not significant, t(34) = 1.34, p = .19. No other effects reached significance, all ps > .10. 
Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.2. 
Response bias 
In order to test for response bias, proportions correct were submitted to a 2 (problem 
type: non-conflict v. conflict) x 2 (cognitive style: higher v. lower) x 2 (block order: 
motivated reasoning problems first v. response bias problems first) mixed ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the first factor. Accuracy was higher for the non-conflict (M = .77) 
than for the conflict (M = .64) problems, F(1, 58) = 11.17, p = .001, ηp2 = .16. The higher 
style subgroup had higher accuracy overall (M = .75) than the lower style group (M = .65), 
F(1, 58) = 6.80, p = .012, ηp2 = .11. Participants given the response bias block first had 
higher accuracy (M = .73) than those who solved the motivated reasoning block first (M 
= .68), F(1, 58) = 6.80, p = .012, ηp2 = .11. Problem type and cognitive style interacted, F(1, 
58) = 4.73, p = .034, ηp2 = .075. Follow-up tests revealed that for the higher cognitive style 
subgroup there was no accuracy difference between the non-conflict and conflict 
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problems, t(26) < 1, p = .33. The lower style subgroup performed better for the non-
conflict (M = .76) than for the conflict (M = .54) problems, t(34) = 3.36, p = .002. Problem 
type also interacted with block order, F(1, 58) = 4.47, p = .039, ηp2 = .072. Follow-up tests 
revealed that in the response bias first block accuracy was significantly higher for the non-
conflict (M = .83) than for the conflict (M = .63) problems, t(30) = 3.14, p = .004. In the 
motivated reasoning first block this difference was not significant, t(30) = 1.29, p = .21. No 
other effects were significant, all ps > .17. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2 
Experiment 10: Means (Standard Errors) for the Accuracy, Confidence Rating and Response 
Time Analysis 
Var Block Style Believable Unbelievable Non-conflict Conflict 
Acc MR first High .69 (.05) .77 (.06) .73 (.05) .67 (.07) 
  Low .67 (.03) .64 (.04) .65 (.03) .54 (.05) 
 RB first High .71 (.04) .77 (.05) .77 (.04) .74 (.06) 
  Low .69 (.04) .59 (.05) .84 (.04) .46 (.06) 
Conf MR first High 2.19 (0.14) 2.18 (0.14) 2.10 (0.14) 2.08 (0.14) 
  Low 1.95 (0.09) 1.92 (0.09) 1.89 (0.09) 1.81 (0.09) 
 RB first High 1.94 (0.11) 2.01 (0.11) 2.16 (0.11) 2.27 (0.11) 
  Low 1.84 (0.11) 1.64 (0.12) 2.22 (0.12) 1.95 (0.11) 
RT MR first High 23,244 (2,098) 21,576 (1,944) 16,282 (1,544) 17,555 (1,830) 
  Low 20,851 (1,365) 21,220 (1,265) 13,041 (1,004) 13,581 (1,190) 
 RB first High 15,333 (1,640) 14,812 (1,520) 20,511 (1,208) 20,311 (1,431) 
  Low 15,935 (1,740) 16,016 (1,612) 18,428 (1,280) 19,289 (1,518) 
Note. Accuracy is proportion correct responses, confidence is on a scale from 1 – 3, and 
response time is measured in ms. 
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Confidence 
Motivated reasoning 
Confidence ratings were analysed using a 2 (problem type: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 
(cognitive style: higher v. lower) x 2 (block order: motivated reasoning block first v. 
response bias block first) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. A 
significant main effect of block order was found, indicating that confidence was higher for 
those who were presented with the motivated reasoning problems first (M = 2.11) 
compared to those presented with the response bias problems first (M = 1.86), F(1, 58) = 
4.97, p = .030, ηp2 = .079. Confidence was also marginally larger for the higher cognitive 
style (M = 2.09) compared to the lower cognitive style (M = 1.88) group, F(1, 58) = 3.44, p 
= .069, ηp2 = .056. Cognitive style marginally interacted with problem type, suggesting that 
the higher style subgroup was more confident for the unbelievable than for the believable 
problems, with the opposite pattern emerging for the lower style participants, F(1, 58) = 
3.31, p = .074, ηp2 = .054. No other effects approached significance, all ps > .13. Means and 
standard errors can be found in Table 4.2. 
Response bias 
Confidence ratings were analysed using a 2 (problem type: non-conflict v. conflict) x 2 
(cognitive style: higher v. lower) x 2 (block order: motivated reasoning block first v. 
response bias block first) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. 
Confidence was higher for the non-conflict (M = 2.09) than for the conflict (M = 2.03) 
problems, F(1, 58) = 4.25, p = .044, ηp2 = .068. Problem type and cognitive style interacted, 
F(1, 58) = 8.91, p = .004, ηp2 = 13. Follow-up tests revealed that those lower in cognitive 
style were more confident for the non-conflict (M = 2.07) than for the conflict (M = 1.91) 
problems, t(34) = 3.52, p = .001. There was no such difference for those higher in cognitive 
style, t(26) = 1.11, p = .28. Problem type, cognitive style, and block order also marginally 
interacted, F(1, 58) = 3.12, p = .083, ηp2 = .051. This effect suggested that the lower 
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cognitive style participants who were presented with the response bias block first had a 
large drop in confidence: they were highly confident for the non-conflict problems (M = 
2.22), but much less confident for the unbelievable problems (M = 1.64). No other effects 
approached significance, all ps > .21. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.2. 
Latency 
Motivated reasoning 
Log-transformed response latency was analysed using a 2 (problem type: believable v. 
unbelievable) x 2 (cognitive style: higher v. lower) x 2 (block order: motivated reasoning 
block first v. response bias block first) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
factor. The analysis only resulted in a main effect of block order, indicating that those 
given the motivated reasoning problems first took much longer (M = 22,869 ms) to 
respond than those given the response bias problems first (M = 15,669 ms), F(1, 58) = 
14.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. No other effects approached significance, all ps > .19. Means and 
standard errors can be found in Table 4.2. 
Response bias 
Log-transformed response latency was analysed using a 2 (problem type: non-conflict v. 
conflict) x 2 (cognitive style: higher v. lower) x 2 (block order: motivated reasoning block 
first v. response bias block first) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. 
Participants given the response bias problems first took longer to respond (M = 19,883 ms) 
than those given the motivated reasoning problems first (M = 15,560 ms), F(1, 58) = 8.28, 
p = .006, ηp2 = .13. There was also a marginal main effect of cognitive style, suggesting that 
those higher in cognitive style took longer to respond (M = 18,837 ms) than those of lower 
cognitive style (M = 16,605 ms), F(1, 58) = 3.42, p = .07, ηp2 = .056. No other effects 
approached significance, all ps > .16. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.2. 
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4.3.3 Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 10 was to investigate whether analytic cognitive style was linked 
to motivated reasoning. The results indicated that motivated reasoning occurred mainly in 
a higher cognitive style subgroup. Response bias was found for all participants regardless 
of cognitive ability, although the magnitude of the effect was larger for those of lower 
cognitive style, and for those presented with the response bias problems first. These 
findings also demonstrate that the forced choice paradigm can be used to measure both 
components of belief bias using a between or a within subjects manipulation, as long as 
individual differences are controlled for. 
A clear pattern on the relation between motivated reasoning and individual differences 
has emerged: using the ROC and the forced choice procedure we demonstrated that those 
of higher cognitive ability and/or style were more likely to engage in motivated reasoning 
than those of relatively lower ability/style. This naturally raises the question which 
individual difference is the most potent predictor: is adequate cognitive ability required in 
order to be able to engage in motivated reasoning, or is cognitive style the necessary 
prerequisite for motivated reasoning? We addressed this issue in our final experiment. 
4.4 Experiment 11 
The aim of this final experiment was to compare the relative importance of cognitive 
ability and cognitive style as determinants of both belief bias components. Having 
established that cognitive style and cognitive ability both predict motivated reasoning, we 
investigated whether ability or style was the crucial factor. Our use of the ROC method also 
allowed us to investigate whether the cognitive style effect could be replicated using a 
different method.  
We tested a large participant sample using the belief bias confidence rating task as used in 
Experiments 5 – 8. Our findings so far suggest that neither the response bias account nor 
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the traditional accounts appear to provide a viable interpretation of the presented belief 
bias patterns, although, as predicted by all of these theories, response bias still remains a 
major component. Based on our previous findings, we predict that both higher cognitive 
ability and higher cognitive style are linked to motivated reasoning, with response bias 
occurring more generally for all participants, albeit in a greater degree for the lower 
ability and/or style participants. The main analysis (excluding the endorsement and 
latency analyses) was a three-step process. First, accuracy and bias SDT parameters were 
compared as a function of cognitive ability and cognitive style in separate analyses. Next, 
mediational analysis was used to investigate whether style or ability respectively 
mediated the link between ability or style and motivated reasoning. The same mediational 
analyses were also performed for response bias. Finally, a path model was created to 
account of the effect of individual differences in cognitive ability and cognitive style on 
motivated reasoning, response bias, response time taken, and reasoning performance. 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants 
A total of 191 University of Waterloo (Canada) undergraduates volunteered to take part in 
the study (62 male, 129 female, age: range = 17 – 50, M = 20, SD = 3). 
Materials and Measures 
The materials consisted of 64 complex (multiple model) syllogisms, half of which were 
valid and half of which were invalid. Item contents were randomly assigned to the 
syllogistic problem frames for each participant anew as in Experiments 5 – 8. 
The cognitive ability and cognitive style measures differed somewhat from the previous 
experiments. Participants were given six different measures that have been used in past 
research to differentially measure cognitive ability or cognitive style (e.g., Pennycook et al., 
2012). The key factor that distinguishes these measures is the presence of a misleading 
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intuitive response cue. The cognitive ability and cognitive style measures were roughly 
equivalent in terms of difficulty, but the former measures did not cue misleading intuitive 
responses. Consequently, in order to get a higher cognitive ability score the participant 
needed to engage analytic processing. In contrast, for participants to get a higher analytic 
cognitive style score, a compelling intuitive response needed to be resisted in favour of 
some relatively light analytic processing. For the cognitive style measure participants 
completed 3 CRT problems (as in Experiment 10), 6 incongruent base-rate problems (De 
Neys & Glumicic, 2008), and 18 ratio bias problems (Bonner & Newell, 2010). For the 
cognitive ability measure participants completed 3 numeracy problems (Schwartz, 
Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997), 6 neutral base-rate problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), 
and the 10 item WordSum verbal intelligence test (Huang & Hauser, 1998). These 
problems can be found in Appendix A. Cognitive ability and cognitive style scores were 
computed by averaging across the mean accuracy of the measures outlined above. 
Procedure and Design 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiments 5 – 8 (Chapter 3), with the exception 
that cognitive ability and cognitive style were measured prior to the syllogistic reasoning 
task. The individual differences tasks were administered in the following order: base-rate 
(neutral and conflict), ratio-bias, CRT, numeracy, WordSum.  
The experiment used a 2 (logical validity: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion believability: 
believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (analytic ability/style: higher v. lower) mixed design, with 
the first two factors manipulated within subjects and the ability and style variables 
manipulated between subjects. Participants were assigned to a higher or lower ability and 
style group based on whether they scored at or above v. below the median (analytic style: 
Mdn = .625; cognitive ability: Mdn = .75). Note that ability and style were not crossed in the 
first step of this analysis. One participant was removed from all further analyses because 
we failed to collect individual differences data. 
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4.4.2 Results 
Endorsement 
Endorsement rates were analysed to allow for a comparison with traditional belief bias 
results reported in the literature. We analysed the results for ability and style separately. 
Cognitive ability 
Endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion 
believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two factors. Valid arguments were endorsed 
more than invalid arguments, F(1, 188) = 201.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .52. Believable arguments 
were endorsed more than unbelievable arguments, F(1, 188) = 106.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. 
The two factors also significantly interacted indicating that the validity effect was larger 
for unbelievable than for believable problems, F(1, 188) = 5.54, p = .020, ηp2 = .029. 
Cognitive ability interacted with validity showing that the validity effect was larger for the 
higher ability subgroup, F(1, 188) = 17.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .084. Ability also interacted with 
believability suggesting that the belief effect was larger for the lower ability subgroup, F(1, 
188) = 6.79, p = .010, ηp2 = .035. Finally, the three factors also significantly interacted, F(1, 
188) = 9.37, p = .003, ηp2 = .047. Follow-up tests for the higher and lower groups 
separately indicated that for the high ability subgroup a significant logic x belief 
interaction occurred, F(1, 94) = 22.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. The logic x belief interaction was 
not significant for the low ability group, F(1, 94) < 1, p = .67. The ability main effect did not 
approach significance, p = .62. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.3. 
Cognitive style 
Endorsement rates were submitted to a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion 
believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (cognitive style: higher v. lower) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two factors. Valid arguments were endorsed 
more than invalid ones, F(1, 188) = 196.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .51. Believable arguments were 
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endorsed more than unbelievable ones, F(1, 188) = 121.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .39. Logic and 
belief interacted in such a way that the validity effect was larger in the unbelievable 
condition, F(1, 188) = 4.75, p = .031, ηp2 = .025. Cognitive style interacted with validity 
showing that the higher style subgroup was better at discriminating between  valid and 
invalid arguments compared to the lower style group, F(1, 188) = 20.40, p < .001, ηp2 
= .098. Style interacted with believability in such a way that the lower style subgroup was 
more influenced by their prior beliefs than the high style group, F(1, 188) = 24.86, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .12. Finally, the three-way interaction between logic, belief and style was also 
significant, F(1, 188) = 15.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .077. Follow up analyses revealed that the 
logic x belief interaction was significant in the higher style group, F(1, 99) = 22.93, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .18, but not in the lower style group, F(1, 89) = 1.39, p = .24, ηp2 = .015. The main 
effect of style did not approach significance, p = .78. Means and standard errors can be 
found in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 
Experiment 11: Means (Standard Errors) for the Endorsement Rate Analysis for Cognitive 
Ability and Cognitive Style 
 Valid Invalid 
 Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Higher Ability .84 (.02) .71 (.03) .57 (.03) .30 (.03) 
Lower Ability .85 (.02) .53 (.03) .68 (.03) .35 (.03) 
Higher Style .82 (.02) .74 (.03) .56 (.03) .32 (.02) 
Lower Style .87 (.02) .49 (.03) .70 (.03) .34 (.03) 
Note. Ability = cognitive ability, style = analytic cognitive style. 
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SDT 
As in Experiments 5 – 8 we plotted ROCs (Figure 4.1) to which we fit SDT models for each 
participant to estimate accuracy (Az) and bias (ca). The parameters were analysed as a 
function of cognitive ability and cognitive style separately. 
 
Figure 4.1. Top row: Aggregate ROCs for the higher (A) and lower (B) cognitive ability 
groups. Bottom row: Aggregate ROCs for the higher (C) and lower (D) cognitive ability 
groups. 
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Cognitive ability 
Accuracy was analysed using a 2 (conclusion believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 
(cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
factor. Participants reasoned better for unbelievable (Az = .68) than for believable (Az = .66) 
syllogisms, F(1, 188) = 4.49, p = .035, ηp2 = .023. Higher ability participants (Az = .72) also 
reasoned better than lower ability ones (Az = .61), F(1, 188) = 26.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. 
Belief and ability interacted, F(1, 188) = 8.91, p = .003, ηp2 = .045. Follow up tests revealed 
that the higher ability group reasoned better for unbelievable than for believable 
problems, t(94) = 4.38, p < .001. This difference was absent in the lower ability group, t(94) 
< 1, p = .60. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.4. 
Response bias was analysed using a 2 (conclusion believability: believable v. unbelievable) 
x 2 (cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
factor. Participants adopted a more liberal response criterion for the believable (ca = -0.68) 
than for the unbelievable (ca = 0.05) problems, F(1, 188) = 108.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .37. 
Ability and believability interacted, suggesting that the belief effect was larger in the lower 
ability subgroup, F(1, 188) = 5.25, p = .023, ηp2 = .027. Follow-up tests revealed that the 
belief effect was significant for those of higher, t(94) = 9.02, p < .001 and lower, t(94) = 
5.71, p < .001 cognitive ability. There was no main effect of cognitive ability, p = .87. Means 
and standard errors can be found in Table 4.4. 
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 Table 4.4 
Experiment 11: Means (Standard Errors) for the SDT Analysis for Cognitive Ability and 
Cognitive Style 
 Accuracy (Az) Bias (ca) 
 Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Higher Ability .69 (.02) .75 (.02) -0.61 (0.06) -0.04 (0.07) 
Lower Ability .62 (.02) .60 (.02) -0.76 (0.06) 0.13 (0.07) 
Higher Style .69 (.02) .76 (.02) -0.53 (0.06) -0.10 (0.07) 
Lower Style .62 (.02) .59 (.02) -0.84 (0.06) 0.21 (0.07) 
Note. Lower bias values indicate more liberal criterion placement. 
Cognitive style 
Accuracy was analysed using a 2 (conclusion believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 
(cognitive style: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. 
There was a marginal main effect of belief, suggesting that reasoning accuracy tended to 
be higher for the unbelievable (Az = .67) than for the believable (Az = .65) problems, F(1, 
188) = 3.79, p = .053, ηp2 = .020. Higher style participants also reasoned better (Az = .72) 
than lower style ones (Az = .60), F(1, 188) = 28.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Belief and style 
interacted, F(1, 188) = 15.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .074. Follow up tests revealed that the higher 
cognitive style group reasoned better for the unbelievable than the believable arguments, 
t(99) = 4.78, p < .001. For the low style group, no such difference occurred, t(89) = 1.19, p 
= .24. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.4. 
Bias was analysed using a 2 (conclusion believability: believable v. unbelievable) x 2 
(cognitive style: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. 
Participants adopted a more liberal response criterion for the believable (ca = -0.69) 
compared to the unbelievable (ca = 0.06) problems, F(1, 188) = 122.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .39. 
Belief and style interacted suggesting that the belief effect is larger for the lower compared 
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to the higher style group, F(1, 188) = 21.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Follow up tests confirmed 
that the belief effect was significant for both the higher, t(99) = 9.44, p < .001 and lower 
group, t(89) = 5.51, p < .001. There was no main effect of style, p = .97. Means and standard 
errors can be found in Table 4.4. 
Latency 
Log transformed response times were analysed separately for cognitive ability and 
cognitive style. 
Cognitive ability 
We analysed RT using a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion believability: 
believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (cognitive ability: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the first two factors. Participants responded more quickly to valid 
(M = 13,427 ms) than to invalid (M = 16,487 ms) problems, F(1, 188) = 104.30, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .36. Higher ability participants responded significantly more slowly (M = 16,814 ms) 
than lower ability (M = 13,099 ms) ones, F(1, 188) = 8.12, p = .005, ηp2 = .041. Logic and 
ability interacted, suggesting that the validity effect was larger for the higher ability 
subgroup than for the lower ability group, F(1, 188) = 6.64, p = .011, ηp2 = .034. Follow up 
tests confirmed that the validity effect was significant for both the higher, t(94) = 8.25, p 
< .001, and lower ability group, t(94) = 5.64, p < .001. No other effects were significant, all 
ps > .11. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.5. 
Cognitive style 
RTs were analysed using a 2 (logical status: valid v. invalid) x 2 (conclusion believability: 
believable v. unbelievable) x 2 (cognitive style: higher v. lower) mixed ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the first two factors. Participants responded more quickly to valid 
(M = 13,325 ms) than to invalid (M = 16,331 ms) problems, F(1, 188) = 102.37, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .35. Participants higher in cognitive style also responded more slowly (M = 17,273 ms) 
than those lower in style (M = 12,383 ms), F(1, 188) = 16.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .083. Logic and 
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style interacted, F(1, 188) = 9.88, p = .002, ηp2 = .050. Follow-up tests revealed that the 
validity effect was significant for both the higher cognitive style group, t(99) = 9.29, p 
< .001, and for the lower cognitive style group, t(89) = 4.70, p < .001. No other effects were 
significant, all ps > .17. Means and standard errors can be found in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 
Experiment 11: Means (Standard Errors) for the Latency Analysis for Cognitive Ability and 
Cognitive Style 
 Valid Invalid 
 Believable Unbelievable Believable Unbelievable 
Higher Ability 15,199 (707) 14,380 (615) 19,337 (933) 18,339 (904) 
Lower Ability 12,070 (707) 12,056 (615) 14,627 (933) 14,002 (904) 
Higher Style 15,566 (676) 14,946 (583) 19,594 (897) 18,986 (858) 
Lower Style 11,490 (713) 11,299 (614) 13,701 (946) 13,042 (905) 
Note. Response latency was measured in milliseconds. 
Mediation Analysis 
We conducted several mediational analyses in order to answer our main question whether 
cognitive ability or cognitive style is the more potent predictor of motivated reasoning. We 
conducted the analyses for motivated reasoning and response bias separately. We 
calculated a motivated reasoning index (MRI) by subtracting Az–believable from Az–
unbelievable, with higher values indicating more motivated reasoning. We also calculated 
a response bias index (RBI) by subtracting ca–believable from ca–unbelievable, after 
adding a constant k (k = 10000, arbitrarily chosen to be large enough) to both values. This 
constant was added to deal with the fact that for some participants the sign for ca-
believable and unbelievable was not identical, leading to skewed bias estimates. Higher 
values of RBI indicated more response bias. Prior to conducting the following analyses, 10 
outliers were removed using boxplots (Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2. Outliers for the variables included in the mediation analyses were determined 
using boxplots. Including the outliers in the analyses did not change the conclusions. Two 
outliers overlapped. 
Motivated reasoning 
We tested whether cognitive ability mediated the link between cognitive style and 
motivated reasoning. First, we regressed MRI on cognitive style. The analysis revealed that 
style significantly predicted motivated reasoning, b = 0.30, t(178) = 3.26, p = .001. Second, 
we added cognitive ability into the regression. The analysis showed that style still 
significantly predicted motivated reasoning, b = 0.29, t(177) = 2.56, p = .011. In contrast, 
ability did not significantly predict motivated reasoning, b = 0.03, t(177) < 1, p = .84. 
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Cognitive ability did not mediate the relationship between cognitive style and cognitive 
ability, Sobel’s Z = 0.21, p = .83. 
We also tested the opposite hypothesis that cognitive style mediated the link between 
cognitive ability and motivated reasoning. MRI was regressed on cognitive ability, 
indicating that ability significantly predicted motivated reasoning, b = 0.24, t(178) = 1.97, 
p < .05. When cognitive style was added to the regression cognitive ability no longer 
predicted motivated reasoning, t(177) < 1, p = .84. Instead, cognitive style became the 
major predictor, b = .29, t(177) = 2.56, p = .011. Cognitive style fully mediated the effect of 
cognitive ability on motivated reasoning, b = 0.21, SE = 0.09, Sobel’s Z = 2.47, p = .015. An 
illustration of the mediation can be found in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3. Cognitive style fully mediates the effect of cognitive ability on motivated 
reasoning. Path coefficients are standardised. 
Response bias 
We investigated whether cognitive ability mediated the link between analytic cognitive 
style and response bias. First, we regressed RBI on ACS. Analytic style was negatively 
related to response bias, b = -1.56, t(178) = -4.82, p < .001. When CA was added to the 
regression, ACS still predicted response bias, b = -1.20, t(177) = -3.07, p = .003, but CA did 
not, b = -0.84, t(177) = -1.64, p = .10. Consequently, cognitive ability did not mediate the 
effect of analytic style on response bias, b = -0.36, SE = 0.22, Sobel’s Z = -1.62, p = .11. 
We then investigated whether perhaps analytic cognitive style mediated the link between 
cognitive ability and response bias – as was the case for motivated reasoning. We started 
Cognitive Ability Motivated Reasoning
Cognitive Style
.01 (.15*)
.57*** .23*
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by regressing RBI on CA, showing that cognitive ability was negatively related to response 
bias, b = -1.73, t(178) = -3.99, p < .001. When ACS was added to the regression, ACS 
predicted response bias, b = -1.20, t(177) = -3.07, p = .003, but CA no longer did, b = -0.84, 
t(177) = -1.64, p = .10. It turned out that the link between CA and RBI was fully mediated 
by ACS, b = -0.89, SE = 0.31, Sobel’s Z = -2.91, p = .004 (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4. Cognitive style fully mediates the effect of cognitive ability on response bias. Path 
coefficients are standardised. 
Path Analysis 
We used path analysis to create a descriptive model of our data integrating the effects of 
cognitive ability and style on latency, response bias, motivated reasoning and reasoning 
accuracy. To take latency into account, an additional 5 outliers were removed on the basis 
of boxplots on response time (see Figure 4.5).  
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Figure 4.5. Outliers for response latency were determined using a boxplot. Including the 
outliers in the analyses did not change the conclusions. 
In order to create our model we divided our variables into three types: cognitive ability 
(CA) and analytic cognitive style (ACS) were chosen as the exogenous predictor variables 
as they are assumed to be relatively constant due to their trait-like status. Response bias 
(RBI), motivated reasoning (MRI), and overall response time taken (log transformed RT, 
lnRT) were considered intermediate “process”-level variables, as they bear on how people 
reason. Finally, reasoning accuracy (Az) was taken as the outcome variable of interest. All 
variables were treated as observed variables as is common in path analysis. The 
exogenous variables (CA and ACS) were assumed to be correlated. All endogenous 
variables (RBI, MRI, lnRT, Az) were assumed to have some random measurement error 
associated with them. In a first step, we used maximum likelihood estimation to fit a 
nearly saturated model in which CA and ACS both predicted RBI, MRI, lnRT, and Az, with 
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lnRT predicting RBI, MRI, and Az, and RBI and MRI predicting Az (see Figure 4.6). The 
model fit the data well, χ2 (1) = 0.63, p = .43. 
Figure 4.6. Full model relating cognitive style, ability, response bias, motivated reasoning, 
response time and reasoning accuracy. Path coefficients are standardised. 
Inspection of the path coefficients confirmed the high correlation between style and ability. 
Cognitive style predicted response bias, motivated reasoning, and response time better 
than cognitive ability did. In contrast, cognitive ability seemed to be the better predictor of 
reasoning accuracy. Finally, longer response times were linked to better reasoning 
accuracy, as was less response bias. In an attempt to create a more parsimonious model of 
the data, we pruned some of the weaker paths from the full model (Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7. Reduced model relating cognitive style to response bias, motivated reasoning, and 
response time taken. Cognitive ability is linked to reasoning accuracy. Response time predicts 
motivated reasoning, response bias, and reasoning accuracy. Path coefficients are 
standardised. 
To test whether these restrictions significantly reduced the fit of the model, we conducted 
a likelihood ratio test. Imposing the outlined restrictions did not significantly reduce the fit 
of the model, Δχ2 (5) = 5.14, p = .40. The reduced model fit the data well, χ2(6) = 5.66, p 
= .45. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
The aim of our final experiment was to investigate whether cognitive ability or cognitive 
style was the more important predictor of motivated reasoning. The data demonstrated 
that cognitive style was a better predictor of motivated reasoning than cognitive ability. 
The same held true for response bias, with higher levels of analytic cognitive style 
predicting reduced levels of response bias. 
These conclusions were reached by combining various analytic techniques. We used the 
ROC procedure to replicate our previous findings which were based on the forced choice 
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method, providing more support for the idea that motivated reasoning was mainly 
engaged in by a subgroup of high ability and/or style participants. These analyses further 
revealed that response bias was fairly universal, although the effect was larger for the low 
style/ability participants. Next, mediational analyses demonstrated that analytic style 
appeared to be responsible for the link between cognitive ability and motivated reasoning, 
and the link between cognitive ability and response bias. Finally, path analysis was used to 
bring together the mediational analyses and provided the additional insight that cognitive 
ability was the main predictor of actual reasoning accuracy, in contrast to analytic style, 
which mainly influenced the “processing variables”, i.e., how long participants took to 
respond, how response biased they were, and how much motivated reasoning they 
engaged in. Even though we must be cautious with this interpretation given the caveats of 
mediational and path analysis (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010), we want to stress that this 
model is psychologically viable.  According to this individual differences model of belief 
bias, high ability is linked to increased reasoning accuracy, whereas high style is linked to 
increased motivated reasoning and decreased response bias. Adding to the psychological 
plausibility, the path analysis demonstrated that these effects of cognitive style were 
partially mediated by the amount of time taken to respond. We discuss these findings in 
more detail and in light of the other findings in this chapter in the general discussion. 
4.5 General Discussion 
In the current chapter we focused on the impact of individual differences in cognitive 
ability and analytic cognitive style in an attempt to test our proposed individual 
differences account of belief bias. In Experiment 9 we used the forced choice reasoning 
method to replicate Experiment 8’s finding that high cognitive ability is linked to 
motivated reasoning. In Experiment 10, we used the forced choice method to demonstrate 
that cognitive style also predicted motivated reasoning. This finding was replicated using 
the ROC method in Experiment 11. More importantly, in Experiment 11 we demonstrated 
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that analytic style, rather than cognitive ability, was the main predictor of motivated 
reasoning and response bias. These findings are incompatible with the response bias 
account of belief bias, according to which motivated reasoning is not a component of belief 
bias. To the contrary, our findings show that motivated reasoning is indeed a significant 
component of belief bias. To account for this pattern of results we proposed a modified 
individual differences account of belief bias in which analytic cognitive style predicts the 
tendency to engage in more motivated reasoning and to resist response bias.  This account 
further suggests that cognitive style partially has its effects through the recruitment of 
more time to respond, a proxy of cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005). 
4.5.1 Individual Differences Matter 
The presented experiments also provide some important methodological insights for the 
study of reasoning (and perhaps even cognitive psychology in general). The conclusions 
drawn from the experiments in this chapter would have been rather different had we not 
explicitly taken individual differences into account. Consider for instance the following 
hypothetical scenario. If we had run Experiment 9 with exactly the same participants but 
without taking individual differences in cognitive ability into account the very 
straightforward and clear conclusion would have been that participants engaged in 
response bias (M non-conflict = .74, M conflict = .67), F(1, 95) = 6.89, p = .010, ηp2 = .067, but not 
motivated reasoning (M believable = .73, M unbelievable = .74), F(1, 95) = 1.39, p = .24, ηp2 = .014, 
providing converging evidence for the response bias account using a novel method within 
the SDT paradigm. Next, having established that motivated reasoning was absent in 
Experiment 9, perhaps we would have been interested in attempting to replicate these 
findings using a blocked design. Once again, the analysis of Experiment 10 would have 
indicated that participants engaged in response bias (M non-conflict = .76, M conflict = .63), F(1, 
60) = 10.89, p = .002, ηp2 = .15, but not motivated reasoning (M believable = .71, M unbelievable 
= .73), F(1, 60) = 1.39, p = .24, ηp2 = .023.  
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Finally, having firmly established strong evidence compatible with the response bias 
account using the forced choice paradigm, we may have been interested in doing one large 
final study using the ROC method. As in the previous two experiments, we would have 
concluded that participants engaged in response bias, (ca believable = -0.68, ca unbelievable = 0.05), 
F(1, 189) = 105.85, p < .001,  ηp2 = .36. In contrast with the previous two experiments, 
however, the analysis would have indicated that participants engaged in a very small 
degree of motivated reasoning (Az believable = .66, Az unbelievable = .68), F(1, 189) = 4.31, p = .039,  
ηp2 = .02. Perhaps we would have concluded that the non-simultaneous forced choice 
method eliminates response bias sometimes (E4) and motivated reasoning at others (E9, 
E10). Similarly, we may have concluded that the ROC method always leads to response 
bias, but only occasionally to motivated reasoning (E5, E11). Furthermore, the motivated 
reasoning effects were so small that they are probably psychologically insignificant. The 
main conclusion may then have been that Dube et al. (2010) were accurate in their 
conclusions and that belief bias is just a response bias. 
4.5.2 Latency, Confidence and Dual Process Theories 
We also collected and analysed response latency and confidence ratings, although this was 
not the main focus of our analyses. There was some consistency, although the results were 
not overly indicative in providing evidence in favour or against various accounts. In 
general, it was found that the higher ability and/or style participants took more time to 
respond than the lower ability/style group. Furthermore, valid problems were processed 
faster than invalid problems, pointing to a potential fluency effect (Morsanyi & Handley, 
2012). The most striking finding was that problem type and believability did not appear to 
consistently impact latency. In E9, for instance, it was found that participants took more 
time to respond to believable problems than to other problem types. In contrast, the 
analysis of E10 revealed that participants responded more quickly to non-conflict 
compared to believable problems. The only consistent finding was that participants did 
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not appear to take more time to respond to the unbelievable problems. At face value, this 
could be considered evidence against motivated reasoning accounts of belief bias which 
suggest that unbelievable conclusions should result in additional analytic processing 
compared to believable conclusions, leading to increased reasoning accuracy (e.g., 
Thompson, Newstead, & Morley, 2011; Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 
2003). We failed to replicate Thompson et al.’s findings, although one explanation is that 
our crude measure of response time did not distinguish between reading, reasoning, and 
rationalising time. It is possible, for instance, that believable conclusions occasionally lead 
to drawn-out response times due to an increased confirmation tendency. If anything, the 
findings were more consistent with Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith’s (2011) modified 
selective processing account, which predicts that participants with a higher reasoning 
aptitude have different response time profiles than pororer reasoners. The path analysis 
in Experiment 11 confirmed that participants who took longer to respond were less likely 
to show belief bias as response bias, more likely to engage in motivated reasoning, and 
more likely to get the correct response. Importantly, though, response time was linked to 
cognitive style, not cognitive ability – even though the latter is typically considered a more 
potent predictor of reasoning ability (Stanovich & West, 2008). 
These findings are compatible with dual process theories (DPT) of reasoning according to 
which cognitive ability and cognitive style are determinants of belief bias and reasoning 
aptitude. Unfortunately, DPT is often treated as a meta-theory which does not make many 
concrete predictions about the effect of the various individual differences and their 
interrelation (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a; 2013b). These types of predictions are usually 
reserved for particular instantiations of the theory (e.g., some of the traditional theories of 
belief bias such as selective processing theory). For instance, even though DPT typically 
acknowledges that style and ability are correlated with each other, as well as with 
response bias, the presented results in the literature did not lead to modifications of the 
traditional belief bias theories (Sá et al., 1999). There is also no consensus in the literature 
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whether cognitive ability is meant to lead to increased (Newstead et al., 2004) or 
decreased (Quayle & Ball, 2000) motivated reasoning. In the current chapter, we have 
attempted resolve these inconsistencies by applying the SDT method. In doing so, we 
proposed a modified individual differences account of belief bias, according to which 
cognitive style is linked to both components of belief bias, and cognitive ability is linked to 
reasoning performance, with reasoning time playing a significant role in explaining the 
former (see Figure 4.7).  
The main conclusions of this chapter are that ignoring individual differences in the study 
of belief bias can lead to incorrect conclusions, and that cognitive style appears to be the 
major predictor of the degree of motivated reasoning and response bias. We now turn to 
Chapter 5 in which we present a general discussion of the findings in this dissertation and 
their wider implications. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this dissertation was to further our understanding of human reasoning.  We 
discussed the various systematic biases which impact on deductive reasoning, focusing 
specifically on belief bias – the interference of induction with deduction (Wilkins, 1928). 
Various accounts of belief bias were introduced, all of which have in common that their 
main aim is to provide a psychological theory for two reliable empirical findings (Evans, 
Barston, & Pollard, 1983). First, all theories must account for the main effect of beliefs on 
conclusion endorsement, or the fact that believable conclusions are accepted more than 
unbelievable ones (response bias). Second, all theories must explain the interaction 
between logic and belief, or the finding that people appear to be better at discriminating 
between valid and invalid syllogisms when such arguments have unbelievable conclusions 
(motivated reasoning).  
We then introduced the response bias account of belief bias by Dube, Rotello, and Heit 
(2010) which explains the main effect of beliefs in terms of a response bias and the logic x 
belief interaction in terms of a Type 1 error. Dube et al. used SDT to demonstrate that the 
traditional analysis of endorsement rates typically used to investigate belief bias is flawed, 
because it presumes linear receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves. In contrast to 
this assumption, reasoning ROCs turned out to be curvilinear (Dube et al., 2010; 2011; 
Heit & Rotello, 2005; 2010; Rotello & Heit, 2009). The implication of their argument was 
that all traditional theories of belief bias are incorrect. In response to this strong 
conclusion, Klauer and Kellen (2011) applied an alternative measurement model based on 
the multinomial processing tree (MPT) framework which could also account for the 
curvilinear ROCs. This model interpreted the logic x belief interaction in terms of 
motivated reasoning. Dube et al. (2011) rejected this alternative measurement method on 
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the account of it being too flexible and less psychologically viable than the SDT model. In 
sum, the belief bias debate centred on the question of whether motivated reasoning is a 
component of belief bias or not. 
We adopted the SDT approach in order to advance the belief bias debate. In Chapter 2, we 
extended the SDT approach by developing a novel forced reasoning method which allowed 
us to measure response bias and motivated reasoning directly. In the first three 
experiments two arguments were simultaneously presented, one of which was always 
valid and one of which was always invalid. In Experiment 1, we eliminated the possibility 
for participants to show response bias, leaving open the possibility for motivated 
reasoning only. Consistent with Dube et al.’s response bias account, motivated reasoning 
was not found. In Experiment 2, we reintroduced the possibility for participants to show 
response bias, in an attempt to find converging evidence for the response bias account. 
Contrary to our predictions, response bias was not found. We hypothesised that perhaps 
the forced choice method somehow altered the participants’ reasoning strategy, effectively 
eliminating response bias (and perhaps motivated reasoning).  
We proposed two ways in which the simultaneous presentation may have altered the 
reasoning process. According to the belief suppression hypothesis, presenting the 
response bias problems randomly intermixed with the motivated reasoning problems 
caused the participants to realise that beliefs and validity are unrelated, leading them to 
actively suppress their prior beliefs and to using an alternative reasoning process. In 
Experiment 3, this belief suppression hypothesis was disconfirmed, with no response bias 
occurring even though the response bias problem types were presented in the absence of 
the motivated reasoning problems. According to the structural focus hypothesis, the 
simultaneous problem presentation cued premise to conclusion reasoning instead of the 
default conclusion to premise reasoning strategy (Morley, Evans, & Handley, 2004), 
causing both components of belief bias to be eliminated. In Experiment 4, we tested the 
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structural focus hypothesis: non-simultaneous problem presentation was used to induce 
conclusion to premise reasoning, and evidence consistent with motivated reasoning was 
found. This finding provided evidence incompatible with the response bias account of 
belief bias. 
In Chapter 3 we aimed to resolve the inconsistency between Experiment 4 – in which 
evidence consistent with motivated reasoning was found – and Dube et al.’s key 
experiment in which motivated reasoning was not found. Although both experiments 
explicitly employed methods situated within the SDT framework, one possible explanation 
for the discrepancy was a difference in the specific method (forced choice v. ROC).  
Throughout Chapter 3 we used the ROC method to eliminate this possibility. In 
Experiment 5, we investigated whether syllogism complexity was a determinant of 
motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning was found for complex (multiple model), but 
not simple (one model) syllogisms, but response bias was found for both problem types. 
We hypothesised that Dube et al.’s participants may have differed from ours a certain way 
(e.g., in motivation or its proxy: time taken to respond). In Experiment 6, we investigated 
the impact of a response time manipulation. Inconsistent with previous research (Evans & 
Curtis-Holmes, 2005), the speeded task manipulation had no effect on either component of 
belief bias. Even more confusing was the finding that motivated reasoning did not occur in 
the self-paced condition, replicating Dube et al. (2010). In Experiment 7 we investigated 
the effect of pragmatic instructions on response bias and motivated reasoning, 
hypothesising that such instructions might lead to more response bias, and potentially 
more motivated reasoning. Instructions did not impact on either component of belief bias. 
Furthermore, we failed to replicate Experiments 4 and 5, finding once again that 
motivated reasoning was absent. An exploratory analysis of Experiment 7 suggested that 
only those participants who took more time to reason engaged in motivated reasoning.  
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Inspired by the idea that different participants may have been reasoning in different ways, 
in Experiment 8 we investigated the effect of individual differences in cognitive ability 
alongside a response time manipulation. Motivated reasoning was engaged in mainly by 
those of higher cognitive ability, whereas response bias was universally present. The 
response time manipulation successfully eliminated (or even reversed) motivated 
reasoning for the higher ability subgroup, in contrast to Experiment 6 where the 
manipulation had no effect. In light of these findings we proposed an individual 
differences account of belief bias, according to which everybody shows response bias, but 
only those of higher cognitive ability engage in motivated reasoning. This account 
provided a potential explanation for the inconsistent findings in the previous experiments: 
perhaps motivated reasoning was present in certain experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) 
but absent in others (Experiments 6 and 7) because a smaller proportion of higher ability 
participants was sampled in the latter compared to the former. 
In Chapter 4 we further tested the individual differences account of belief bias, employing 
both the forced choice and the ROC method. In Experiment 9 we successfully replicated 
the finding that motivated reasoning was engaged in mainly by those of higher cognitive 
ability using the non-simultaneous forced choice reasoning method, demonstrating that 
the effect was robust to variations in the (SDT) method. In Experiment 10, we 
demonstrated that cognitive style as measured by the cognitive reflection test (CRT; 
Frederick, 2005) also predicted motivated reasoning. In Experiment 11, we used a 
meditational analysis in combination with the ROC method to demonstrate that the effect 
of cognitive ability on motivated reasoning and response bias was mediated by cognitive 
style. Finally, path analysis was used to present a statistically and psychologically viable 
individual differences model of belief bias. This model is discussed in more detail in the 
next section.  
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5.2 Implications 
As outlined in the summary above, the main aim of this thesis was to further the belief bias 
debate which centred on the question of whether motivated reasoning is a component of 
belief bias, or whether a pure response bias is sufficient to explain the data. We now turn 
to a discussion of the wider methodological, empirical, and theoretical implications of this 
work. 
5.2.1 Methodological 
The use of SDT as a more appropriate way of measuring human reasoning played a central 
role in the experiments in this dissertation. This approach was advocated by Dube et al. 
(2010), who demonstrated that the relationship between hits and false alarms in 
reasoning is curvilinear and that endorsement rate analysis is inappropriate, suggesting 
that the use of a more appropriate measurement method such as SDT led to increased 
consistency and parsimony, showing that belief bias was just a response bias. Using a 
more appropriate measurement method was an important step forward, but some issues 
still remained. For instance, using the appropriate measurement method did not 
guarantee more consistent measurements: even though SDT (Dube et al., 2010) and MPT 
(Klauer & Kellen, 2011) were both able to accommodate curvilinear ROCs, disagreement 
on the status of motivated reasoning remained depending on the chosen method.  
We actively avoided getting into the SDT – MPT debate (e.g., Province & Rouder, 2012), 
but we had some reasons to prefer SDT in this dissertation. First, SDT is a very general 
theory of human decision making which has been successfully applied in other important 
domains of cognitive psychology, most notably memory and psychophysics (Pazzaglia, 
Dube, & Rotello, in press). Consequently, SDT offers a general framework which is 
applicable in any task where a marked preference for one item class over another (i.e., a 
response bias) may be confounded with sensitivity or accuracy (Green & Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The case of belief bias lends itself very well to this approach, 
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given the marked preference of believable over unbelievable syllogisms (e.g., Evans et al., 
1983). In contrast, the MPT method requires a novel instantiation of the model for each 
problem, with the only common ground being that discrete detect-states can be reached 
with a certain probability of a threshold being exceeded (Luce, 1963).  Second, the SDT 
model’s ability to relate confidence ratings to accuracy in order to enrichen the data via 
the mechanism of criterion placement is psychologically justified on the basis of various 
experiments on metacognition (Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Results 
from such studies suggest that confidence or the so-called feeling of rightness plays an 
important role in reasoning and judgement, for instance in deciding whether or not to 
stick with the initial response. In contrast, for MPT to accommodate for curvilinear ROCs, 
the (arguably less psychologically plausible) assumption needs to be made that 
participants differ in the way in which they use the confidence rating scale (Klauer & 
Kellen, 2011). Finally, model recovery simulations demonstrated that the MPT model was 
more flexible than the SDT model, given that the former was better at fitting data which 
was generated from the latter than vice versa (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2011).  
We extended the SDT method using the forced choice reasoning procedure to avoid the 
pitfalls of traditional modeling – as well as endorsement rate analysis. The major 
contribution of the forced choice method was its ability to provide methodologically 
correct estimates of accuracy (Macmillen & Creelman, 2005). The method allowed us to 
measure response bias and motivated reasoning directly by comparing accuracy between 
different problem types. Consequently, the various theories of belief bias – including the 
response bias account – could be tested. Using a better measurement method (SDT) which 
avoided the pitfalls of modeling (forced choice) turned out not to be sufficient to decrease 
the inconsistency, however: motivated reasoning and response bias appeared and 
disappeared between experiments, even though the conditions were identical. Only when 
we took individual differences into account a major leap forward in consistency was found: 
higher ability participants were more likely to engage in motivated reasoning than lower 
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ability participants, regardless of the specific method  used (i.e., ROC or forced choice). 
Consequently, we argue that the main methodological implication of this dissertation is 
that individual differences in cognitive ability and cognitive style need to be taken into 
account when investigating belief bias. Merely using a more appropriate measurement 
method alone was not sufficient to resolve the question whether motivated reasoning is a 
component of belief bias or not, although neither was accounting for individual differences 
when using an inappropriate measurement method (see in this respect the inconsistent 
observation of the logic x belief interaction as a function of cognitive ability found in 
Quayle & Ball, 2000 and Newstead et al., 2004).  
The key to advancing our understanding of belief bias – and reasoning in general – turned 
out to be a combination of using the appropriate measurement method and accounting for 
individual differences. Future research on human reasoning would also benefit from 
taking these methodological considerations into account. 
5.2.2 Empirical 
The main empirical question of this dissertation was whether motivated reasoning could 
be observed in syllogistic reasoning if the appropriate measurement method was used. 
The answer turned out to be yes, but only under certain conditions: motivated reasoning 
was observed only for people reasoning about sufficiently complex arguments, who were 
provided with adequate time to respond, under a certain set of standard instructions, and 
who possessed above average levels of analytic cognitive style and/or ability. Even though 
this was the main empirical finding, some additional interesting observations were made. 
The first three experiments presented in this dissertation employed the simultaneous 
forced choice reasoning method. In this method, two syllogisms were presented side by 
side and the participants were instructed to choose the valid one. Even though the 
simultaneous forced choice method did not actively increase our understanding of belief 
bias in terms of which account is more viable, it had the unexpected side-effect of 
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completely eliminating both components of belief bias, while still retaining above chance 
reasoning performance. The finding that forced choice reasoning can eliminate both 
components of belief bias is novel, and particularly interesting given the inability of 
instructional manipulations to fully eliminate belief bias (Evans, Newstead, Allen, & 
Pollard, 1994; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992). The simultaneous forced choice 
method may provide to be useful in future research aiming to educate people on logical 
reasoning by demonstrating that logic and beliefs are unrelated. 
The remaining forced choice experiments, which employed a non-simultaneous problem 
presentation, demonstrated that the forced choice method is capable of directly measuring 
response bias and motivated reasoning whilst conforming to the underlying assumptions 
of ROC curvilinearity. It turned out that response bias was engaged in by all participants, 
although follow-up tests suggested that the effect was particularly strong for the lower 
style/ability participants. Nevertheless, these findings replicated and confirmed the classic 
finding that belief bias as response bias is pervasive and universal (Wilkins, 1928). 
Syllogism complexity has been used as a means of distinguishing between the various 
theories of belief bias. For instance, according to Mental Models Theory (Oakhill et al., 
1989) and Selective Processing Theory (Evans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2000), the logic x 
belief interaction should be absent for simple (i.e., one-model) syllogisms. In contrast, 
Selective Scrutiny predicts that the logic x belief interaction should be present for all 
problems regardless of their complexity (Evans et al., 1983). The data with respect to the 
logic x belief interaction in one-model syllogisms is inconsistent, as it was absent in certain 
experiments (e.g., Newstead et al., 1992; Klauer et al., 2000) and present in others (Evans 
& Pollard, 1990; Glinsky & Judd, 1994). In Experiment 5, we demonstrated that motivated 
reasoning was absent for simple problems when SDT was used. Although one potential 
issue with this finding is that individual differences were not taken into account, the fact 
that motivated reasoning occurred for the complex condition suggests that the sample was 
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of above average cognitive ability and/or style. Nevertheless, additional research 
specifically taking these variables into account is required to verify the finding. 
Like complexity, response time is frequently manipulated in reasoning to test various 
theories (e.g., Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 2009; Schroyens, Schaeken, & Handley, 2003). For 
instance, according to Misinterpreted Necessity (Evans et al., 1983), the logic x belief 
interaction originates from the application of a belief heuristic for the very difficult 
indeterminately invalid problems, and limiting response times should increase the use of 
such heuristics, resulting in a larger interaction for the speeded group. In contrast, MMT 
and SPT predict that limiting the response time available should reduce the ability to 
engage in motivated reasoning, resulting in an absence of the interaction. Evans and 
Curtis-Holmes (2005) found that motivated reasoning was eliminated, consistent with 
predictions from MMT and SPT. The results also indicated that belief bias as response bias 
increased in magnitude under a response time limit. This latter finding was taken in 
support of dual process theories (DPT) of reasoning, as it suggests that the influence of 
beliefs originates from a heuristic process which takes time to be overridden by additional 
processing. One caveat of this study was that the results were based on a traditional 
analysis of endorsement rates. We investigated the effect of the response time 
manipulation in combination with the more appropriate ROC method (Experiment 6) and 
taking individual differences into account (Experiment 8). Contrary to Evans and Curtis-
Holmes’ findings, limiting the amount of time available to respond did not increase the 
magnitude of the response bias. In fact, the only effect of the response time limit on 
criterion placement appeared to be that the high ability group was slightly more 
conservative in the speeded condition, regardless of beliefs. These findings suggest that 
the effects of response time on belief bias might not be as well understood as previously 
thought, with the time limit mainly having an effect on the motivated reasoning 
component of belief bias, and only for the higher ability/style participants. 
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A similar story can be told about the effect of pragmatic instructions on belief bias. In 
Experiment 7, we investigated the impact of an instructional manipulation on response 
bias and motivated reasoning. Previous research demonstrated that pragmatic 
instructions led to increased response bias in a causal conditional reasoning task, 
regardless of ability (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2010). The conclusions from these 
studies were based on analysis of endorsement rates. In contrast, using the SDT method, 
we did not find any effect of instructions. The cause for this discrepancy can be two-folded. 
Either the difference in the measurement method was responsible, or the fact that we did 
not look at the impact of individual differences obfuscated the results. Evans et al. (2010)’s 
results suggest that, perhaps lower and higher ability/style groups make use of pragmatic 
instructions in qualitatively different ways. Future research using a more appropriate 
measurement method and taking individual differences into account will indicate whether 
this is the case. Regardless what such research might find, the key empirical findings of 
Experiments 6 (response time) and 7 (instructions) is that they underscore the 
pervasiveness of belief bias as response bias. 
Like in much of the previous research on belief bias (e.g., Evans et al., 1983), the bulk of 
our theorising focused on the effect of conclusion believability on reasoning accuracy 
(motivated reasoning) and conclusion endorsement (response bias). However, more 
recently, researchers interested in reasoning and DPT have started focusing more on 
processing variables such as response time taken and confidence ratings. This research 
has suggested that decreased confidence and increased response times are indicative of 
the implicit detection of a conflict between the normative (e.g., responses in line with logic 
or probability theory) and the heuristic (e.g., responses in line with prior beliefs) task 
characteristics (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 
2013; Thompson et al., 2003; Thompson et al., 2011). Even though it was not our primary 
focus, we also collected response latencies and confidence ratings. In fact, the latter were 
an essential part of the ROC method. In contrast to this promising trend advocated by the 
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studies above, our response time data did not provide evidence consistent or inconsistent 
with the response bias account: beliefs did not impact on response time taken, at least 
when the ROC method was used (Experiments 5, 6, 7, 8, 11).  
Response time did occasionally differ as a function of believability in the forced choice 
experiments, but the findings were inconsistent. Compared to the other problem types, 
unbelievable problems were responded to more quickly sometimes (Experiment 1), but 
equally fast at others (Experiments 2-4). Believable problems were responded to more 
slowly in one study (Experiment 9), but not in other ones (Experiments 1 – 4, Experiment 
10). Neutral contents elicited longer response times in one study (Experiment 3), but not 
in a different one (Experiment 1). The only interesting consistent response time finding 
was that high style/ability participants took longer to respond than their counterparts 
(Experiments 8 – 11), possibly due to their increased tendency towards cognitive 
reflection. Furthermore, this additional time significantly increased reasoning accuracy 
and motivated reasoning, but decreased response bias (Experiment 11). Our findings 
suggest that response time is a less optimal dependent variable for belief bias theorising, 
but that it can play a key mediational role. One potential reason why its usefulness as a 
dependent variable is reduced might be found in the fact that response time is not 
identical to reasoning time, due to the fact that reasoning generally takes a lot of time and 
effort. Response times in reasoning are probably a fairly crude measure given that it is 
difficult to disentangle the time spent reading, reasoning, and rationalising. More fine-
grained measures of response time which somehow manage to differentiate between 
these response phases, possibly in combination with eye-tracking data (Ball, Phillips, 
Wade & Quale, 2006) may turn out to fare better. 
Similar inconsistencies were found for the confidence rating data in the forced choice 
experiments. In the non-simultaneous forced choice experiments, believable problems 
elicited lower confidence in one case (Experiment 4), higher confidence in another one 
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(Experiment 10), or had no effect whatsoever (Experiment 9). High ability participants 
were more confident than low ability participants (Experiment 9), mimicking Shynkaruk 
and Thompson’s (2006) findings, but no confidence differences as a function of cognitive 
style were found (Experiment 10). Slightly more consistency was found in the 
simultaneous forced choice experiments, with neutral problems eliciting lower confidence 
than believable and unbelievable (Experiment 1) or non-conflict and conflict (Experiment 
3) problem types. No confidence differences between the four problem types were found 
(Experiment 2).  Taken together, these findings suggest that confidence ratings on their 
own did not contribute many interesting insights into our understanding of belief bias. 
The main function of confidence ratings appears to elevate the usefulness of endorsement 
rates allowing us to estimate SDT parameters using the ROC procedure. 
5.2.3 Theoretical 
The starting point of this dissertation was a theoretical debate about the status of 
motivated reasoning. According to the response bias account, belief bias is just a response 
bias and motivated reasoning is not a significant component of belief bias. We 
demonstrated that motivated reasoning is a part of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. 
Consequently, the main theoretical contribution is that the response bias account of belief 
bias proposed by Dube et al. (2010) is insufficient to account for the current pattern of 
results.  
A more constructive implication for the belief bias theories is that cognitive ability and 
cognitive style need to be taken into account. We have provided a jumping-off point by 
proposing the individual differences account of belief bias (Figure 5.1). This account 
consists of a psychologically and statistically viable pathway model which proposes a 
relationship between cognitive ability, cognitive style, response time taken, motivated 
reasoning, response bias, and reasoning accuracy. This model suggests that cognitive 
ability is the better predictor of actual reasoning performance, with analytic cognitive 
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style being the better predictor of motivated reasoning and response bias. Furthermore, 
this model suggests that style partially has its effect through the recruitment of additional 
cognitive reflection time, via which it also leads to additional reasoning accuracy. 
Importantly, the model specifically acknowledges the fact that analytic style and cognitive 
ability are highly correlated. 
Figure 5.1. Individual differences model of belief bias. 
Rather than providing an actual detailed process-level theory of belief bias such as Mental 
Models Theory (MMT; Oakhill et al., 1989) or Selective Processing Theory (SPT; Evans et 
al., 2001), the individual differences model of belief bias can be seen more as an 
overarching framework which can unite the more detailed theories of belief bias, none of 
which specifically account for individual differences in style and ability. For example, it is 
possible that lower style participants operate in a pure response bias manner as proposed 
by Dube et al.’s (2010) response bias account, engaging only in limited actual reasoning, 
possibly relying instead on certain heuristics such as those proposed by the Probability 
Heuristics Model (PHM; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; 2009) to 
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achieve a modicum of logical reasoning competence. Participants of higher analytic 
cognitive style and sufficient cognitive ability, in contrast, might operate in a manner 
consistent with SPT (adopting a negative testing strategy for unbelievable problems and a 
positive testing strategy for believable problems) or MMT (searching for additional 
counterexamples in the face of an unbelievable conclusion). The model can also explain 
how certain very high ability participants respond in a perfectly normative manner by 
performing an exhaustive search for all the mental models regardless of believability, or 
by abstracting the problem and applying the relevant logical rules. 
The main theoretical implication of Dube et al.’s (2010; 2011) work was that all the 
traditional theories of belief bias were incorrect, because these theories provided a 
psychological explanation (i.e., motivated reasoning) for a statistical artefact (the logic x 
belief interaction, a type 1 error). Given that our work has established that motivated 
reasoning is indeed a component of belief bias, we now revisit the original theories of 
belief bias which were introduced earlier and evaluated how they fare in light of the 
current findings. 
Traditional Belief Bias Theories 
According to Selective Scrutiny (SS; Evans et al., 1983), participants accept believable 
conclusions but engage in additional reasoning for unbelievable conclusions. As such, the 
account predicts a universal response bias and motivated reasoning affecting all types of 
syllogisms, including the simplest ones. Evidence incompatible with SS was found in 
Experiment 5, in which we demonstrated that motivated reasoning was eliminated for 
simple (one model) syllogisms. More generally, it was also found that motivated reasoning 
did not occur in Experiments 1 and 3 which used the forced choice method. SS does not 
specify that the belief bias effects originate from conclusion to premise reasoning. 
Consequently, there is no reason why simultaneously presenting two unbelievable 
arguments should lead to the elimination of motivated reasoning. SS has been rejected 
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before in previous studies (e.g., Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000), but these experiments 
did not account for ROC curvilinearity. Our current findings alongside the earlier findings 
cement the idea that SS has failed as a model of belief bias. 
Misinterpreted Necessity (MN; Evans et al., 1983) asserts that participants do not grasp 
the concept of necessity. Consequently, when presented with complex syllogisms in which 
multiple models of the premises need to be constructed to reach the correct conclusion 
(e.g., indeterminately invalid – aka multiple model – syllogisms), participants instead 
respond on the basis of believability, resulting in motivated reasoning due to the increased 
rejection of unbelievable invalid problems. Note that the term motivated reasoning is a bit 
of a misnomer in this case: the observed accuracy effect is actually driven by the 
application of a belief heuristic (participants are giving the right response for the wrong 
reasons). One prediction from this account is that imposing a response time limit should 
lead to more motivated reasoning, given that the effect is thought to originate from the use 
of a belief heuristic, and that more heuristic responding supposedly occurs when 
participants are placed under a time limit (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). We 
demonstrated that this does not happen (Experiment 6), or even that the opposite 
happens (Experiment 8). 
Metacognitive Uncertainty (MU; Quayle & Ball, 2000) is an extension of MN which suggests 
that motivated reasoning occurs because the working memory resources of the average 
participant are exceeded by the requirements of indeterminately invalid syllogisms. 
According to this theory, then, motivated reasoning should be absent for those of higher 
working memory capacity, a correlate of cognitive ability (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003). 
Experiments 8, 9, and 11 demonstrate that the reverse occurs: participants of higher 
cognitive ability (and thus presumably higher WMC) show more motivated reasoning. 
The Modified Verbal Reasoning Theory (MVRT; Thompson et al., 2003) originated from 
the finding that people spend more time reasoning about believable than unbelievable 
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conclusions. According to MVRT, participants spend more time on believable problems 
because they reason until a self-imposed deadline has elapsed. This deadline is thought to 
be longer for believable than for unbelievable problems, because the former ones are 
more palatable. Beliefs affect accuracy, then, because participants will base their 
judgement on conclusion believability if this deadline elapses and no response has been 
found. Consequently, for indeterminately invalid unbelievable problems, more “invalid” 
responses are given (due to the lower response deadline which cues a correct belief-based 
rejection), leading to increased accuracy. We measured response time in all of our 
experiments, but we did not replicate the finding that participants reasoned longer about 
believable compared to unbelievable problems. Consequently, the theory invokes an 
additional mechanism to explain an empirical result that turned out be less reliable than 
previously assumed. Furthermore, MVRT suggests that motivated reasoning should occur 
irrespective of cognitive ability or cognitive style, something that was not observed. In 
addition to this, one might predict that instructional manipulations or explicit response 
time manipulations should result in a different pattern of results, as this manipulation 
interferes with the self-imposed response time deadlines. Experiments 6 and 7 both 
provided evidence inconsistent with this prediction. Whereas future research might show 
that the process underlying syllogistic reasoning is verbal in nature, MVRT in its current 
form is not supported by the current data. 
The Mental Models Theory (MMT; Oakhill,  Johnson-Laird & Garnham, 1989) of belief bias 
explains motivated reasoning by suggesting that in the crucial stage of the evaluation of 
the initial conclusion, additional models are sought if the conclusion is unbelievable, 
leading to increased correct rejections (i.e., accuracy), but only for multiple model (that is, 
complex) syllogisms. This leads to two predictions. First, one model (simple) syllogisms 
should not lead to motivated reasoning. This exact pattern was observed in Experiment 5. 
Second, people of higher cognitive ability should be better at constructing the alternative 
models due to their increased WMC. Once again, this was confirmed by our findings in 
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Experiments 8, 9, and 11. One potential issue for MMT is the finding that, rather than 
cognitive ability, cognitive style turned out to be the major predictor of motivated 
reasoning. Furthermore, if it is the case that motivated reasoning results in additional time 
spent on model construction, then we should find evidence of drawn out reasoning times 
for unbelievable compared to believable problems. As mentioned above, this was not 
observed. MMT explains response bias by proposing that after the reasoning process is 
complete, a conclusion “filter” occasionally rejects unbelievable conclusions or accepts 
believable conclusions, for one-model problems, irrespective of cognitive ability or 
cognitive style. Contrary to this assumption, we demonstrated that under some 
circumstances response bias was severely reduced or even eliminated in a higher 
cognitive ability (Experiment 9) or higher cognitive style (Experiment 10) subgroup. More 
generally, analytic style was negatively related to response bias (E11). Despite these 
shortcomings, MMT provides a better explanation of the data compared to the other 
traditional belief bias accounts discussed above. 
Selective Processing Theory (SPT; Evans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2000) proposes that 
participants reason from the conclusion to the premises (Morley, Evans, & Handley, 2004) 
and that they only ever construct a single mental model of the premises (Evans, Handley, 
Harper, & Johnson-Laird, 1999). Motivated reasoning is explained by a belief-driven 
alteration to the reasoning process, with unbelievable conclusions leading to a 
disconfirmatory strategy in contrast to believable conclusions, for which a default, 
confirmatory strategy is used. The negative testing strategy is thought to facilitate 
construction of the incompatible model, increasing the correct rejection rate of 
indeterminately invalid syllogisms. Believable conclusions, on the other hand, are thought 
to result in the incorrect acceptance of indeterminately invalid syllogisms. For valid 
problems, these belief based strategies have no impact – because a disconfirming model 
can never be found – with beliefs only occasionally making their mark in terms of a 
general response bias. Like MMT, SPT predicts that motivated reasoning should not occur 
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for simple syllogisms, given that only a single model of the premises exists. Also, one 
prediction might be that participants of higher cognitive ability are more able to engage in 
the effortful (Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006) negation-based disconfirmatory 
reasoning strategy cued by unbelievable conclusions. The finding that limiting response 
time occasionally reversed the motivated reasoning effect (e.g. Experiments 6 and 7) can 
also be explained by SPT: this finding suggests that those who would typically engage in 
disconfirmation still attempt to do so in the face of a response time deadline, but simply 
fail due to the increased effort required. 
A modified version of SPT (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011) specifically allows 
for individual differences to play a role in explaining response time patterns by suggesting 
that qualitatively different types of reasoners exist, something which resonates well with 
the current findings (E7, E8, E9, E10, E11). In that sense, our individual differences 
account of belief bias and the findings on which it was based bears the most resemblance 
to this modified SPT, with the added benefit of providing an explicit relational 
configuration of the various individual differences which have an impact on both 
components of belief bias as well as reasoning accuracy. We note, however, that our model 
does not require that participants reason in the way proposed by SPT. As outlined above, 
it is equally possible that a completely different reasoning process underlies the 
performance pattern captured by our model. One can imagine for instance that other 
mechanisms explain the findings equally well. Examples of such mechanisms are the 
search for counterexamples proposed by MMT, the semantic encoding and re-encoding of 
the premises proposed by MVRT, or the use probabilistic heuristics proposed by the PHM. 
The PHM (Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; 2009) differs from the belief 
bias theories outlined above in various ways. The two key differences lie on the 
computational level (i.e., what is the normatively correct standard to compare 
performance to?) and the algorithmic level (i.e., what are people actually doing?). On the 
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computational level, the theory posits that people treat the syllogistic reasoning task as a 
probabilistic- rather than logical reasoning task. This means that participants strive to 
reduce uncertainty, rather than determine necessity, accepting or drawing only 
conclusions which are less uninformative than the premises. On the algorithmic level, 
rather than using mental models or logical rules to reason, PHM proposes five fast and 
frugal heuristics which are used to determine the informativeness (i.e., probabilistic or p-
validity) of the conclusion. The appropriateness of these heuristics is justified by 
probability calculus. Three heuristics are used to generate a conclusion given a set of 
premises: G1) the min-heuristic, G2) p-entailment, and G3) attachment. Two heuristics are 
used to test whether a certain conclusion is likely to be p-valid: T1) the max-heuristic and 
T2) the some…not heuristic (these heuristics are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1). 
Our results raise the question how PHM can account for the finding that under various 
conditions, certain high ability participants are better at determining whether or not a 
conclusion is (p-) valid. One possible explanation is that certain participants under certain 
conditions are more likely to apply the heuristics which lead to the correct response. More 
specifically, the key might lie in whether the participants simply use the min-heuristic, 
whether they go on to use p-entailment after that, and whether they then follow this up by 
applying the attachment heuristic. As our experiments show, motivated reasoning 
occurred only for complex (multiple model) syllogisms which all have conclusions using 
the “some … not” quantifier. Importantly, most of these complex syllogisms featured 
premises with a “no” and a “some” quantifier. Application of the min-heuristic for 
syllogisms with “no” and “some” premises suggests that the correct conclusion should 
employ the “no” quantifier (because “no X are Y” is less informative than “some X are Y”, 
and the min heuristic proposes that the least informative premise quantifier is the 
preferred quantifier for the conclusion). If the participant stops after applying the min-
heuristic, this will lead to correct rejections approximately half the time and incorrect 
rejections the other half (considering that half the problems are valid and half are invalid). 
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It is possible that unbelievable conclusions motivate participants to go a step further and 
to use p-entailment after the min-heuristic to determine that “some…not” is the next 
preferred conclusion quantifier (because “no X are Y” probabilistically entails that “some X 
are not Y”). Finally, only those with sufficiently high levels of analytic cognitive style 
and/or ability will proceed to apply the attachment heuristic to determine whether the 
order of the presented conclusion conforms to the order suggested by the attachment 
heuristic, leading to better performance. 
An alternative way to reconcile PHM with our motivated reasoning findings lies in the test 
phase which follows conclusion generation. Chater and Oaksford (1999) explicitly 
acknowledge that the generation heuristics (G1-3) are the most important part of the 
model, with the test heuristics (T1 and T2) being of lesser importance. In fact, it is 
mentioned that the test phase might very well involve “…the kinds of processes discussed by 
other theories that can account for logical performance, such as mental models […] [or] 
mental logic […]…” (Chater & Oaksford, 1999, pp. 196) and that these are “…complex 
processes likely to be subject to large individual variation.” (Chater & Oaksford, 1999, p. 
207). As such, it is fully possible that the bulk of the reasoning process takes the form of 
applying probability heuristics, with only those of higher analytic cognitive style and/or 
ability going beyond the default by applying the testing processes proposed by MMT or 
SPT. We now propose some more general considerations for future research based on 
these implications. 
5.3 Future Research 
In our previous section we have outlined the various methodological, empirical, and 
theoretical implications of the experiments conducted in this dissertation. We now 
provide a brief overview of several research topics which follow naturally from our 
findings. 
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5.3.1 PHM and Motivated Reasoning 
We proposed two ways in which our individual differences model of belief bias might be 
reconciled with the PHM. A first possibility is that conclusion believability and individual 
differences impact upon the amount and the sequence of heuristics which are typically 
applied, which in turn leads to higher reasoning performance. Alternatively, it is also 
possible that high ability participants simply act more according to the principles outlined 
by MMT or SPT in their test phase. One way of distinguishing between these explanations 
could lie in the PHM’s ability to account for reasoning with two additional quantifiers, 
namely “most” and “few”. If we replicate the finding that high style/ability participants 
engage in motivated reasoning for all syllogisms, including those which contain the 
quantifiers “most” and “few”, then this would suggest that the motivated reasoning effect 
is somehow interwoven with the application of the probability heuristics, because 
according to traditional logic, conclusions with statistical quantifiers are logically invalid. 
Consequently, if it turns out that the motivated reasoning effects generalise to the few and 
most quantifiers, then this suggests that the effect cannot be explained by tacking on the 
use of mental models or verbal reasoning in the test phase of PHM. 
5.3.2 Eliminating Belief Bias 
One novel finding was that the simultaneous forced choice method resulted in the 
elimination of both components of belief bias. This finding is particularly interesting in 
light of the fact that no methods are truly successful at completely eliminating belief bias. 
Rather than abandoning the simultaneous forced choice method in favour of its non-
simultaneous counterpart, we propose three broad areas of research which could readily 
benefit from the application of the simultaneous method. First, from an educational point 
of view, the method might prove useful in teaching people about how beliefs may interfere 
with reasoning and decision making. Having participants solve a standard belief bias task 
prior to solving a simultaneous forced choice task might provide them with a visceral 
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demonstration of how beliefs and logic are two independent concepts. Second, from a 
methodological point of view, the simultaneous method might prove useful for the 
investigation of syllogistic reasoning with meaningful contents but without any 
interference of beliefs. For instance, the impact of various manipulations such as 
complexity, response time taken, instructions, and cognitive load on syllogistic reasoning 
performance in the absence of belief bias could be tested, without resorting to abstract 
contents. Finally, the results raise the question of whether it is possible to use the 
simultaneous forced choice method as a prime to eliminate (one or both components of) 
belief bias in a consequent reasoning task. If this turns out to be the case, a next logical 
step would be to investigate whether the results are temporary, or whether they translate 
to later test phases and even different tasks. 
5.3.3 Dual Process Theory 
The dual process theory (DPT; e.g., Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011) of reasoning proposes 
that two types of processes exist. Type 1 processes are quick and effortlessly executed. In 
contrast, type 2 processes are slow and require effort (in the form of working memory 
resources). Belief bias has often been taken as compelling evidence in favour of DPT (e.g., 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013a; 2013b): the finding that participants are apparently unable to 
resist the influence of their prior beliefs when judging the logical validity of reasoning 
problems is explained in terms of a type 1 – type 2 conflict. Type 1 processes cue a quick 
and effortless default response on the basis of conclusion believability, which may then be 
inhibited using effortful type 2 processing. If such inhibition is successful, and the relevant 
conditions are in place (e.g., the right mindware, correct instructions, sufficient time, 
adequate levels of cognitive ability and style), then the participant may proceed by 
computing the normatively correct response by engaging in logical reasoning – which also 
requires type 2 processing. A strong point of DPT is that various predictions about the 
impact of certain manipulations can readily be drawn (e.g., using novel problems, 
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providing more detailed instructions, limiting the amount of response time available, and 
presenting participants with a concurrent working memory load should all have an impact 
on reasoning accuracy and the degree of belief bias). For instance, DPT predicts that 
limiting the amount of response time available should reduce logical reasoning accuracy 
and increase belief bias. Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005) demonstrated exactly this: 
limiting the amount of time available to respond resulted in less accuracy and more belief 
bias as response bias (motivated reasoning was also eliminated, but it is not the main 
focus of the standard DPT of reasoning). This finding was taken as strong evidence in 
favour of the DPT of reasoning. As we have shown in Experiments 6 and 8, however, these 
results need to be nuanced: when the proper measurement techniques were used and 
individual differences were taken into account, it turned out that belief bias as response 
bias remained unaffected by a response time limit. 
This raises the question whether the other manipulations which are often taken in support 
of DPT and though to be well understood stand up to scrutiny when the appropriate 
methodology is applied (e.g., SDT and individual differences). For instance, a concurrent 
working memory load has been shown to reduce reasoning accuracy and increase belief 
bias (De Neys, 2006). Likewise, strong deductive instructions have been shown to increase 
reasoning accuracy and eliminate or reduce belief bias (Newstead et al., 1992; Evans et al., 
1994). Our finding that Evans and Curtis-Holmes’ (2005) response time limit result was 
not replicated using the appropriate method suggests that similar replications should be 
conducted for the working memory load and instructions manipulations. This is especially 
important given the strong emphasis of DPT on belief bias as a means of justifying the 
appropriateness of the theory. If it turns out that the DPT account of belief bias does not 
hold up, then this may suggest that a uni process theory is sufficient to account for belief 
bias (Kruglanski, 2013). Such a finding would follow a trend in other domains of cognitive 
psychology such as memory (Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2008) and learning (Mitchell, De 
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Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009), where recent research suggests that DPT might not be 
fundamental to explaining the current empirical findings. 
5.3.4 Belief Bias in Other Arguments 
One question which was not explored in this dissertation is whether the present results 
extend to other argument types. We focused exclusively on syllogistic reasoning, but belief 
bias is not unique to syllogisms. In the study of reasoning with causal conditionals, for 
instance, it has been demonstrated that response bias is pervasive unless participants are 
of higher cognitive ability and are given strong deductive reasoning instructions (Evans et 
al., 2010). Belief bias as response bias has also been demonstrated to occur in transitive 
inference, which is a different class of relational reasoning problems focusing on 
magnitude relations between categories (e.g., assuming that mice are taller than blubs and 
that blubs are taller than elephants, does it follow that mice are taller than elephants?; 
Andews, 2010). Belief bias is also present in informal reasoning tasks: participants are 
influenced by their prior beliefs when estimating the height of people (Sá, West, & 
Stanovich, 1999) and when evaluating the quality of various arguments (Thompson & 
Evans, 2012). Importantly, evidence of motivated reasoning has not been found for any of 
these problems, suggesting that motivated reasoning is a phenomenon unique to 
syllogistic reasoning. This seems odd, given the pervasiveness of motivated reasoning in 
daily life, for instance in climate change deniers (Lewandowsky, Cook, Oberauer, & 
Hubble-Marriott, 2013) and scientists (Francis, 2013). Perhaps it is not the case that 
motivated reasoning does not exist for these types of reasoning problems, but rather that 
the tasks have not been investigated using the appropriate methods. A reanalysis of such 
studies using a more appropriate measurement method such as SDT which also takes 
individual differences into account might lead to a more consistent picture about the 
nature of belief bias across experimental tasks.  
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5.3.5 Individual Differences in Memory 
In contrast to reasoning research, the use of appropriate measurement methods has been 
a topic of much greater interest in research on memory. For instance, the shape of ROC 
curves has been taken as evidence in favour of (Yonelinas & Parks, 2007) or against 
(Wixted, 2007) the DPT of recognition memory. However, in spite of this strong focus on 
modelling, the debate on whether two types of processes (i.e., familiarity and recollection) 
are required to accommodate for recognition memory performance has not been resolved 
to this day (Jang, Wixted, & Huber, 2009; Pazzaglia, Dube, & Rotello, in press; Province & 
Rouder, 2012). We propose that taking individual differences into account while using the 
appropriate measurement method might be a fruitful strategy which could advance the 
debate in the field of recognition memory, just as it did for belief bias. For instance, our 
proposed individual differences model of belief bias could readily be extended to 
recognition memory in a source memory task (see Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2. Possible extension of the individual differences model of belief bias to the case of 
recognition memory. 
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In parallel to the individual differences model of belief bias, this instantiation of the model 
for recognition memory proposes that cognitive ability positively predicts overall 
recognition memory performance, perhaps through its link with working memory 
capacity. Cognitive style, in contrast, predicts the strategic choice to engage in more 
retrieval time, leading to a greater reliance on recollection, and less reliance on familiarity, 
resulting in greater overall accuracy (in a source memory task). As with our individual 
differences model of belief bias, perhaps this model (or a better fitting variant of the model) 
could be used as a framework to relate several algorithmic level theories of recognition 
memory (e.g., low ACS = familiarity based processing in a continuous SDT-like fashion: 
Wixted, 2007; High ACS = recollection based processing in a discrete MPT-like way: 
Province & Rouder, 2012). Additional insights into the underlying type of processing could 
then stem from research in which people are tested simultaneously on reasoning and 
memory tasks, investigating the underlying pattern of correlations. For instance, if DPT is 
correct and familiarity and response bias are both based on type 1 processing, whereas 
recollection and motivated reasoning are based on type 2 processing, then we should find 
that people who engage in response bias more also rely more on familiarity, whereas 
people who show more motivated reasoning are more likely to engage in recollection, and 
that these relationships are mediated by cognitive style and ability. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this dissertation we focused on two components of belief bias in human reasoning: 
response bias and motivated reasoning. We used an SDT approach to advance a 
theoretical debate between proponents of traditional belief bias accounts, according to 
which belief bias consists of both response bias and motivated reasoning, and proponents 
of the response bias account, according to which belief bias is just a response bias. We 
determined that belief bias is not just a response bias – at least not all the time. In doing so, 
we developed a novel forced choice reasoning method which has the unique ability to tap 
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into response bias and motivated reasoning without the additional requirements of 
statistical modelling. In addition to this, the method also turned out to be capable of fully 
eliminating both belief bias components. The major finding was that individual differences 
play a crucial role in belief bias and its relation to reasoning. This led to the proposal of an 
individual differences account which provided a framework capable of uniting various 
extant theories of belief bias. We hope that future research using this framework will be 
useful in furthering our understanding of belief bias, human reasoning, and cognitive 
psychology in general.
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Instructions, Materials, Briefs, and Debriefs 
Experiments 1 – 4 
Instructions 
Additional instructions were presented on the computer screen prior to the experiment. 
These can be found in the method sections of the relevant experiments. 
 
In this experiment we are interested in people’s reasoning. In a typical reasoning 
experiment, you would be asked to indicate whether the conclusion (the sentence under 
the line) is valid, i.e. whether it follows logically from the premises that precede it. A valid 
conclusion is one that must be true, assuming the premises are true. For example: 
    All diamonds are blutos (1st premise) 
 
    All blutos are expensive things (2nd premise) 
 
 
    All diamonds are expensive things 
 
(conclusion) 
 
This conclusion is logically valid because it necessarily follows from the premises. 
In this experiment you will be choosing between two similar reasoning problems. You will 
be presented with 48 problem slides. Every slide will show two reasoning problems that 
have the same conclusion, but different premises. One of the problems will have a valid 
conclusion and one will have an invalid conclusion. Either the left problem has a valid 
conclusion or the right problem has a valid conclusion. It is your task to choose which 
argument is the valid one. 
    
    All diamonds are blutos 
 
 
 
 
   All expensive things are blutos 
 
    All blutos are expensive things  
 
   All blutos are diamonds 
      
All diamonds are expensive things 
 
 
 
    
All diamonds are expensive things 
 
Notice that the conclusion is identical for the left problem and the right problem. However, 
the conclusion is only logically valid for the left problem, because it necessarily follows 
from the premises. The conclusion is logically invalid for the right problem, because it 
doesn’t necessarily follow from the premises. It is your task to indicate whether the 
conclusion is valid for the left problem or whether conclusion is valid for the right 
problem. Use your mouse to choose either the left or the right problem. Choosing the left 
problem implies that you think that the left argument is valid and that the right argument 
is invalid. Choosing the right problem implies that you think that the right argument is 
valid and that the left argument is invalid. 
Every time you choose you will also be asked to indicate your confidence in your response. 
Please use all three levels of confidence during the experiment. 
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If you don’t understand the instructions, ask the experimenter to explain them to you now. 
Otherwise, follow the instructions on the screen. 
Materials 
These materials were used in all experiments, with the exception of Experiment 5 in which 
simple syllogisms were also used.  
Syllogistic structures 
Valid Invalid 
EI3_O2: No A are B 
Some  B are C 
Some C are not A 
EI3_O1: No A are B 
Some  B are C 
Some A are not C 
EI4_O2: No B are A 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
EI4_O1: 
 
 
No B are A 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
EI1_O2: No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some C are not A 
EI1_O1: No A are B 
Some B are C 
Some A are not C 
IE1_O1: Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are not C 
IE1_O2: Some A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
OA3_O1: Some A are not B 
All C are B 
Some A are not C 
OE3_O1: Some A are not B 
No C are B 
Some A are not C 
AO3_O2: All A are B 
Some C are not B 
Some C are not A 
EO3_O2: 
 
 
No A are B 
Some C are not B 
Some C are not A 
OA4_O2: Some B are not A 
All B are C 
Some C are not A 
OE4_O2: 
 
Some B are not A 
No B are C 
Some C are not A 
AO4_O1: 
 
 
All B are A 
Some B are not C 
Some A are not C 
EO4_O1: No B are A 
Some B are not C 
Some A are not C 
Note. A = “All X are Y”; E = “No X are Y”; I = “Some X are Y”; O = “Some X are not Y”. The first 
digit indicates the figure (1 = AB-BC; 2 = BA-CB; 3 = AB-CB; 4 = BA-BC). The second digit 
indicates the conclusion direction (1 = A-C; 2 = C-A). 
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Item contents 
Category Members 
amphibians 
birds 
boats 
cars 
criminals 
furniture 
dogs 
drinks 
fish 
fruits 
insects 
reptiles 
tools 
trees 
vegetables 
weapons 
frogs 
parrots 
kayaks 
BMWs 
robbers 
desks 
Spaniels 
beers 
trout 
prunes 
bees 
lizards 
hammers 
oaks 
carrots 
cannons 
salamanders 
sparrows 
canoes 
Volvos 
murderers 
sofas 
Labradors 
sodas 
salmons 
peaches 
beetles 
iguanas 
saws 
willows 
cabbages 
swords 
toads 
ducks 
yachts 
Vauxhalls 
embezzlers 
cupboards 
Terriers 
wines 
cods 
apples 
ants 
snakes 
spanners 
pines 
parsnips 
guns 
newts 
robins 
speedboats 
Fiats 
terrorists 
bookcases 
Dalmatians 
whiskeys 
haddocks 
bananas 
spiders 
crocodiles 
shovels 
maples 
radishes 
spears 
Note. In Experiment 1 only the first two columns of members were used for the believable 
and unbelievable problem types, whereas the third column was used as the linking term 
for the neutral problems. 
 
Linking terms 
redes fosks pives pields decottions sothods renes bunges 
wasses geets swants cronxes firters nickhomes revoules pinds 
foins chindles soats sonds pumes papes trops envenches 
lebs brops stoges crots punties stamuses vennars cortemns 
weens quinces loaxes stoals curges gruts cosuors wightes 
punds jubs parfs fises hoons tutches brimbers punes 
cofts spashes fimps brams heets piffures burtes queels 
flamps dathses darms vosts trinnels goples boodings veemers 
Note. Pseudowords were generated using Wuggy (Keuleers & Brysbaert, 2008). 
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Brief 
On this sheet you will find all the information necessary for you to be able to give informed 
consent to take part in this experiment. Please read it carefully. You can ask the 
experimenter any questions you may have. 
 
In this task you will be presented with 48 times 2 reasoning problems. For every trial you 
will be asked to choose which of both has a valid conclusion (see instructions for details). 
 
Please remember that you have the right to stop your participation at any time. Also, your 
data will be kept confidential and the only connection between the two tasks is a 
participant code to make sure you remain anonymous. It follows that the data-analysis will 
also be completely anonymous. You have the right to withdraw your data after the 
experiment. If you care to do so, it will be removed from the analysis. 
 
If you understand all these of these things and if you agree to them please read and sign 
the informed consent form on the back of this page. 
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE 
 
School of Psychology 
 
CONSENT TO PARICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Researcher:  
 
Dries Trippas 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Topic:  
 
Confidence, choice and reasoning 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The aim of this research is to study the relationship between reasoning and confidence 
 
As a participant in this study you will be asked to judge the validity of 48 times 2 
reasoning problems on a computer screen. All further instructions will be provided on an 
instruction sheet and on screen.  
 
Upon finishing the experiment you will receive a written debrief with detailed information 
about the experiment and contact details for more information. You are also welcome to 
ask any further questions to the experimenter during and after the experiment. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me.   
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my 
data to be destroyed if I wish.  
 
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.  
 
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far 
as possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been  
separately assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSSH regulations) 
  
 
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 
 
Name:        ……………………………………….……………………………….   
 
Signature:   .....................................……………..                    Date:   ................………….. 
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Debrief 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
In this study we wanted to investigate belief bias. Belief bias is the tendency for people to 
accept or refute arguments based on conclusion believability. There are two common 
ways of explaining belief bias. One explanation is that people simply accept believable 
conclusions more than unbelievable conclusions without actually reasoning about the 
problems (e.g., Dube, Rotello & Heit, 2010). Another series of theories claims that 
conclusion believability somehow influences the reasoning process. For instance: if the 
conclusion is believable, people will just accept it. However, if the conclusion is 
unbelievable people will look at the premises and start looking for counterexamples to see 
if the conclusion necessarily follows or not (Evans, 2003). 
 
In this experiment we attempted to compare both accounts of belief bias by forcing people 
to choose between a valid and an invalid argument. The catch was that even though across 
the entire experiment conclusions differed in believability, the two arguments presented 
next to each other never differed in conclusion believability, only in validity. As such, you 
as a participant had no means to accept or reject arguments based on conclusion 
believability because one had to be valid and one had to be invalid, thus forcing you to 
reason about the underlying structure (or just guess if reasoning was too hard). 
 
If you have any further questions, or if you want to withdraw you data, please feel free to 
contact us. 
 
Researcher:  Dries Trippas:   dries.trippas@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors:  Professor Simon Handley: shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
    
  Dr. Michael Verde:   michael.verde@plymouth.ac.uk 
  
References: 
 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2003). In two minds: Dual process accounts of reasoning. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454-459 
 
Dube, Rotello & Heit. (2010). Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCS: It’s a response 
bias effect. Psychological Review, 117, 831-863. 
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Experiment 5 
Instructions 
In this experiment you will be asked to judge the validity of conclusions of 64 reasoning 
problems. A conclusion can either be valid or invalid. In order to judge whether the 
conclusion of a certain reasoning problem is valid or not, you need to apply the rules of 
logic. A conclusion is valid if it necessarily follows from the premises. A conclusion is 
invalid if it doesn’t necessarily follow from the premises. You also must consider both 
premises to be true, even if they contain nonsense terms such as “blutos”. Consider the 
following reasoning problem as an example: 
 
 
All diamonds are blutos (1st premise) 
  
All blutos are expensive things (2nd premise) 
  
___________________________________ 
 
All diamonds are expensive things 
 
 
(conclusion) 
 
 
This conclusion is logically valid because it necessarily follows from the premises. 
 
Before the actual experiment begins you will receive 4 practice trials to make sure you 
understand the instructions. You can respond “valid” by pressing the “s” key or “invalid” 
by pressing the “k” key. After each valid/invalid decision you will also have to indicate 
how confident you are in your response by pressing “1” (=not at all confident), “2” 
(=moderately confident), or “3” (=very confident). Please use all three levels of confidence 
during the experiment. It is very important that you understand these instructions before 
beginning with the actual experiment. If you don’t, please tell the experimenter and he will 
explain them to you again. 
 
After the practice trials, the actual experiment will begin. When you have completed all 64 
trials, you will be shown a slide that indicates the end of the experiment. When you see 
this, tell the experimenter you’re done and you will be debriefed. 
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Materials 
The materials for the complex problems were identical to those used in Experiments 1 – 4. 
The following additional syllogistic structures were used in the simple condition: 
Valid Invalid 
AE1_E1: All A are B 
No B are C 
No A are C 
AE1_I1: All A are B 
No B are C 
Some A are B 
AE3_E1: All A are B 
No C are B 
No A are C 
AE3_I1: All A are B 
No C are B 
Some A are B 
EA3_E1: No A are B 
All C are B 
No A are C 
EA3_I1: No A are B 
All C are B 
Some A are B 
EA2_E1: No B are A 
All C are B 
No A are C 
EA2_I1: No B are A 
All C are B 
Some A are B 
IA1_I1: Some A are B 
All B are C 
Some A are C 
IA1_E1: Some A are B 
All B are C 
No A are B 
AI4_I1: All B are A 
Some B are C 
Some A are C 
AI4_E1: All B are A 
Some B are C 
No A are B 
IA4_I1: Some B are A 
All C are A 
Some A are C 
IA4_E1: Some B are A 
All B are C 
No A are B 
AI2_I1: All B are A 
Some C are B 
Some A are C 
AI2_E1: All B are A 
Some C are B 
No A are B 
AE1_E2: All A are B 
No B are C 
No C are A 
AE1_I2: All A are B 
No B are C 
Some C are A 
AE3_E2: All A are B 
No C are B 
No C are A 
AE3_I2: All A are B 
No C are B 
Some C are A 
EA3_E2: No A are B 
All C are B 
No C are A 
EA3_I2: No A are B 
All C are B 
Some C are A 
EA2_E2: No B are A 
All C are B 
No C are A 
EA2_I2: No B are A 
All C are B 
Some C are A 
IA1_I2: Some A are B 
All B are C 
Some C are A 
IA1_E2: Some A are B 
All B are C 
No C are A 
AI4_I2: All B are A 
Some B are C 
Some C are A 
AI4_E2: All B are A 
Some B are A 
No C are A 
IA4_I2: Some B are A 
All B are C 
Some C are A 
IA4_E2: Some B are A 
All C are A 
No C are A 
AI2_I2: All B are A 
Some C are B 
Some C are A 
AI2_E2: All B are A 
Some C are B 
No C are A 
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Note. A = “All X are Y”; E = “No X are Y”; I = “Some X are Y”; O = “Some X are not Y”. The first 
digit indicates the figure (1 = AB-BC; 2 = BA-CB; 3 = AB-CB; 4 = BA-BC). The second digit 
indicates the conclusion direction (1 = A-C; 2 = C-A). 
 
Brief 
On this sheet you will find all the information necessary for you to be able to give informed 
consent to take part in this experiment. Please read it carefully. You can ask the 
experimenter any questions you may have. 
 
In this task you will be presented with 64 reasoning problems. For every reasoning 
problem you will be asked to judge the validity of its conclusion (see instructions for 
details). 
 
Please remember that you have the right to stop your participation at any time. Also, your 
data will be kept confidential and the only connection between the two tasks is a 
participant code to make sure you remain anonymous. It follows that the data-analysis will 
also be completely anonymous. You have the right to withdraw your data after the 
experiment. If you care to do so, it will be removed from the analysis. 
 
If you understand all these of these things and if you agree to them please read and sign 
the informed consent form on the back of this page.  
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE 
 
School of Psychology 
 
CONSENT TO PARICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Researcher:  
 
Dries Trippas 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Topic:  
 
Reasoning about syllogisms 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The aim of this research is to study the relationship between reasoning and confidence 
 
As a participant in this study you will be asked to judge the validity of 64 reasoning 
problems on a computer screen. All further instructions will be provided on an instruction 
sheet and on screen.  
 
Upon finishing the experiment you will receive a written debriefing with detailed 
information about the experiment and contact details for more information. You are also 
welcome to ask any further questions to the experimenter during and after the experiment. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me.   
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my 
data to be destroyed if I wish.  
 
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.  
 
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far 
as possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been  
separately assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSSH regulations) 
  
 
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 
 
Name:        ……………………………………….……………………………….   
 
Signature:   .....................................……………..                    Date:   ................………….. 
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Debrief 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
In this study we wanted to investigate the relation between reasoning about syllogisms 
and confidence. You were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In one condition 
participants were presented with single model syllogisms. In the other condition they 
were presented with multiple model syllogisms. A single model syllogism is easier to solve 
than a multiple model syllogism. 
 
Previous research has shown that when people are asked to reason about syllogisms with 
conclusions that vary in believability, a belief by logic interaction occurs. This suggests 
that when people are confronted with an unbelievable conclusion, they will be motivated 
to reason more and consequently give the correct response more often. A recent paper has 
contested this belief bias effect in terms of a motivated reasoning account (Dube, Rotello & 
Heit, 2010). They found that people will be more inclined to respond valid if the 
conclusion is believable, but that their reasoning performance is equal for believable and 
unbelievable conclusions. 
 
In this experiment we attempted to test a prediction based on this account of belief bias: If 
accuracy doesn’t change but the only difference is a shift in response bias, than we should 
find a similar shift in response bias (and lack of shift in accuracy) for single model 
syllogisms compared to multiple model syllogisms. 
 
If you have any further questions, or if you want to withdraw you data, please feel free to 
contact us. 
 
Researcher:  Dries Trippas:   dries.trippas@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors:  Professor Simon Handley: shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
    
  Dr. Michael Verde:  michael.verde@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Experiment 6 
Instructions 
Note. These are the instructions for the speeded condition. The instructions for the self-
paced condition are identical to those of Experiment 5. 
In this experiment you will be asked to judge the validity of conclusions of 64 reasoning 
problems under a time limit. A conclusion can either be valid or invalid. In order to judge 
whether the conclusion of a certain reasoning problem is valid or not, you need to apply 
the rules of logic. A conclusion is valid if it necessarily follows from the premises. A 
conclusion is invalid if it doesn’t necessarily follow from the premises. You also must 
consider both premises to be true, even if they contain nonsense terms such as “blutos”. 
Consider the following reasoning problem as an example: 
 
 
All diamonds are blutos (1st premise) 
  
All blutos are expensive things (2nd premise) 
  
___________________________________ 
 
All diamonds are expensive things 
 
 
(conclusion) 
 
 
This conclusion is logically valid because it necessarily follows from the premises. 
 
Before the actual experiment begins you will receive 4 practice trials to make sure you 
understand the instructions. You can respond “valid” by pressing the “s” key or “invalid” 
by pressing the “k” key. A red timer at the top of the screen will show how much time you 
have left to make a response. After each valid/invalid decision you will also have to 
indicate how confident you are in your response by pressing “1” (=not at all confident), “2” 
(=moderately confident), or “3” (=very confident). Please use all three levels of confidence 
during the experiment. It is very important that you understand these instructions before 
beginning with the actual experiment. If you don’t, please tell the experimenter and he will 
explain them to you again. 
 
After the practice trials, the actual experiment will begin. When you have completed all 64 
trials, you will be shown a slide that indicates the end of the experiment. When you see 
this, tell the experimenter you’re done and you will be debriefed. 
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Materials and Brief 
The materials and brief were identical to those used in Experiment 5. 
Debrief 
The debrief for the self-paced condition was identical to the one used in Experiment 5. 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
In this study we wanted to investigate the relation between reasoning about syllogisms 
and confidence under a time limit. You were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. 
In one condition participants had unlimited time. In the other condition participants had 
to reason under a 10 second time limit.  
 
Previous research has shown that when people are asked to reason about syllogisms with 
conclusions that vary in believability, a belief by logic interaction occurs. This is known as 
belief bias (Evans, 2003). This suggests that when people are confronted with an 
unbelievable conclusion, they will be motivated to reason more and consequently give the 
correct response more often. A recent paper has contested this belief bias effect in terms 
of a motivated reasoning account (Dube, Rotello & Heit, 2010). They found that people will 
be more inclined to respond valid if the conclusion is believable, but that their reasoning 
performance is equal for believable and unbelievable conclusions. 
 
In this experiment we attempted to test a prediction based on this account of belief bias: If 
the only difference between believable and unbelievable items is a shift in response bias, 
then we should find a larger shift in response for the time limit condition compared to the 
no time limit condition. 
 
If you have any further questions, or if you want to withdraw you data, please feel free to 
contact us. 
 
Researcher:  Dries Trippas:   dries.trippas@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors:  Professor Simon Handley: shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
    
  Dr. Michael Verde:  michael.verde@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Experiment 7 
Instructions 
The instructions in the normal instructions condition were identical to those used in the 
complex condition of Experiment 5. The instructions below are for the pragmatic 
instructions condition. 
In this experiment you will be asked to judge whether a piece of information below a line 
follows from some other information above a line. In doing so, it is important that you 
respond as quickly as possible while following your gut instinct. Simply go with the first 
answer that comes to mind. In other words, you should base the answer on your intuition. 
 
Before the actual experiment begins you will receive 4 practice trials to make sure you 
understand the instructions. You can respond “follows” by pressing the “s” key or “doesn’t 
follow” by pressing the “k” key. After each valid/invalid decision you will also have to 
indicate how confident you are in your response by pressing “1” (=not at all confident), “2” 
(=moderately confident), or “3” (=very confident). Please use all three levels of confidence 
during the experiment. It is very important that you understand these instructions before 
beginning with the actual experiment. If you don’t, please tell the experimenter and he will 
explain them to you again. 
 
After the practice trials, the actual experiment will begin. When you have completed all 64 
trials, you will be shown a slide that indicates the end of the experiment. When you see 
this, tell the experimenter you’re done and you will be debriefed. 
 
Materials and Brief 
The materials and brief were identical to those used in the complex condition of 
Experiment 5 
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Debrief 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. You completed 64 reasoning problems 
(more specifically, syllogisms). People tend to be influenced by their prior beliefs when 
judging whether a conclusion is valid or not (e.g., Evans 2003). The aim of this study was 
to investigate the effect of different instructions on this so-called belief bias. You were 
randomly assigned to either a group with weak instructions or to a group with normal 
instructions. We predicted that people in the weak instructions group would be more 
influenced by beliefs than people in the normal instructions group (Evans, Newstead, Allen, 
& Pollard, 1994). 
 
If you have any further questions, or if you want to withdraw you data, please feel free to 
contact us. 
 
Researcher:  Dries Trippas:   dries.trippas@plymouth.ac.uk 
    
Supervisors:  Prof. Simon Handley: shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
  Dr. Michael Verde: mfverde@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Experiment 8 
Instructions 
The instructions for the reasoning task (both speeded and self-paced) were identical to 
those used in Experiment 6. Prior to the AH4 test, the following instructions were 
presented. 
The AH4 is a test of general intelligence that consists of two parts. The first part is a 
measure of crystallized intelligence (e.g., vocabulary and following instructions). The 
second part is a measure of fluid intelligence (e.g., spatial reasoning and completing 
sequences).  
 
Both parts are preceded by ten practice trials. These do not count towards your total score, 
but they should be completed to familiarize yourself with the task. For the actual test you 
will get 10 minutes to complete Part I and 10 minutes to complete Part II. On your desk 
you should find a question book and a response sheet. Please do not write in the actual 
question book, but fill out the responses on the response sheet under the corresponding 
number. 
 
Before you begin, please fill out the date, your name, your age, your gender, and what 
stage you are currently in. After this, please complete the practice trials for Part I. Once 
everybody has filled out the form and completed the practice trials we can begin with the 
timed part of the experiment. If you have any questions whatsoever, ask them during the 
practice trials. 
 
Do not start solving the actual questions until explicitly told to do so! 
 
Materials 
The materials were identical to the ones used in the complex condition of Experiment 5. 
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Brief 
On this sheet you will find all the information necessary for you to be able to give informed 
consent to take part in this experiment. Please read it carefully. You can ask the 
experimenter any questions you may have. 
 
The first task is a measure of general intelligence which involves solving a number of 
problems known as the AH4. There are two parts to the AH and completing both will take 
about 20 minutes in total. 
 
The second task is a reasoning task in which you will be presented with 64 reasoning 
problems. For every reasoning problem you will be asked to judge the validity of its 
conclusion. Both tasks will be explained in more detail before the start of the experiment. 
The experiment in its entirety will take no more than 1 hour. 
 
Please remember that you have the right to stop your participation at any time. Also, your 
data will be kept confidential and the only connection between the two tasks is a 
participant code to make sure you remain anonymous. It follows that the data-analysis will 
also be completely anonymous. You have the right to withdraw your data after the 
experiment. If you care to do so, it will be removed from the analysis. 
 
If you understand all these of these things and if you agree to them please read and sign 
the informed consent form on the back of this page. 
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PLYMOUTH UNVERSITY 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE 
School of Psychology 
 
CONSENT TO PARICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Researcher:  
 
Dries Trippas 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Topic:  
 
Reasoning and Intelligence 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The aim of this research is to study the relationship between reasoning and intelligence 
 
As a participant in this study you will first be asked to take the AH4, a test of general 
intelligence. In a second task you will have to judge the validity of 64 reasoning problems 
on a computer screen. All further instructions will be provided before you start the actual 
experiment.  
 
Upon finishing the experiment you will receive a written debriefing with detailed 
information about the experiment and contact details for more information. You are also 
welcome to ask any further questions to the experimenter during and after the experiment. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me. I understand that I am free to 
withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my data to be destroyed if I wish.  
 
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.  
 
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far as 
possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been separately 
assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSSH regulations)   
 
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 
Name:        ……………………………………….……………………………….   
 
Signature:   .....................................……………..                    Date:   ................………….. 
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Debrief 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
In this study we wanted to investigate the relation between reasoning about syllogisms 
under a time limit and intelligence. You were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. 
In one condition participants had unlimited time. In the other condition participants had 
to reason under a 10 second time limit.  
 
Previous research has shown that when people are asked to reason about syllogisms with 
conclusions of varying believability, a belief by logic interaction occurs. This is known as 
belief bias (Evans, 2003). This suggests that when people are confronted with an 
unbelievable conclusion, they will be motivated to reason more and consequently give the 
correct response more often. A recent paper has contested this belief bias effect in terms 
of a motivated reasoning account (Dube, Rotello & Heit, 2010). They found that people will 
be more inclined to respond valid if the conclusion is believable, but that their reasoning 
performance is equal for believable and unbelievable conclusions. 
 
Previous research has shown that general intelligence as measured by the AH4 is related 
to the ability to follow instructions when reasoning about belief bias problems (Evans, 
Handley, Neilens, Bacon, & Over, 2010). In this experiment, we measured general 
intelligence because we suspected that showing belief bias might be positively related to 
general intelligence. We also wanted to investigate the effect of imposing a time limit on 
this potential relation between belief bias and intelligence. 
 
If you have any further questions, or if you want to withdraw you data, please feel free to 
contact us. 
 
Researcher:  Dries Trippas:   dries.trippas@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors:  Professor Simon Handley: shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
    
  Dr. Michael Verde:  michael.verde@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Experiment 9 
Instructions and Materials 
The instructions were identical to the forced choice instructions used in Experiments 1 – 4. 
The materials were identical to the ones used in Experiment 4. 
Brief 
On this sheet you will find all the information necessary for you to be able to give informed 
consent to take part in this experiment. Please read it carefully. You can ask the 
experimenter any questions you may have. 
 
The first task is a measure of general intelligence which involves solving a number of 
problems known as the AH4. There are two parts to the AH and completing both will take 
about 20 minutes in total. 
 
The second task is a reasoning task in which you will be presented with 64 reasoning 
problems. For every reasoning problem you will be asked to decide which of two 
reasoning problems is valid. Both tasks will be explained in more detail before the start of 
the experiment. The experiment in its entirety will take no more than 1 hour. 
 
Please remember that you have the right to stop your participation at any time. Also, your 
data will be kept confidential and the only connection between the two tasks is a 
participant code to make sure you remain anonymous. It follows that the data-analysis will 
also be completely anonymous. You have the right to withdraw your data after the 
experiment. If you care to do so, it will be removed from the analysis. 
 
If you understand all these of these things and if you agree to them please read and sign 
the informed consent form on the back of this page. 
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Debrief 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
In this study we wanted to investigate belief bias. Belief bias is the tendency for people to 
accept or refute arguments based on conclusion believability. There are two common 
ways of explaining belief bias. One explanation is that people simply accept believable 
conclusions more than unbelievable conclusions without actually reasoning differently 
about believable and unbelievable problems (Dube, Rotello & Heit, 2010). A more 
traditional explanation is that conclusion believability impacts and alters the actual 
reasoning process. For instance: if a conclusion is unbelievable reason better because they 
are more motivated to refute the argument (Evans, 2003). 
 
In this experiment we attempted to compare both accounts of belief bias by forcing you to 
choose between a valid and an invalid argument. Sometimes both conclusions were 
believable, sometimes they were both unbelievable, and sometimes one was believable 
and one was unbelievable. Prior research using this method has not produced findings in 
line with the traditional or the new account. We hypothesised that this lack of belief bias 
was because the side by side presentation of the arguments focussed the attention on the 
structure of the arguments, lowering the usefulness of believability as a cue. In this study 
we attempted to increase the usefulness of beliefs as a cue to drive reasoning by only ever 
showing one problem at a time, reducing the possibility for participants to make a decision 
on the basis of superficial structural problem characteristics. Finally, we also attempted to 
investigate whether this process is mediated in any way by cognitive ability. 
 
If you have any further questions, or if you want to withdraw you data, please feel free to 
contact us. 
 
Researcher:  Dries Trippas:   dries.trippas@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors:  Professor Simon Handley: shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
    
  Dr Michael Verde:  michael.verde@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Experiment 10 
Instructions and Materials 
The instructions were identical to the forced choice instructions used in Experiments 1 – 4. 
The materials were identical to the ones used in Experiment 4. 
Brief 
On this sheet you will find all the information necessary for you to be able to give informed 
consent to take part in this experiment. Please read it carefully. You can ask the 
experimenter any questions you may have. 
 
The first task is a forced choice reasoning task in which you will be presented with two 
reasoning problems side by side 64 times. For every trial you will be asked to choose 
which of both has a valid conclusion (see instructions for details). 
 
The second task consists of three simple reasoning problems which you will be asked to 
solve. 
 
Both tasks will be explained in more detail before the start of the experiment. The 
experiment in its entirety will take no more than 45 minutes. 
 
Please remember that you have the right to stop your participation at any time. Also, your 
data will be kept confidential and the only connection between the two tasks is a 
participant code to make sure you remain anonymous. It follows that the data-analysis will 
also be completely anonymous. You have the right to withdraw your data after the 
experiment. If you care to do so, it will be removed from the analysis. 
 
If you understand all these of these things and if you agree to them please read and sign 
the informed consent form on the back of this page. 
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UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE 
 
School of Psychology 
 
CONSENT TO PARICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Researcher:  
 
Dries Trippas 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Topic:  
 
Forced Choice and Simple Reasoning 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The aim of this research is to study the effect of cognitive ability on forced choice 
reasoning 
 
As a participant in this study you will first be asked solve a forced choice reasoning task. 
Next, you will be asked to solve three simple reasoning problems. All further instructions 
will be provided on an instruction sheet and on the screen.  
 
Upon finishing the experiment you will receive a written debrief with detailed information 
about the experiment and contact details for more information. You are also welcome to 
ask any further questions to the experimenter during and after the experiment. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me.   
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my 
data to be destroyed if I wish.  
 
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.  
 
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far 
as possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been  
separately assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSSH regulations) 
  
 
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 
 
Name:        ……………………………………….……………………………….   
 
Signature:   .....................................……………..                    Date:   ................………….. 
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Debrief 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
In this study we wanted to investigate belief bias. Belief bias is the tendency for people to 
accept or refute arguments based on conclusion believability. There are two common 
ways of explaining belief bias. One explanation is that people simply accept believable 
conclusions more than unbelievable conclusions without actually reasoning differently 
about believable and unbelievable problems (Dube, Rotello & Heit, 2010). A more 
traditional explanation is that conclusion believability impacts and alters the actual 
reasoning process. For instance: if a conclusion is unbelievable people’s reasoning is better 
because they are more motivated to refute it (Evans, 2003). 
 
In this experiment we attempted to compare both accounts of belief bias by forcing you to 
choose between a valid and an invalid argument. Sometimes both conclusions were 
believable, sometimes they were both unbelievable, and sometimes one was believable 
and one was unbelievable. Prior research using this method has not produced findings in 
line with the traditional or the new account. We hypothesised that this lack of belief bias 
was because the side by side presentation of the arguments focussed the attention on the 
structure of the arguments, lowering the usefulness of believability as a cue. In this study 
we attempted to increase the usefulness of beliefs as a cue to drive reasoning by only ever 
showing one problem at a time, reducing the possibility for participants to make a decision 
on the basis of superficial structural problem characteristics. Finally, we also attempted to 
investigate whether this process is mediated in any way by cognitive reflection, which is 
the tendency to resist a first intuitive response in favour of a more difficult analytic one. 
This was measured using the three simple reasoning problems presented after the 
reasoning study. 
 
If you have any further questions, or if you want to withdraw you data, please feel free to 
contact us. 
 
Researcher:  Dries Trippas:   dries.trippas@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors:  Professor Simon Handley: shandley@plymouth.ac.uk 
    
  Dr Michael Verde:   michael.verde@plymouth.ac.uk 
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Experiment 11 
Instructions 
The instructions were identical to those used in the self-paced condition of Experiment 5. 
Participants were instructed for the base rate, ratio bias, numeracy, wordsum, and CRT 
tasks using on screen instructions taken from Pennycook et al. (2012). 
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Materials 
The reasoning materials were identical to those used in all the previous experiments. 
The following measures were used to measure analytic cognitive style (ACS) and cognitive 
ability (CA). 
Analytic Cognitive Style measures 
Base rate conflict (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2012). 
Example item: In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the 
participants there were 5 engineers and 995 
lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen participant of 
this study. Jack is 36 years old. He is not married 
and is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend 
his free time reading science fiction and writing 
computer programs. What is most likely?  
a) Jack is a lawyer  
b) Jack is an engineer 
“Analytic” answer = Jack is a 
lawyer 
 
“Intuitive” answer = Jack is an 
engineer 
 
 
Cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). 
Example item: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs 
$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost? 
Correct answer = 5 
 
“Intuitive” answer = 10 
 
 
Ratio bias (Bonner & Newell, 2010) 
Example item: 
 
“Analytic” answer = Left 
 
“Intuitive” answer = Right 
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Cognitive ability measures 
Base rate neutral (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2012) 
Example item: In a study 1000 people were tested. Among 
the participants there were 997 pool players 
and 3 basketball players. Jason is a randomly 
chosen participant of this study. Jason is 29 
years old and has lived his whole life in New 
York. He has green coloured eyes and black 
hair. He drives a light-gray car. What is most 
likely?  
a) Jason is a pool player  
b) Jason is a basketball player 
“Analytic” answer = Jason is a 
pool player 
 
No intuitive answer 
 
Numeracy (Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997) 
Example item: In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of 
winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is your best 
guess about how many people would win a $10 
prize if 1000 people each buy a single ticket to 
BIG BUCKS? 
Correct answer = 10 
 
No intuitive answer 
 
WordSum (Huang & Hauser, 1998; Pennycook et al., 2012) 
Example item: Which word comes closest to the meaning of 
CAPRICE:  
a) value,  
b) a star,  
c) grimace,  
d) whim,  
e) inducement,  
f) don’t know 
Correct answer = whim 
 
No intuitive answer 
 
Brief and Debrief 
The brief and debrief were based on those used in Experiments 9 and 10, but adjusted for 
the fact that the experiment was run at the University of Waterloo, Canada, and that both 
cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style were tested. 
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Appendix B: ANOVA Tables 
Experiment 1 
The following analyses are presented in the order in which they are presented in the 
dissertation. 
Accuracy 
Motivated reasoning analysis 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 26.59 1 26.59 274.45 <.001 .94 
Error(Intercept) 1.84 19     
Problem Type 0.04 1 0.04 0.58 .46 .03 
Error(Problem Type) 1.24 19 0.07    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
Full analysis 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 38.46 1 38.46 351.00 <.001 .95 
Error(Intercept) 1.84 19     
Problem Type 0.06 2 0.03 0.71 .50 .04 
Error(Problem Type) 1.71 38     
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
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Confidence 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 255.23 1 255.23 839.96 <.001 .98 
Error(Intercept) 5.77 19 0.30    
Problem Type 0.94 2 0.47 11.35 <.001 0.37 
Error(Problem Type) 1.57 38 0.04    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
Latency 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 5905.36 1 5905.36 38153.21 <.001 1 
Error(Intercept) 2.94 19 0.16    
Problem Type 0.18 2 0.09 2.90 .068 .13 
Error(Problem Type) 1.21 38 0.03    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
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Experiment 2 
Accuracy 
Response bias analysis 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 36.63 1 36.63 295.65 <.001 .91 
Error(Intercept) 3.59 29 0.12    
Problem Type 0.001 1 0.001 0.02 .90 .001 
Error(Problem Type) 2.41 29 0.08    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
Motivated reasoning analysis 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 36.27 1 36.27 443.19 <.001 0.94 
Error(Intercept) 2.37 29 0.08    
Problem Type 0.002 1 0.002 0.04 .84 .001 
Error(Problem Type) 1.42 29 0.05    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
Confidence 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 487.28 1 487.28 1339.96 <.001 .98 
Error(Intercept) 10.55 29 0.36    
Problem Type 0.05 3 0.02 0.47 .70 .02 
Error(Problem Type) 2.75 87 0.03    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
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Latency 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 11190.82 1 11190.82 26559.336 <.001 .99 
Error(Intercept) 12.22 29 0.42    
Problem Type 0.08 3 0.03 1.37 .26 .05 
Error(Problem Type) 1.61 87 0.02    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
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Experiment 3 
Accuracy 
Response bias analysis 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 27.49 1 27.49 296.19 <.001 .94 
Error(Intercept) 1.86 20 0.09    
Problem Type 0.02 1 0.02 0.18 .68 .01 
Error(Problem Type) 1.76 20 0.09    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
Full analysis 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 42.61 1 42.61 336.56 <.001 .94 
Error(Intercept) 2.53 20 0.13    
Problem Type 0.04 2 0.02 0.32 .73 .02 
Error(Problem Type) 2.40 40 0.60    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
Confidence 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 291.16 1 291.16 1107.76 <.001 .98 
Error(Intercept) 5.26 20 0.26    
Problem Type 1.32 2 0.66 18.06 <.001 .48 
Error(Problem Type) 1.46 40 0.04    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
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Latency 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 5892.99 1 2982.99 37224.07 <.001 .99 
Error(Intercept) 3.22 20 0.16    
Problem Type 0.49 2 0.25 8.63 .001 .30 
Error(Problem Type) 1.14 40 0.03    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
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Experiment 4 
Accuracy 
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 86.42 1 86.42 742.30 <.001 .94 
Error(Intercept) 5.94 51 0.12    
Problem Type 0.05 1 0.05 0.49 .49 .01 
Error(Problem Type) 4.70 51 0.09    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 85.63 1 85.63 633.20 <.001 .93 
Error(Intercept) 6.90 51     
Problem Type 0.27 1 0.27 4.10 .048 .074 
Error(Problem Type) 3.37 51 0.07    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
Confidence 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 1000.52 1 1000.52 1377.63 <.001 .964 
Error(Intercept) 37.04 51 0.73    
Problem Type 0.37 3 0.12 3.33 .021 .061 
Error(Problem Type) 5.62 153 0.04    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
  
241 
 
Latency 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 20335.14 1 20335.14 31930.38 <.001 .99 
Error(Intercept) 32.48 51 0.64    
Problem Type 0.07 3 0.023 0.94 .43 .02 
Error(Problem Type) 3.79 153 0.035    
Note. Problem Type is a within subjects factor. 
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Experiment 5 
Endorsement 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 178.84 1 178.84 2114.22 <.001 .96 
Complexity 1.07 1 1.07 12.69 .001 .13 
Error(Intercept)  7.53 89 0.09    
Validity 51.09 1 51.09 398.66 <.001 .82 
Validity x Complexity 12.03 1 12.03 93.86 <.001 .51 
Error(Validity) 11.41 89 0.13    
Believability 1.07 1 1.07 10.08 .002 .10 
Believability x Complexity 0.12 1 0.12 1.17 .28 .01 
Error(Believability) 9.44 89 0.11    
Validity x Believability 0.19 1 0.19 5.47 .022 .058 
Validity x Believability x Complexity 0.34 1 0.34 9.82 .002 .099 
Error(Validity x Believability) 3.08 89 0.04    
Note. Complexity is a between-subjects factor. All other factors are manipulated within 
subjects. 
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SDT 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 164.82 1 164.82 2201.00 <.001 .96 
Complexity 7.24 1 7.24 96.68 <.001 .52 
Error(Intercept) 6.67 89 0.075    
Believability 0.10 1 0.10 6.90 .010 .072 
Believability x Complexity 0.083 1 0.083 5.51 .021 .058 
Error(Believability) 1.35 89 0.015    
Note. Complexity is a between-subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 4.16 1 4.16 26.76 <.001 .23 
Complexity 10.18 1 10.18 65.44 <.001 .42 
Error(Intercept) 13.84 89 0.16    
Believability 2.48 1 2.48 10.35 .002 .10 
Believability x Complexity .095 1 .095 0.40 .53 .004 
Error(Believability) 21.34 89 0.24    
Note. Complexity is a between-subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
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Latency 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 31080 1 31080 62837 <.001 .99 
Complexity 1.30 1 1.30 2.64 .11 .03 
Error(Intercept)  44.02 89 0.50    
Validity 0.03 1 0.03 1.94 .17 .02 
Validity x Complexity 0.43 1 0.43 25.48 <.001 .22 
Error(Validity) 1.50 89 0.02    
Believability 0.006 1 0.006 0.22 .64 .002 
Believability x Complexity 0.002 1 0.002 0.052 .82 .001 
Error(Believability) 2.59 89 0.029    
Validity x Believability 0.015 1 0.015 0.51 .48 .006 
Validity x Believability x Complexity 0.027 1 0.027 0.91 .34 .010 
Error(Validity x Believability)       
Note. Complexity is a between-subjects factor. All other factors are manipulated within 
subjects. 
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Experiment 6 
Endorsement 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 152.18 1 152.18 1575.03 <.001 .95 
Time Limit 0.23 1 0.23 2.35 .13 .027 
Error(Intercept)  8.12 84 0.097    
Validity 5.82 1 5.82 67.26 <.001 .46 
Validity x Time Limit 0.17 1 0.17 1.93 .17 .023 
Error(Validity) 7.26 84 0.086    
Believability 3.66 1 3.66 30.01 <.001 .26 
Believability x Time Limit 0.22 1 0.22 1.77 .19 0.21 
Error(Believability) 10.25 84 .12    
Validity x Believability 0.27 1 0.27 4.39 .039 .050 
Validity x Believability x Time Limit 0.048 1 0.048 0.78 .38 .009 
Error(Validity x Believability) 5.19 84 0.062    
Note. Time Limit is a between-subjects factor. All other factors are manipulated within 
subjects. 
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SDT 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 79.81 1 79.81 1295.69 <.001 .94 
Time Limit 0.08 1 0.08 1.31 .26 .015 
Error(Intercept) 5.17 84 0.062    
Believability 0.066 1 0.066 1.99 .16 .023 
Believability x Time Limit 0.016 1 0.016 0.48 .49 .006 
Error(Believability) 2.78 84 0.033    
Note. Time Limit is a between-subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 8.48 1 8.48 44.68 <.001 .35 
Time Limit 0.35 1 0.35 1.83 .18 0.21 
Error(Intercept) 15.94 84 0.19    
Believability 7.65 1 7.65 32.81 <.001 .28 
Believability x Time Limit 0.49 1 0.49 2.12 .15 .025 
Error(Believability) 19.58 84 0.23    
Note. Time Limit is a between-subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
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Latency 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 27935 1 27935 78693 <.001 .999 
Time Limit 15.28 1 15.28 43.04 <.001 .34 
Error(Intercept)  29.82 84 0.36    
Validity 0.49 1 0.49 28.02 <.001 .25 
Validity x Time Limit 0.16 1 0.16 9.09 .003 .10 
Error(Validity) 1.48 84 0.02    
Believability 0.009 1 0.009 0.36 .55 .004 
Believability x Time Limit 0.002 1 0.002 0.09 .77 .001 
Error(Believability) 2.20 84 0.026    
Validity x Believability 0.014 1 0.014 0.95 .33 .011 
Validity x Believability x Time Limit 0.02 1 0.022 1.55 .22 .018 
Error(Validity x Believability) 1.21 84 0.014    
Note. Time Limit is a between-subjects factor. All other factors are manipulated within 
subjects. 
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Experiment 7 
Endorsement 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 129.31 1 129.31 873.39 <.001 .93 
Instructions 0.091 1 0.091 0.62 .44 .01 
Error(Intercept)  9.48 64 0.15    
Validity 6.53 1 6.53 47.22 <.001 .43 
Validity x Instructions 0.25 1 0.25 1.81 .18 .028 
Error(Validity) 8.85 64 0.14    
Believability 4.87 1 4.87 24.58 <.001 .28 
Believability x Instructions 0.095 1 0.095 0.48 .49 .007 
Error(Believability) 12.69 64 0.20    
Validity x Believability 0.002 1 0.002 0.029 .87 <.001 
Validity x Believability x Instructions 0.005 1 0.005 0.093 .76 .001 
Error(Validity x Believability) 3.57 64 0.056    
Note. Instruction is a between-subjects factor. All other factors are manipulated within 
subjects. 
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SDT 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 69.28 1 69.28 926.46 <.001 .94 
Instructions 0.10 1 0.10 1.39 .24 0.021 
Error(Intercept) 4.79 64 0.075    
Believability 0.024 1 0.024 0.70 .41 0.011 
Believability x Instructions 0.001 1 0.001 0.20 .89 <.001 
Error(Believability) 2.20 64 0.034    
Note. Instruction is a between-subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 8.96 1 8.96 30.19 <.001 .32 
Instructions 0.20 1 0.20 0.66 .42 .01 
Error(Intercept) 19.00 64 0.30    
Believability 10.16 1 10.16 25.53 <.001 .29 
Believability x Instructions 0.12 1 0.12 0.311 .58 .005 
Error(Believability) 25.47 64 0.40    
Note. Instruction is a between-subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
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Latency 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 22415 1 22415 20977 <.001 .997 
Instructions 2.47 1 2.47 2.31 .13 .035 
Error(Intercept)  68.39 64 1.07    
Validity 0.54 1 0.54 25.022 <.001 .28 
Validity x Instructions 0.035 1 0.035 1.65 .20 .025 
Error(Validity) 1.38 64 0.022    
Believability 0.034 1 0.034 0.89 .35 .014 
Believability x Instructions .006 1 .006 0.17 .68 .003 
Error(Believability) 2.43 64 0.038    
Validity x Believability 0.001 1 0.001 0.068 .80 .001 
Validity x Believability x Instructions 0.005 1 0.005 0.219 .64 .003 
Error(Validity x Believability) 1.35 64 0.021    
Note. Instruction is a between-subjects factor. All other factors are manipulated within 
subjects. 
  
251 
 
Experiment 8 
Endorsement 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 144.83 1 144.83 880.15 <.001 .92 
Time Limit 0.77 1 0.77 4.68 .034 .055 
Cognitive Ability 0.09 1 0.09 0.55 .46 .007 
Time Limit x Cognitive Ability 0.51 1 0.51 3.07 .084 .036 
Error(Intercept) 13.33 81 0.17    
Validity 6.92 1 6.92 66.25 <.001 .45 
Validity x Time Limit 1.61 1 1.61 15.37 <.001 .16 
Validity x Cognitive Ability 0.36 1 0.36 3.46 .066 .041 
Validity x Limit x Ability 0.001 1 0.001 0.013 0.91 <.001 
Error(Validity) 8.46 81 0.104    
Believability 2.24 1 2.24 16.70 <.001 .17 
Believability x Time Limit 0.059 1 0.059 0.44 .51 .005 
Believability x Cognitive Ability 0.28 1 0.28 2.08 .15 .025 
Believability x Limit x Ability 0.09 1 0.09 0.64 .43 .008 
Error(Believability) 10.85 81 0.13    
Validity x Believability 0.05 1 0.05 0.87 .35 .011 
Validity x Believability x Time Limit .86 1 .86 14.92 <.001 .16 
Validity x Believability x Ability .016 1 .016 .28 .60 .003 
Validity x Believability x Limit x Ability 0.024 1 0.024 0.42 .52 .005 
Error(Validity x Believability) 4.70 81 .058    
Note. Time Limit and Cognitive Ability are between subjects factors. All other factors are 
manipulated within subjects. 
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SDT 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 78.02 1 78.02 1133.90 <.001 .93 
Time Limit 0.59 1 0.59 8.84 .005 .095 
Cognitive Ability 0.33 1 0.33 4.81 .031 .056 
Time Limit x Cognitive Ability .002 1 .002 .03 .87 < .001 
Error(Intercept) 5.57 81 0.07    
Believability 0.018 1 0.018 0.534 .47 .007 
Believability x Time Limit 0.28 1 0.28 8.35 .005 0.93 
Believability x Cognitive Ability 0.003 1 0.003 0.086 .77 .001 
Believability x Limit x Ability 0.109 1 0.109 3.223 .076 .038 
Error(Believability) 2.749 81 0.034    
Note. Time Limit and Cognitive Ability are between subjects factors. 
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Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 5.44 1 5.44 14.86 <.001 .16 
Time Limit 0.94 1 0.94 2.56 .11 .031 
Cognitive Ability 0.14 1 0.14 0.38 .54 .005 
Time Limit x Cognitive Ability 1.05 1 1.05 2.87 .094 .034 
Error(Intercept) 29.66 81 0.366    
Believability 5.26 1 5.26 19.00 <.001 .19 
Believability x Time Limit 0.017 1 0.017 0.063 .80 .001 
Believability x Cognitive Ability 0.69 1 0.69 2.50 .12 .03 
Believability x Limit x Ability 0.13 1 0.13 0.47 .49 .006 
Error(Believability) 22.42 81 0.28    
Note. Time Limit and Cognitive Ability are between subjects factors. 
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Latency 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 27322 1 27322 56631 <.001 .999 
Time Limit 22.98 1 22.98 47.62 <.001 .37 
Cognitive Ability 0.37 1 0.37 0.76 .39 .009 
Time Limit x Cognitive Ability 0.003 1 0.003 0.006 .94 <.001 
Error(Intercept) 39.08 81 .48    
Validity 0.62 1 0.62 16.31 <.001 .17 
Validity x Time Limit 0.16 1 0.16 8.41 .005 .094 
Validity x Cognitive Ability 0.006 1 0.006 0.32 .58 .004 
Validity x Limit x Ability 0.001 1 0.001 0.034 .85 <.001 
Error(Validity) 1.57 81 0.019    
Believability 0.008 1 0.008 0.342 .56 .004 
Believability x Time Limit 0.003 1 0.003 0.140 .71 .002 
Believability x Cognitive Ability 0.035 1 0.035 1.48 .23 .018 
Believability x Limit x Ability <.001 1 <.001 .003 .96 <.001 
Error(Believability) 1.927 81 0.024    
Validity x Believability .012 1 .012 0.65 .42 .008 
Validity x Believability x Time Limit 0.002 1 0.002 0.13 .72 .002 
Validity x Believability x Ability < .001 1 <.001 0.001 .97 <.001 
Validity x Believability x Limit x Ability 0.001 1 0.001 0.028 .87 <.001 
Error(Validity x Believability) 1.442 81 0.018    
Note. Time Limit and Cognitive Ability are between subjects factors. All other factors are 
manipulated within subjects. 
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Experiment 9 
Accuracy 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 145.89 1 145.89 1225.09 <.001 .93 
Cognitive Ability 1.79 1 1.79 15.02 <.001 .14 
Error(Intercept) 11.19 94 0.12    
Problem Type 0.05 1 0.05 1.07 .30 .011 
Problem Type x Cognitive Ability .415 1 .415 9.58 .003 .092 
Error(Believability) 4.075 94 0.043    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Problem Type is a within subjects 
factor. 
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 129.57 1 129.57 1488.59 <.001 .94 
Cognitive Ability 1.52 1 1.52 17.21 <.001 .16 
Error(Intercept) 8.29 94 0.09    
Problem Type 0.492 1 0.492 7.67 .007 .08 
Problem Type x Cognitive Ability 0.235 1 0.235 3.66 .059 .04 
Error(Believability) 6.03 94 .064    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Problem Type is a within subjects 
factor. 
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Confidence 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 820.29 1 820.29 1904.73 <.001 .95 
Cognitive Ability 1.477 1 1.47 3.41 .068 .035 
Error(Intercept) 40.48 94 0.43    
Problem Type 0.024 1 0.024 0.73 .40 .008 
Problem Type x Cognitive Ability 0.096 1 0.096 2.86 .094 .03 
Error(Believability) 3.152 94 0.034    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Problem Type is a within subjects 
factor. 
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 851.64 1 851.64 2074.43 <.001 .96 
Cognitive Ability 1.96 1 1.96 4.77 .031 .048 
Error(Intercept) 38.59 94 0.41    
Problem Type 0.013 1 0.013 0.49 .49 .005 
Problem Type x Cognitive Ability 0.048 1 0.048 1.83 .18 .019 
Error(Believability) 2.44 94 0.026    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Problem Type is a within subjects 
factor. 
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Latency 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 18589 1 18589 118185 <.001 .999 
Cognitive Ability 0.001 1 0.001 0.008 .93 <.001 
Error(Intercept) 14.79 94 0.16    
Problem Type 0.113 1 0.113 4.82 .031 .049 
Problem Type x Cognitive Ability 0.001 1 0.001 0.05 .82 .001 
Error(Believability) 2.20 94 0.023    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Problem Type is a within subjects 
factor. 
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 18326 1 18326 77287 <.001 .999 
Cognitive Ability 0.12 1 0.12 0.50 .48 .005 
Error(Intercept) 22.29 94 0.24    
Problem Type 0.009 1 0.009 0.363 .55 .004 
Problem Type x Cognitive Ability 0.049 1 0.049 1.74 .19 .018 
Error(Believability) 2.46 94 .026    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Problem Type is a within subjects 
factor. 
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Experiment 10 
Accuracy 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 85.50 1 58.50 636.19 <.001 .92 
Block Order 0.089 1 0.089 0.66 .42 .01 
Cognitive Style 0.37 1 0.37 2.75 .10 .045 
Block Order x Cognitive Style <.001 1 <.001 0.002 .96 <.001 
Error(Intercept) 7.80 58 .13    
Problem Type 0.088 1 0.088 2.62 .11 .043 
Problem Type x Block Order 0.064 1 0.064 1.90 .17 .032 
Problem Type x Cognitive Style 0.421 1 0.421 12.48 .001 .177 
Problem Type x Order x Style 0.003 1 0.003 0.094 .76 .002 
Error(Problem Type) 1.96 58 0.034    
Note. Block Order and Cognitive Style are between subjects factors. Problem Type is a 
within subjects factor. 
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Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 81.77 1 81.77 918.56 <.001 .94 
Block Order 0.514 1 0.514 5.77 .019 .091 
Cognitive Style 0.605 1 0.605 6.80 .012 .105 
Block Order x Cognitive Style 0.001 1 0.001 0.007 .93 <.001 
Error(Intercept) 5.16 58 0.089    
Problem Type 1.249 1 1.249 11.17 .001 .16 
Problem Type x Block Order 0.500 1 0.500 4.47 .039 .072 
Problem Type x Cognitive Style 0.528 1 0.528 4.73 .034 .075 
Problem Type x Order x Style 0.214 1 0.214 1.91 .17 .032 
Error(Problem Type) 6.49 58 0.112    
Note. Block Order and Cognitive Style are between subjects factors. Problem Type is a 
within subjects factor. 
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Confidence 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 453.49 1 453.49 1275.28 <.001 .96 
Block Order 1.768 1 1.768 4.97 .030 .079 
Cognitive Style 1.224 1 1.224 3.44 .069 .056 
Block Order x Cognitive Style 0.003 1 0.003 0.009 .93 <.001 
Error(Intercept) 20.63 58 0.356    
Problem Type 0.061 1 0.061 1.074 .30 .018 
Problem Type x Block Order 0.031 1 0.031 0.541 .47 .009 
Problem Type x Cognitive Style 0.189 1 0.189 3.31 .074 .054 
Problem Type x Order x Style 0.132 1 0.132 2.31 .13 .038 
Error(Problem Type) 3.31 58 0.057    
Note. Block Order and Cognitive Style are between subjects factors. Problem Type is a 
within subjects factor. 
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Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 488.18 1 448.18 1345.91 <.001 .96 
Block Order 0.562 1 0.562 1.55 .22 .026 
Cognitive Style 0.547 1 0.547 1.51 .22 .025 
Block Order x Cognitive Style 0.022 1 0.022 0.061 .81 .001 
Error(Intercept) 21.04 58 0.363    
Problem Type 0.125 1 0.125 4.25 .044 .068 
Problem Type x Block Order 0.008 1 0.008 0.281 .60 .005 
Problem Type x Cognitive Style 0.263 1 0.263 8.91 .004 .13 
Problem Type x Order x Style 0.092 1 0.092 3.12 .083 .051 
Error(Problem Type) 1.71 58 0.029    
Note. Block Order and Cognitive Style are between subjects factors. Problem Type is a 
within subjects factor. 
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Latency 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 11020 1 11020 37360 <.001 .998 
Block Order 4.265 1 4.265 14.46 <.001 .20 
Cognitive Style 0.050 1 0.050 0.17 .68 .003 
Block Order x Cognitive Style 0.024 1 0.024 0.082 .78 .001 
Error(Intercept) 17.11 58 0.295    
Problem Type 0.007 1 0.007 0.332 .57 .006 
Problem Type x Block Order 0.003 1 0.003 0.148 .70 .003 
Problem Type x Cognitive Style 0.034 1 0.034 1.72 .20 .029 
Problem Type x Order x Style 0.013 1 0.013 0.67 .42 .011 
Error(Problem Type) 1.138 58 0.20    
Note. Block Order and Cognitive Style are between subjects factors. Problem Type is a 
within subjects factor. 
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Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 10866 1 10866 45724 <.001 .999 
Block Order 1.968 1 1.968 8.281 .006 .125 
Cognitive Style 0.812 1 0.812 3.418 .070 .056 
Block Order x Cognitive Style 0.210 1 0.210 0.882 .352 .015 
Error(Intercept) 13.784 58 0.238    
Problem Type 0.049 1 0.049 1.935 .169 .032 
Problem Type x Block Order 0.006 1 0.006 0.229 .634 .004 
Problem Type x Cognitive Style 0.029 1 0.029 1.158 .286 .020 
Problem Type x Order x Style 0.004 1 0.004 0.150 .70 .003 
Error(Problem Type) 1.473 58 0.025    
Note. Block Order and Cognitive Style are between subjects factors. Problem Type is a 
within subjects factor. 
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Experiment 11 
Endorsement 
Cognitive ability 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 421.47 1 421.47 2665.87 <.001 .93 
Cognitive Ability 0.039 1 0.039 0.245 .621 .001 
Error(Intercept)  29.723 188 0.158    
Validity 26.972 1 26.972 201.080 <.001 .517 
Validity x Cognitive Ability 2.327 1 2.327 17.345 <.001 .084 
Error(Validity) 25.217 188 0.134    
Believability 24.705 1 24.705 106.144 <.001 .361 
Believability x Cognitive Ability 1.580 1 1.580 6.786 .010 .035 
Error(Believability) 43.758 188 0.233    
Validity x Believability 0.293 1 0.293 5.538 .020 .029 
Validity x Believability x Ability 0.495 1 0.495 9.367 .003 .047 
Error(Validity x Believability) 9.943 188 0.053    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Validity and Believability are within 
subjects factors. 
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Analytic cognitive style 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 420.55 1 420.55 2657.65 <.001 .934 
Cognitive Style 0.012 1 0.012 0.078 .78 <.001 
Error(Intercept)  29.749 188 0.158    
Validity 26.008 1 26.008 196.78 <.001 .511 
Validity x Cognitive Style 2.696 1 2.696 20.40 <.001 .098 
Error(Validity) 24.848 188 0.132    
Believability 25.854 1 25.854 121.34 <.001 .392 
Believability x Cognitive Style 5.295 1 5.295 24.86 <.001 .117 
Error(Believability) 40.042 188 0.213    
Validity x Believability 0.243 1 0.243 4.45 .031 .025 
Validity x Believability x Style 0.808 1 0.808 15.78 <.001 .077 
Error(Validity x Believability) 9.630 188 0.051    
Note. Cognitive Style is a between subjects factor. Validity and Believability are within 
subjects factors. 
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SDT 
Cognitive ability 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 220.37 1 220.37 2268.74 <.001 .923 
Cognitive Ability 2.572 1 2.572 26.476 <.001 .123 
Error(Intercept) 18.261 188 0.097    
Believability 0.143 1 0.143 4.494 .035 .023 
Believability x Cognitive Ability 0.284 1 0.284 8.909 .003 .045 
Error(Believability) 5.985 188 0.032    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor.
  
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 38.00 1 38.00 121.92 <.001 .393 
Cognitive Ability 0.008 1 0.008 0.026 .872 <.001 
Error(Intercept) 58.605 188 0.312    
Believability 50.493 1 50.493 108.227 <.001 .365 
Believability x Cognitive Ability 2.449 1 2.449 5.249 .023 .027 
Error(Believability) 87.710 188 0.467    
Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
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Analytic cognitive style 
Motivated reasoning 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 217.177 1 217.177 2257.70 <.001 .923 
Cognitive Style 2.748 1 2.748 28.566 <.001 .132 
Error(Intercept) 18.084 188 0.096    
Believability 0.117 1 0.117 3.785 .053 .020 
Believability x Cognitive Style 0.464 1 0.464 15.020 <.001 .074 
Error(Believability) 5.805 188 0.031    
Note. Cognitive Style is a between subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
Response bias 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 37.885 1 37.885 121.515 <.001 .393 
Cognitive Style 0.001 1 0.001 0.002 .97  
Error(Intercept) 58.613 188 0.312    
Believability 52.657 1 52.657 122.434 <.001 .394 
Believability x Cognitive Style 9.304 1 9.304 21.632 <.001 .103 
Error(Believability) 80.856 188 0.430    
Note. Cognitive Style is a between subjects factor. Believability is a within subjects factor. 
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Latency 
Cognitive ability 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 67979 1 67979 57829 <.001 .997 
Cognitive Ability 9.545 1 9.545 8.120 .005 .041 
Error(Intercept)  220.998 188 1.176    
Validity 5.315 1 5.315 104.301 <.001 .357 
Validity x Cognitive Ability 0.338 1 0.338 6.641 .011 .034 
Error(Validity) 9.579 188 0.051    
Believability 0.042 1 0.042 1.037 .310 .005 
Believability x Cognitive Ability 0.100 1 0.100 2.474 .117 .013 
Error(Believability) 7.600 188 0.040    
Validity x Believability 0.027 1 0.027 0.631 .428 .003 
Validity x Believability x Ability 0.017 1 0.017 0.400 .528 .002 
Error(Validity x Believability) 7.927 188 0.042    
Note. Cognitive Ability is a between subjects factor. Validity and Believability are within 
subjects factors. 
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Analytic cognitive style 
Effect SS df MSE F p ηp2 
Intercept 67672 1 67672 60152 <.001 .997 
Cognitive Style 19.041 1 19.041 16.925 <.001 .083 
Error(Intercept)  211.502 188     
Validity 5.131 1 5.131 102.369 <.001 .353 
Validity x Cognitive Style 0.495 1 0.495 9.884 .002 .050 
Error(Validity) 9.422 188     
Believability 0.036 1 0.036 0.891 .346 .005 
Believability x Cognitive Style 0.075 1 0.075 1.837 .177 .010 
Error(Believability) 7.625 188 0.041    
Validity x Believability 0.025 1 0.025 0.595 .441 .003 
Validity x Believability x Style 0.007 1 0.007 0.162 .687 .001 
Error(Validity x Believability) 7.937 188 0.042    
Note. Cognitive Style is a between subjects factor. Validity and Believability are within 
subjects factors. 
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Mediation 
Motivated reasoning 
Analytic Cognitive Style (ACS) -> Cognitive Ability (CA) -> Motivated Reasoning Index (MRI) 
Model 1: MRI ~ Intercept + ACS 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept -0.151 0.062 -2.432 .016 
ACS 0.299 0.092 3.256 .002 
Note. R2 = .056; F(1, 178) = 10.6 
Model 2: MRI ~ Intercept + ACS + CA 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept -0.164 0.091 -1.814 .07 
ACS 0.286 0.112 2.563 .011 
CA 0.030 0.147 0.206 .84 
Note. R2 = .056; F(2, 177) = 5.294. 
Model 3: CA ~ Intercept + ACS 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept 0.446 0.032 14.156 <.001 
CA 0.429 0.047 9.137 <.001 
Note. R2 = .319, F(1, 178) = 83.48 
Mediation: Indirect effect = 0.013; SE = 0.063; Z = 0.206; N = 180 
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Cognitive Ability (CA) -> Analytic Cognitive Style (ACS) -> Motivated Reasoning Index (MRI) 
Model 1: MRI ~ Intercept + CA 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept -0.134 0.091 -1.469 .15 
CA 0.244 0.123 1.974 .0499 
Note. R2 = .021; F(1, 178) = 3.898. 
Model 2: MRI ~ Intercept + CA + ACS 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept -0.164 0.091 -1.814 .07 
CA 0.030 0.147 0.206 .84 
ACS 0.286 0.112 2.563 .011 
Note. R2 = .056; F(2, 177) = 5.294. 
Model 3: ACS ~ Intercept + CA 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept 0.106 0.060 1.758 .08 
ACS 0.745 0.081 9.137 <.001 
Note. R2 = .319, F(1, 178) = 83.48 
Mediation: Indirect effect = 0.213; SE = 0.086; Z = 2.468; N = 180 
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Response bias 
Analytic Cognitive Style (ACS) -> Cognitive Ability (CA) -> Response Bias Index (RBI) 
Model 1: RBI ~ Intercept + ACS 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept 1.676 0.218 7.707 <.001 
ACS -1.557 0.323 -4.822 <.001 
Note. R2 = .116; F(1, 178) = 23.25 
Model 2: RBI ~ Intercept + ACS + CA 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept 2.053 0.316 6.507 <.001 
ACS -1.195 0.389 -3.070 .003 
CA -0.843 0.513 -1.643 .102 
Note. R2 = .129; F(2, 177) = 13.09. 
Model 3: CA ~ Intercept + ACS 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept 0.446 0.032 14.156 <.001 
CA 0.429 0.047 9.137 <.001 
Note. R2 = .319, F(1, 178) = 83.48 
Mediation: Indirect effect = -0.361; SE = 0.224; Z = -1.62; N = 180 
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Cognitive Ability (CA) -> Analytic Cognitive Style (ACS) -> Response Bias Index (RBI) 
Model 1: RBI ~ Intercept + CA 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept 1.676 0.218 7.707 <.001 
CA -1.557 0.323 -4.822 <.001 
Note. R2 = .116; F(1, 178) = 23.25 
Model 2: RBI ~ Intercept + CA + ACS 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept 2.053 0.316 6.507 <.001 
CA -0.843 0.513 -1.643 .102 
ACS -1.195 0.389 -3.070 .003 
Note. R2 = .129; F(2, 177) = 13.09. 
Model 3: ACS ~ Intercept + CA 
Effect Coefficient Standard Error t p 
Intercept 0.106 0.060 1.758 .08 
ACS 0.745 0.081 9.137 <.001 
Note. R2 = .319, F(1, 178) = 83.48 
Mediation: Indirect effect = -0.890; SE = 0.306; Z = -2.91; N = 180 
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Path Analysis 
Full model (see Figure 4.6): χ2 (1) = 0.629, p = .428 
Regression weights:  
Effect Estimate SE Z p 
RT ~ ACS 0.875 0.235 3.723 <.001 
RT ~ CA 0.334 0.307 1.088 0.276 
MRI ~ ACS 0.243 0.117 2.082 0.037 
MRI ~ CA 0.013 0.147 0.088 0.93 
RBI ~ ACS -0.767 0.396 -1.94 0.052 
RBI ~ CA -0.664 0.498 -1.333 0.183 
MRI ~ RT 0.075 0.036 2.072 0.038 
RBI ~ RT -0.514 0.123 -4.185 <.001 
Az ~ MRI 0.005 0.057 0.09 0.928 
Az ~ RBI -0.06 0.017 -3.554 <.001 
Az ~ CA 0.307 0.111 2.772 0.006 
Az ~ ACS 0.13 0.089 1.451 0.147 
Az ~ RT 0.143 0.029 4.98 <.001 
Note. RT = response time, ACS = cognitive style, CA = cognitive ability, MRI = motivated 
reasoning index, RBI = response bias index, Az = reasoning accuracy 
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Reduced model (see Figure 4.7): χ2 (6) = 5.66, p = .45. 
Regression weights:  
Effect Estimate SE Z p 
RT ~ ACS 1.015 0.197 5.145 <.001 
RBI ~ ACS -1.033 0.344 -3.005 0.003 
RBI ~ RT -0.527 0.123 -4.287 <.001 
MRI ~ ACS 0.249 0.101 2.461 0.014 
Az ~ RBI -0.063 0.016 -3.841 <.001 
Az ~ CA 0.385 0.095 4.063 <.001 
MRI ~ RT 0.075 0.036 2.086 0.037 
Az ~ RT 0.153 0.028 5.482 <.001 
Note. RT = response time, ACS = cognitive style, CA = cognitive ability, MRI = motivated 
reasoning index, RBI = response bias index, Az = reasoning accuracy
 
